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This dissertation considers the notion of “mysticality” in the works of Cubans 
 
Fina García Marruz and Cintio Vitier, Brazilian Clarice Lispector, and Argentine Jacobo 
 
Fijman, (the latter two both born Jewish in Russian-controlled territory). The present 
 
research engages with mystical, gender, and poetic studies in Latin American literature; 
 
broadly, I look at the way religion is incorporated into Latin American post-modern 
 
poetics. I analyze how Latin American writers use mystical language to address high- 
 
stakes secular issues, such as political revolution, feminism, and cultural identity. I  
 
also discuss female writers whose poetic product is an exploration of a feminine Latin 
 
American lineage. Following the work of Spanish philosopher, María Zambrano, I 
 
develop her theory of poiesis, showing how these Latin American poets conflate the 
 
Divine and the quotidian in order to “divinize” aspects of everyday life. I contend that 
 
this poetic strategy of rhetorical divinization reveals both the profane and transcendent 
 
nature of their poetics. 
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WHY LATIN AMERICA?: TWENTIETH CENTURY LATIN AMERICA AS AN ENTRY POINT FOR 
MYSTICALITY 
The mid-twentieth century in Latin America experienced widespread 
political unrest, revolution, and explosive literary production. In this dissertation 
project I focus on authors from three countries in the Latin American literary 
milieu—Cuba, Argentina, and Brazil—to look at writers that develop complex, 
mystical reflections about dramatic, secular events during the time leading up to 
and after WWII. During this time, Cuba faces its revolution and subsequent 
dictatorship; Argentina experiences coups d’état, the Infamous Decade and 
Peronism; and Brazil witnesses the unfolding of decades-long control by the military 
junta led by Getúlio Vargas.  At the moments leading up to and including this crucial 
mid-century crux, these authors produce what I will call mysticalist texts. In my 
work I explore and problematize how the anticipation of these political and literary 
environments galvanize such provocative and phenomenological poetic works. I 
posit that these authors’ aesthetic and theoretical approaches interrogate their 
political/literary climates, such that their writing inhabits earthly experience (the 
profane) more fully instead of fleeing from it. Rather than label any author or text as 
mystic(al), I suggest a re-examination of how mysticism is expressed in mid-
twentieth century Latin American literature.  
I therefore argue the presence of, what for here on out I will call 
“mysticality,” in the works of Cubans Fina García Marruz and Cintio Vitier, Brazilian 
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Clarice Lispector, and Argentine Jacobo Fijman, (the latter two both born Jewish in 
Russian-controlled territory). The present research engages with mystical, gender, 
and poetic studies in Latin American literature; broadly speaking, I look at the way 
religion is incorporated into Latin American post-modern poetics. I analyze how 
Latin American writers use mystical language to address high-stakes secular issues, 
such as political revolution, feminism, and cultural identity. I will also discuss female 
writers whose poetic product is an exploration of a feminine Latin American lineage. 
Following the work of Spanish philosopher, María Zambrano, I develop her theory of 
poiesis, showing how these Latin American poets conflate the Divine and the 
quotidian in order to “divinize” aspects of everyday life. I contend that this poetic 
strategy of rhetorical divinization reveals both the profane and transcendent nature 
of their poetics. 
MYSTICALITY DEFINED 
I develop a new term, mysticality,—a rhetorical strategy used by my authors-
in-question—which precisely addresses their use of mystical language for outcomes 
that are definitively secular. In short, mysticality is the use of mystical language to 
speak about secular ideas. By expanding the semantic value of mysticism to include 
mysticality, I encompass more inclusive, pragmatic notions of religious rhetoric. A 
broader spectrum for expression, whereby mystical writing appears on a 
continuum, is established, thus allowing for a more malleable definition of what I 
consider to be mystical rhetoric in poetry. Furthermore, I demonstrate that 
mysticality is a new iteration on this spectrum, espousing novel characteristics that 
move the focus to the positives of life on earth, rather than the staunchly mystical 
“life-as-obstacle-to-death/God” approach so favored by Golden Age European 
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mystics. Mysticality, thus, expresses the following characteristics: 
1) Rhetorical structures and lexica reflecting mystical thought and language; 
2) Symbolic communion with an “other”, not God; 
3) Divinization of quotidian items; 
4) Favoring a mystical approach to writing; and 
5) A methodology for describing the authors’ environment. 
I consider two Catholic Cuban authors (Fina García Marruz and Cintio Vitier) 
as well as two Jewish authors (Clarice Lispector and Jacobo Fijman) as writers 
whose religious commitment and experience filtered through to their secular poetic 
and literary works.  
By expanding the semantic value of mysticism to include the broader term of 
mysticality, I explore its location on a modern and postmodern spectrum, lying 
somewhere between religion (as defined in more orthodox terms such as “organized 
religion”) and religiosity (a mode of fidelity that can also apply to secular practices 
such as “high patriotism” or “sustained party loyalty”).1 I argue that in their works 
my authors use mystical language, without necessarily mystical ends, to achieve 
humanist poetic expression. For this reason, I do not believe the notion of neo-
mysticism to be sufficient. Neo-mysticism suggests that their writing is merely a 
new or contemporary version of traditional mysticism. As such, neo-mysticism 
would necessarily characterize my authors as mystics, writing in either the strictly 
                                                        
1 Here I highlight that mystical language has been used before to discuss secular ideas. William James 
describes in Varieties of Religious Experience that often writers endure mystical experiences that are 
not necessarily religious, e.g. in contemplation of and/or communion with nature. Religious language 
has been used for secular meaning in writing before, all over the world. However, my particular 
contentions are that mystical language is employed in Latin America at specific moments in time that 
reflect imminent or contemporary political change. For this reason, my dissertation contributes an 
additive voice to the field of religious and Latin American studies in my suggestion of mysticality as a 
reason to explain the advent of the texts analyzed. 
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Jewish or Christian mystical traditions; the only difference would be that their 
environment is contemporized. I contend, however, that my authors use this new 
mysticalist strategy to write mystically without needing to be mystics.2 I assert that 
the authors often profess themselves to forms of "secular religiosity" instead of 
ritualized religion to avoid becoming resolutely pious writers.  
METHODOLOGY 
The primary methodological approach in this dissertation is close reading. I 
examine particular instances in poems (in one case, a novel) where I believe 
mysticality is most present. During the close readings I analyze rhetorical devices to 
support my argument such as apostrophe, anaphora, epistrophe, and anacoluthon, 
among others. I make certain to consider the potentially Catholic or Jewish aspects 
of the text, when applicable. From a more macro level, in order to situate the 
meaning of mysticality in the texts, I also present socio-political-historical 
information related to the time during which the texts were composed. It is my aim 
to showcase the importance of the authors’ environment and how it may have 
affected his/her poetics.  I ground my arguments in the scholarship of religious 
studies and Latin American poetry experts. Therefore, for this pursuit, I turn to the 
hermeneutics of religious as well as poetic theoretical frameworks (Michel de 
Certeau, Gershom Scholem, William James, and María Zambrano) in addition to 
considering feminist discourse (Simone de Beauvoir, Amy Hollywood, Luce Irigaray 
and Hélène Cixous) as three of the five authors are women “writing” women. As a 
result, my dissertation research contributes to the fields of poetry studies, 
                                                        
2 Only one of my authors, Jacobo Fijman, claimed to be a mystic, although his definitions of any 
category (Jewish, Catholic, mystic) defy any and all norms. 
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philosophy of poetics, religious studies, and feminist studies as well as literary and 
cultural Latin American studies. 
Scholars such as Luce López Baralt, Amy Hollywood, and Carolyn Walker 
Bynum have made excellent case studies to describe the mystical influences on 
contemporary poets in post-WWII Spain and Latin America. In my work I propose 
that, instead of just re-applying the archetypical values of traditional mysticism to 
modern poetry, we should redefine the trope of mysticism today altogether as 
“mysticality” to help us mark how the nature of mystical writing has changed in 
modern and postmodern times. By extending the definitions and the labels of 
mysticism to examine the added aspect of profane politics in mysticalist, I account 
for how mysticism is redefined in the Latin American context and to what degree 
this impacts: 1) social-political output and religious identity in putatively atheistic 
processes such as the Cuban Revolution (in the cases of García Marruz and Vitier), 
2) mystical conversions of faith in the Cold War/Latin American context (Vitier 
converting from Protestantism to Catholicism and Fijman “from” Judaism to 
Catholicism), and 3) the prominence of the female gaze in the mid-century lyrical-
mystic prose writing (Lispector).3  
As is the nature of dissertation work, I acknowledge that my research does 
not present a comprehensive survey of all Latin American authors whose work 
might represent mysticality. As I have discussed, I examine the aforementioned 
poets and their work in light of political turmoil, feminism, and identity-forging. As 
such a broad scope would be impossible to include in this dissertation study, I do 
expect to include authors like Puerto Rican Francisco Matos Paoli (1915-2000), 
                                                        
3To say that Fijman’s conversion is typical would be problematic. His version of Catholicism was 
anything  but orthodox; discussions of his unique conversion are discussed in Chapter Three. 
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Argentine Alejandra Pizarnik (1936-1972), and Uruguayan Delmira Agustini (1886-
1914) in future iterations of this work, either in book form or in comparative 
fashion for journal publications. However, the authors I chose I do believe represent 
this larger trend of mysticality that I note throughout the dissertation. Firstly, the 
choice of Caribbean, Southern Cone, and Brazilian authors was strategic and 
purposeful—I hope that the following analysis showcases mysticality’s presence in 
each of these unique places. The countries represented are located at disparate 
extremes of Latin American—the northern most representation is Cuba, the 
southern most, Argentina, to underscore mysticality’s significance in a variety of 
places within Spanish-speaking Latin America. I include Brazil, consequently, to 
highlight mysticality’s incidence across boundaries of language in Latin America. 
And lastly, the authors-in-question are all writing during a time that either 
anticipates or reflects political change. Every text I chose best represents this 
apprehension: Fina García Marruz’s Las miradas perdidas (1944-1950) is composed 
during the height of her literary group’s emergence in Cuba; Cintio Vitier’s 
Experiencia de la poesía (1944), Extrañeza de estar (1945), Vísperas (1953) and 
Testimonios (1953-1969) are likewise written during the pre-revolutionary period; 
and Clarice Lispector’s A paixão segundo G.H.: romance (1964) reflects the 
implications of the prior Vargas era and the novelist’s own expression of her 
Brazilian identity. Jacobo Fijman’s works appear a bit before the others: Molino Rojo 
(1926), Hecho de estampas (1930), and Estrella de la mañana (1931). These poetry 
collections certainly mirror Fijman’s own apprehension regarding identity and 
belonging, coming out fifteen to twenty years before the advent of Peronism. 
However, I place importance on the way in which Fijman himself wrestled with 
understanding his place as an outsider in Argentina, as his country faced the 
 7 
 
aftermath of WWI, economic achievement, and surge in the presence of literary 
circles in the nation’s capitol. Perhaps Fijman’s writing addresses the very 
uncertainties that were to come for his adopted homeland. For the reasons stated, I 
believe my argument for mysticality is strengthened in using authors and texts from 
varied Latin American settings. 
RELIGION AND SECULARISM  
 History shows that religion and politics have always been intimately tied, 
whether by symbiotic or dissonant connections. Because I focus specifically on Latin 
America, this dissertation aims to demonstrate the ways in which writers in Cuba, 
Argentina, and Brazil reconcile the political and social events of their surroundings, 
expressing themselves through poetic, mystically-charged language. In order to 
explore the link between writers and their mystical rhetoric, I turn to some broad 
notions of religion and secularism by discussing the re-establishment of U.S.-Cuba 
relations. 
In December 2014 U.S. President Barack Obama announced that the U.S. 
would start working to restore political and economic relationships with its former 
Cold War foe, beginning with reducing travel restrictions between the countries. It 
was not until about eight months later when Secretary of State John Kerry visited 
Havana for the re-opening of the U.S. Embassy (formerly the U.S. Interests-Section, 
staffed by U.S. diplomats officially part of the Swiss mission in Havana) in Cuba. The 
embassy was closed in 1961 when the Eisenhower administration severed 
diplomatic ties with the newly-installed communist government of Fidel Castro, 
only thirty-four years old at the time. Kerry’s stay, fewer than twelve hours in 
duration, was intended to be the most potent turn in events symbolizing a shift in 
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relations that would (will) eventually engender a productive diplomatic 
engagement. Many media publications spent time covering the hard work put in by 
both U.S. and Cuban employees at the embassy, the hopefulness felt by those 
affected, as well as the exclusion of many dissidents.  
Appearing to a lesser degree in news outlets was the poetic oration given by 
Cuban-American poet Richard Blanco, son of Cuban exiles who came to the U.S. from 
Spain in 1968. Blanco, President Obama’s inaugural poet in 2013, recited his poem 
“Cosas del Mar” or “Matters of the Sea,” which Blanco himself described as “…the 
easiest poem and the hardest poem to write. In some ways all of my body of work 
has circled around this idea of cultural identity and negotiation of this sense of 
home” (www.voanews.com). According to Blanco, the purpose of the poem is to 
“spur Cubans to reunite emotionally after years of separation due to politics, travel 
restrictions and an economic embargo,” gesturing to the great cleavage between 
Cuban-Americans who support negotiations with the Castro government and those 
who decidedly do not (www.voanews.com).  There is no doubt that President 
Obama selected Blanco strategically, back in 2013 as well as 2015; a writer is often a 
symbol of cultural significance and national sentiment, especially in circumstances 
of inaugurations and reconciliatory celebrations. Importantly, however, the writer 
Obama selected is a poet, writing a poem explicitly for the embassy-opening event. I 
believe the choice of a poet and his poem is highly suggestive; poetry can transcend. 
It can be understood and adopted by the reader or listener in a way that is different 
from prose—it is transient and emotive. Blanco himself stated, "[h]ere I am, this 
bridge between the American side and the Cuban side. My hope was somehow that 
my word would continue to strengthen that bridge, to strengthen a conversation” 
(www.voanews.com). Blanco’s Cuban-American heritage is one evident bridge, but 
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his poetry is the second, more subtle example. His “word” has the capacity to 
connect people and traverse space to ultimately create and substantiate 
conversations. Poetry, in short, is a powerfully transcendent force.  
Let's consider the events that unfolded after the official embassy ceremony. 
Within weeks, Pope Francis announces a visit to Cuba, officially an agnostic state.  
The title of an Associated Press article appearing in the Los Angeles Times dated 
September 19, 2015 reads, “Pope Francis hails U.S.-Cuba relations as model of 
reconciliation” (www.latimes.com). The general gist of the article, heralded by the 
title, suggests that the Pope was more than just a bystander observing the re-
establishment of relations and that the U.S. and Cuban governments are to be 
considered the “model” and leaders of such developments. Pope Francis himself, 
however, was an integral, arguably, the most significant marshal of U.S-Cuba talks. 
Francis himself called directly for progress toward normalization, despite the 
Vatican’s press releases weeks before indicating the Pope would not address politics 
in such an explicit manner (www.latimes.com). What was also revealed, in a short, 
one-sentence paragraph, was the following: “Francis served as mediator and 
guarantor of 18 months of secret negotiations that led to the resumption of 
diplomatic relations between the two countries this year” (www.latimes.com).  The 
elected head of the Catholic faith and one of the most renowned religious leaders 
worldwide turned out to be the clandestine, effective negotiator between two 
secular governments. Francis diplomatically, yet steadfastly explained as much on 
the tarmac of the José Martí International Airport: 
 
For some months now, we have witnessed an event which fills 
us with hope: the process of normalizing relations between 
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two peoples following years of estrangement…I urge political 
leaders to persevere on this path and to develop all its 
potentialities as a proof of the high service which they are 
called to carry out on behalf of the peace and well-being of 
their peoples, of all America, and as an example of 
reconciliation for the entire world. (www.latimes.com) 
 
My purpose in including these events with the Pope as orchestrator between 
the U.S. and Cuba is to underscore the importance that religion has on secular 
movements in our contemporary world. It is impossible to suggest the two are ever 
fully divorced from one another, especially as we confront the challenges and 
terrorist activities presented by ISIS and Boko Harem, among other groups. The 
Pope was very cautious, I believe, in choosing his words when he addressed the 
public in Havana, making no insistence that Cuba permit religious (nevermind 
Catholic) institutions, though presumably one would argue these are his desires. He 
declared that his trip was to help the church “support and encourage the Cuban 
people in its hopes and concerns” (www.latimes.com).  
Now if I consider the Pope’s hopes for Cuba together with Blanco’s poem, I do 
it to reflect on the particular importance of this “reconciliatory bridge.” By re-
establishing relations, the physical divide that is overcome is the sea separating the 
two nations. Poetry—and specifically for my analysis, mysticality in poetry—can 
help bridge this oceanic space between the U.S. and Cuba. In a strange twist, religion 
has been used as a mediator between two sides of an ideological problematic that 
was strictly economic and political in nature. Blanco’s poem is not mystical or 
mysticalist, but it does speak to cultural landscaping and identity-forging—I include 
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his work to highlight poetry’s strength in acting as this “bridge.” What follows in the 
dissertation is an exploration of a poetic writing that goes in this “bridge-like” 
direction. It also speaks for secularism (the people, politics, and immense historical 
moment Blanco addresses) but it also relies to the unverifiable religious or faith 
"call" that set this historic change in motion in the first place.   
WHY MYSTICISM? 
In this section I will address the primary question of mysticism as the central 
crux of my dissertation, and why I argue mysticality best describes my authors’ 
work. First, I will discuss mysticism in terms of the way scholars perceive medieval 
mystical experiences. I have presented the notion that poetry itself is a transcendent 
force—as such, poetry that is imbued with mystical rhetoric carries with it a special 
charge. I argue that each author examined in this dissertation writes with some 
degree of mystical language precisely because mysticism offers an additional way to 
speak outside the text. Each author searches for some apostrophic value: the reader, 
a nation, a god, a cause. Mysticism necessarily implies a separation from one’s body 
and unity with God; that is, there is an “other” desired and acquired (James 67). In 
the texts I examine, this other becomes the rhetorical apostrophe, again resulting in 
the reader, a national discourse, a god, or a cause that the author/meditator seeks. I 
therefore argue that a “mysticalist” (relating to mysticality) tendency evinces the 
rhetorical techniques used by each author-in-question. 
To develop this author-as-meditator idea, I turn to Barbara Newman in her 
study in medieval visionary culture. She discusses monastics’ development of a wide 
range of meditational techniques aimed at mystical encounter, among them 
speculatio. She explains: 
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…the meditator’s gaze was directed toward some specific 
visual focus, whether this object was a part of the natural 
world, an illuminated book, a crucifix, a consecrated host, or an 
internal image constructed by the mind. This deliberate 
training of the gaze was sometimes explicitly theorized as 
conducive to visionary experience. Programmatic accounts of 
the stages of contemplation often begin with speculatio, the 
attentive and reflective study of a visual object, and end with 
ecstasy.   (Newman, What did it mean 15)   
 
Newman identifies a number of objects with which the meditator engages: a 
book, a host, even an image created in the mind of the seeker. All my authors-in-
question participate in the exercise of speculatio—they engage “attentively” and 
“reflectively” in the study of some object, in the end achieving and connecting with 
something textually extra-diegetic. For Fina García Marruz, her Catholicism breeds a 
consecrated host in her poetry becoming the Catholic object-of-desire of the 
Orígenes movement in Cuba; for Cintio Vitier, his conversion and nationalistic 
discourse are the object of his visual focus; for Jacobo Fijman his self-proclaimed 
religiosity inspires godly union in his poetry; and for Clarice Lispector her 
protagonist’s penetrating self-reflection engenders a re-born image of the self. In 
every text, the poetic voice or protagonist is written with an imbued desire to locate 
something outside of him/herself. There is a constant struggle to reconcile the limits 
of words, muddying the boundary between inner and outer experience.4 Religious 
                                                        
4 The idea of the limits of words will recur throughout this dissertation; I will examine the way each 
author conceptualizes and combats the limits of words in his/her writing. 
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Studies scholar Robert Orsi argues for not just the study of religious practices but 
how people imbue these practices with meaning to understand “the totality of their 
ultimate values, their most deeply held ethical convictions, their efforts to order 
their reality, their cosmology” (Orsi, The Madonna of 155th Street xvii). His study is a 
cultural anthropological one, but I will still borrow this notion of the way people (in 
my case writers) render their cosmologies as a reality in their poetry/lyrical prose. 
Finally, in Ann Taves’s book Religious Experience Reconsidered (2009), she discusses 
“what Robert Orsi calls ‘the otiose boundary between ‘inner’ experience and ‘outer’ 
environment that so bedevils religious studies” (Furey 21, citing Taves). Ultimately, 
this vexing difference between “inner” and “outer” will always be debated in 
religious studies; this dissertation merely aims to add another perspective to this 
conversation.   
To couch my argument for mysticality from another perspective, I briefly will 
discuss mysticism in Freud’s psychoanalytic terms. Julia Kristeva presents Freud’s 
views on how the psyche conceptualizes mysticism as the: 
vague self-perception of the realm, beyond the ego, of the 
id…The path of mystical belief plunges the ego into the id by 
means of a sort of sensual autoeroticism that confers a kind of 
omnipotence on the id: revelation and absence, pleasure and 
nothingness. The analytic cure is addressed to the same 
pleasurable encounter of ego and id, but allows these two 
psychic apparatuses to circulate, by means of the transference 
words, from the id to the ego and back, from the ego to the id. 
Resemblances? Absolutely. But no confusion! Easier said than 




In the textual analysis that follows in the next chapters, the issues of 
autoeroticism are not of interest for this particular body of research. However, 
Freud’s dichotomous presentation of “revelation vs. absence” and “pleasure vs. 
nothingness” plays a key role in the way I argue the authors write their poetic 
voices/protagonists. It is often evident in my authors’ texts that poetic revelation is 
derived from the absence of or longing for something necessary: identity 
(ontological, national, revolutionary). Freud’s notion of the “transference of words” 
suggests that there is some fluid play between the id and the ego, that the “cure” is 
the implied “omnipotence” of the id through language. As the id is defined by the 
unconscious part of the mind that corresponds to basic needs and desires, the 
mystical experience fully overtakes the person’s conscious and unconscious self. 
Hence, the typical description of some sort of syncope or otherwise unawareness of 
the person’s state of mind or body is common in mystical encounters. 
Kristeva’s central focus of her book is what she calls a “prereligious need to 
believe.” Such need to believe is likely tied to Freud’s confluence of the id and ego. 
Suggesting that this need is “prereligious” presents a paradox, potentially dating 
back to what William James would call the time before institutionalized religion. All 
of my authors engage in some form of “needing to believe,” though they all do so 
under either the direct guidance or relative influence of some organized religion.  
However, I do argue that they are responding to some innate desire to express 
themselves that differs from the way other poets and writers choose to do so. 
Kristeva herself questions, “[i]s it not surprising that our secularized societies have 
neglected this incredible need to believe? By this I mean they deny the necessary 
paradox that consists in responding to the anthropological need to believe, without 
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reducing it to the historical forms that the history of beliefs confers upon it but by 
sublimating is (as Freud says) into diverse practices and elucidations” (11). Most 
people deny this necessary paradox and succumb to either religion or secularism, 
without accepting the possible convergence of the two. It is at crucial intersection 
that my authors write mysticality because of their fervent need to believe in 
something beyond themselves that cannot be considered strictly divine. And 
mystical language permits this course of poetic praxis. Kristeva further explains: 
 
I call it incredible, this prereligious “need to believe,” for it is 
not a question of making of it an absolute, faltering it and using 
it as a basis for this or that order or hierarchy—neither is it 
one of ignoring it, at the risk of mutilating the individual 
capacity to think and create, at the risk of harming that which 
does not want the social bond itself to congeal into constraints 
but to be a bulwark, an optimal condition for democratic 
debate. (11) 
 
Kristeva’s “need” does not categorize itself among any absolute terms, 
conditions, or institutions. It is not a foundation from which to grow a belief system; 
rather it is the fertile groundwork for an individual to think and create. This 
synchronized process of thinking and creating, of poiesis, (concurrent poetic 
expression and creation) licenses the writer to use whatever language best fits 
his/her expression. In the case in this dissertation, such language is mysticality. 
To close this section, I will discuss the ideas of the experience of God and the 
different notions of what is included in “mystical union.” William Alston reminds us: 
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"our working criterion for mystical perception is that the experience is, or would be 
taken by the subject to be an awareness of God” (Perceiving God 29). Considering 
God as "object," Alston discusses the various ways in which a person might perceive 
said object. He furthers his point: 
 
[j]ust as one can sensorily perceive the same physical object 
with different degrees of attention, and just as a sensorily 
perceived object can be more or less within the focus of 
attention, so it would seem to be with the perception of God. I 
see no reason to think that these long-lasting background 
awarenesses of God are a radically different sort of 
phenomenon from the overwhelming momentary awareness 
that blots out all else. (33) 
 
Alston’s point is that essentially that 1) people perceive objects differently, 
and 2) having long exposure vs. short exposure to such an object does not give 
preference to the latter as necessarily “more mystical.” There are more or less two 
groups of people who experience mystical states: those that engage in systematic 
discipline (quiet prayer, meditation, austerity) and those who have no former 
knowledge or prior preparation whose experiences are spontaneous and otherwise 
unexplained. Both, effectively, constitute mystical categories. In my textual analysis I 
will discuss the mysticalist manifestations of these two categories.  
Lastly, I will briefly outline some of Emmanuel Levinas’s work on the 
ambiguity of God through Joseph Ballan’s article “Divine Anonymities: On 
Transascendence and Transdescendence in the Works of Levinas, Celan, and 
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Lispector” (2008). Levinas describes the very tenuous line between monotheism 
and atheism by his presentation of illeité and il y a. Ballan writes, “Levinas posits the 
impersonality of God, for which he coins the term illeité” from the French il, meaning 
“he” or “it” (541). Illeité marks the minimal gap between atheism and monotheism. 
It lends a subtlety to Levinas’s explication of religion often missing from the bare 
reduction of the religious to the ethical in his 1950s essays. Understood as illeité, the 
impersonality of God has important consequences for the use of religious language, 
most especially (given the context of his work) for philosophy of religion and for 
theology, but also perhaps for literature (Ballan, “Divine Anonymities” 542). Thus, 
for Levinas, the use of religious language can and does reflect the impersonality of 
God. Here, I use the term impersonality to take on other meanings of “otherness”; 
with the (aforementioned) object of desire rooting itself in whatever the author 
chooses it be. Therefore, the illeité, or “itness” can be, for my argument, that which 
the author chooses as his/her visual object or mental image. And consequently, the 
il y a designates, according to Levinas, “bare, senseless material existence.” (Ballan 
541). This term, ultimately becomes indistinguishable from illeité, or “it-ness;” 
denot[ing] the absolute distance or anonymity of God (541). As the il y a is 
congruous to the Spanish hay, or “there is/are,” it is used by our poets in an 
analogous fashion.  Therefore, the “itness” and declaration of “there is/are” of God, 
allows my authors to infuse their poetry/lyrical prose with illeité. The result is a 
divinization of secular circumstance, absorbing something quotidian as if it were the 
sacred presence of God. 
To further this argument, let us consider an untitled Celan poem, also 
discussed by Ballan: 
  Spasms. I love you, psalms, 
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  the feeling-walls deep in the you-ravine 
  rejoice, seedpainted one, 
 
  Eternal, de-eternalized are you 
eternalized, Uneternal, you. 
hey, 
 
into you, into you, 
I sing the bone-rod-scratch 
 
Redred, far behind the pubic hair  
harped, in the caves 
 
outside, all around 
the unending none-whatsoever-canon, 
you throw me the nine times 
twined, dripping 
eyetooth-wreath. (Celan Threadsuns; Joris, Selections 112) 
Celan here is subverting traditional religious language “verging on points of 
blasphemy” (Ballan 547). He uses neologistic compound nouns to depict both God 
(“you-ravine”) and the experience the poetic voice encounters surrounding Him 
(“feeling-walls”). God is eternal, de-eternalized, eternalized and uneternal all at 
once. The poetic voice falls into complete consumption, desiring such “spasms” to 
experience God. Such subversion of language in Celan, as is present in the following 
chapters, allows the transcendence of the immanent. What Hent de Vries calls, “[t]he 
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anonymity of il y a—the 'impersonal, anonymous, yet inextinguishable 
‘consummation’ of being, which murmurs in the depths of nothingness itself”—
returns as the highest, most transcendent term in Levinas’s vocabulary, namely 
illeité (Ballan 543, citing Hent de Vries “An Ethical Sinngebung” 357-359).  
WHY POETRY AND LYRICAL PROSE? POETRY AS MYSTICAL PRAXIS5  
In her book Poetry and the Fate of the Senses (2002) Susan Stewart engages 
with the dynamics of poetic sound. Stewart’s analysis lends an interesting insight 
regarding the unsatisfied condition of reciprocity put forth by the poetic voice, 
addressing the notion of what is “inner” and “outer” in terms of rhetorical 
apostrophe. She explains, “[w]e humans speak in conditions of reciprocity, but also, 
like mockingbirds, we speak in conditions of imitation—and when we practice the 
arts of fiction, we are imitating, and responding to, our own conditions of 
reciprocity” (Stewart 60). As I have already discussed, poetry is powerfully 
transcendent, and hence I believe the poetic voice’s desire to speak to the “outer” 
functions in light of Stewart’s condition of reciprocity. The voice seeks this “other” 
to establish union. In order to more fully develop an explanation of why I chose 
primarily poetry to examine in this dissertation, I will analyze a poem of Uruguayan 
modernist poet Delmira Agustini, titled “¡Poesía!” appearing in the Uruguayan 
journal La Alborada (1902-1903), though the edition I use is Poesías completas 
(1993) (García Pinto 64, 72). I believe it perfectly exemplifies poetry’s supremacy in 
conveying mysticalist or proto-mystical experience. I use Agustini here as an 
additional example of a mysticalist poet, but this mystical mode is present in all the 
                                                        
5 A discussion of poetry vs. lyrical prose is presented in Chapter Four in my analysis of Clarice 
Lispector’s A paixão segundo G.H.: romance (1964). Therefore, in the introduction of my dissertation I 
am to only present why I have chosen poetry and lyrical prose. 
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poems I will examine in the chapters to follow. While Agustini is not a poet I will 
consider during the course of my chapter analysis, her poem is illustrative of my 
argument as a whole.  
DELMIRA AGUSTINI’S “POESÍA!” AS EVIDENCE OF MYSTICALITY 
The poetics of Delmira Agustini thrust the feminine and feminist voice into 
Latin American modernismo. Agustini skillfully recreates the apostrophic “you,” 
which takes on many forms, including the archetypical apostrophe directed at 
someone outside the text; the frequent use of questions, colons and exclamations; 
and the invocation and suppression of this very same “you” that ebbs and flows 
throughout her poems, speaking greatly to the prior arguments made regarding 
Levinas, Freud, Kristeva, and Newman. The soundless gap, or pause, that results 
from what I will call her “apostrophic devices,” divulges an intimacy the poetic voice 
develops with someone outside the text. 
Agustini’s succinct and forceful use of language is inscribed in her poem 
“Poesía!”. Much of this forcefulness issues from a consistent use of a particular 
rhetorical figure, the apostrophe. Traditionally, the apostrophe takes an 
archetypical form of a certain “you” or being addressed outside the confines of text 
that is neither present nor described otherwise to the reader. This outcry to an 
invisible listener conjures up an entity unto which the poetic voice ascribes 
personhood and therefore meaning. As a result, the apostrophe’s function is 
multifarious as it bridges a spatial and—importantly for this analysis—sound 
barrier presented to and confronted by the reader. This apostrophic gap that is 
created invites the reader, or perhaps listener, to venture beyond the confines of the 
written word and to explore the silenced voices that are aroused by the apostrophe 
 21 
 
itself. I turn to Helen Vendler’s definition of the apostrophe in her book Invisible 
Listeners (2005) where she gives a brief explanation of its utility: chiefly, the 
apostrophe is ”…literally a turning away from one’s strophe to address someone 
else…” (Vendler 1). As a strophe is defined as, from the Greek, the act of turning, 
Vendler means to imply a movement of the poetic voice. In this case, a movement 
beyond its own voice toward another is the primary goal. But what is the purpose of 
such a dialogue beyond the page of the written poem or the utterance of the poet? 
Vendler indeed asks why the poet feels the need for this “colloquy with an invisible 
listener” (1). Agustini answers this problematic. By invoking the rite of the 
apostrophe and its many manifestations and thus the outsider that is implied, she 
creates an intentional pause, a gap, a meditation, or better, a soundless caesura. The 
apostrophe invites reflection and mediation on this outsider who is invoked. A mere 
moment is dedicated to the pausing and consideration of this outsider where the 
reader’s hesitation is simultaneously silent and silenced. Through this mediated 
hesitation, the understanding that there will be silence, the lack of response (either 
literally through the lack of words or figuratively through the use of metaphor and 
metonym) is created, accordingly.  
Typical poetic caesura can be linked to famous verse such as that found in the 
Cantar del Mio Cid (1140-1207) where each side of the caesura contains the same 
number of syllables, in this case, six each. In Agustini’s case, the caesura takes on a 
more widely applicable approach to mean any sort of pause or interruption to make 
a rhythmic point, often an unexpected one. Stewart explains that “…when 
irregularity is presented by the sudden or idiosyncratic use of caesura or 
enjambment is used, the speaking voice is counter to the rhythm” (Stewart 65). 
Here, she discusses the prosodic elements of meter in terms of the halting apparatus 
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one encounters with a caesura; however, the basic principle applies also to 
apostrophe as a moment of caesura. If, according to Stewart, “[t]he caesura ‘calls up’ 
and breaks through the transport of rhythmic propulsion” Agustini employs the 
apostrophe to introduce this unexpected moment of suspension within the rhythm 
of the poetic verse in which it appears (Stewart 66). My discussion of the 
apostrophe will not so much concern who is being summoned but rather what is the 
result of this summoning in terms of the momentary breath that is taken. I will 
discuss four different kinds of apostrophes, or apostrophic devices, that Agustini 
employs in her poetry to allow for this soundlessness. They are the following: 1) The 
archetypical apostrophe (the direct addressing of a “you” in this case), 2) The colon 
which pauses the poetic voice as it turns to another, 3) Questions posed to this 
‘other’ and; finally, 4) Exclamatory remarks invoking this ‘other’ or speaking directly 
to it.  
¡POESÍA! 
“¡Poesía!” engages with apostrophes in myriad ways.  The title itself dons an 
exclamation mark: ¡Poesía!, but does not (initially) concretely make grammatical 
sense as, alone, it is just a word like “Pen!” or “Pocketbook!”. If we take Stewart's 
proposition that the “image of the speaker in relation to a listener” as always 
paramount to the poetic voice, then Poetry becomes a listener and thus, the title 
does make grammatical sense. It is a calling out, a request to be heard. The title itself 
calls out to the anthropomorphized Poetry itself, nearly as a call to arms. It is as if 
she says, “Poetry, stand up! Alert! Write!”. Throughout the poem the poetic voice 
seems to punitively address Poetry—through the constant use of exclamation—as 
she attempts to find herself within it as well. Likewise, the meta-nominalization of 
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titling the poem “Poetry” is provoking in that it is both representative of the specific 
poem that follows as well as all poetry. For this reason the self-titling serves as its 
own explicit apostrophe. Furthermore, aside from the apostrophic Poetry that is 
called up in the title, there is also productive use of exclamation points and 
questions that both open and close this poem, acting as a sort of circular appendage 
that apostrophically keeps the poetic voice in rhythm. There is arguably an 
overabundance of exclamatory remarks, counting eighteen in total, appearing in 
each quartet and in over two-thirds of the verses.  An exclamation is used 
conventionally to mark emphasis and to highlight the energy of the voice. This 
standard holds true for “¡Poesía!”; however, the excessive usage changes this 
traditional exclamatory function in that it invites a moment of silence afterward 
precisely because of the overabundance. The reader’s eyes yield to the exclamation 
mark. The apostrophic value ascribed to Poetry in the title that is then surrounded 
by exclamation points underscores the urgency and energy with which a poem is 
read. Poetry uplifts the voice momentarily, allowing for only a mere breath to be 
taken before the next exclamation is to come. It is as if the verses are constantly set 
to an upward rhythm because of this exclamatory punctuation and on this 
consistent upward trajectory, excitement leads to short slides before the next 
mountain to climb. The consistent placement of these exclamation points in 
sequential order mandates a slight pause for the reader’s voice or eyes to jump from 
one verse to the next.  
The first verse, “¡Poesía immortal, cantarte anhelo!” continues the 
apostrophe, not just to address this concept outside of the written word but also to 
Poetry as it exists throughout all of time and space, as immortal. It is the most 
omnipresent of all apostrophes as it invokes a continuous and ever-lasting outcry, 
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which follows the pattern of the exclamation mark. This unceasing apostrophic 
presence is followed by the voracious desire to sing it, to sing “you,” so much so that 
it carries an instrinsic extralinguistic property because it is not only absent from the 
written poem but is also unattainable to the poetic voice. The extra-diagetic or 
extra-textual character of the desired Poetry-song will never be manifested. Stewart 
explains: 
To speak of the aural aspect of poetry is to begin to speak 
necessarily of its linguistic dimension, but we will also need to 
consider the prelinguistic and extralinguistic dimensions of 
sound embedded in the language of poetry. (60) 
 
An unrelenting yearning to sing out Poetry—to bring another aural 
component to Poetry itself via song—is attempted. Yet the effort is in vain: 
¡Mas mil esfuerzos he de hacer en vano! 
¿Acaso puede al esplendente cielo 
Subir altivo el infeliz gusano? 
 
Her need to sing out is halted; moreover, it is prevented. It is an impossibility 
of fate to transcend.  On the one hand, poetry is needed, to a great extent, to actually 
utter its words; on the other, the poetic voice is arrested, restrained. If there is no 
ability to sing out, then there is silence, due to mystery and desire—an impasse is 
exposed via the apostrophe ignited at the beginning and silence results. Because, 
like in prayer, there is no overt verbal answer to the apostrophe, not even the sad 
earthly worm can ascend or transcend the utterances of Poetry and all we are left 
with is a moment of contemplation of what could have been.  
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Why, then, does "Poetry" exert such an enigmatic hold over the poetic voice? 
Agustini delves into the bones of Poetry, describing it as “…la sirena misteriosa / 
que atrae con su voz al navegante.” The apostrophic outcry is such because it 
searches for Poetry’s meaning. Regarding this search, Stewart explains that 
“…poetry presents an image of the speaker in relation to a listener and begins the 
social work of making that relation intelligible through its own projected conditions 
of reception” (Stewart 67). Agustini begins this questioning of the existence of the 
listener by including a question and importantly, providing no answer to it. When 
she asks if “the unhappy worm can ascend triumphantly to the glorious skies,” the 
question’s function is twofold. Firstly, this unanswered rhetorical question invokes 
and maintains temporary silence due to the necessary caesura after a rhetorical 
question.  Poetry, to whom the question is directed, cannot answer and the poem 
itself must go on without reconciliation. The poetic voice moves past this silenced 
gap and continues in the search for an answer. Secondly, like the exclamations, the 
question mark also projects forward and upward the reader’s eye or voice. It leaves 
a moment lingering in the air knowing that a response to the question will not only 
be improbable, but also unheard. 
Poetry, then, is itself is a magnetic force; it attracts a navigator, who fittingly, 
is a traveler who seeks out a place, direction, and meaning in the world. Poetry 
harkens to the navigator but consistently eludes him/her, as is evidenced by the 
remainder of the apostrophes used throughout the rest of the poem, carrying us to 
its end. There is a constant pursuing of Poetry, to define it, to sing it. Yet, the poetic 
voice can neither find it, nor itself. At the end she exclaims:  
 
¿Yo soy quién soy, que en mi delirio anhelo 
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Alzar mi voz para ensalzar tus galas?  
¡Un gusano que anhela ir hasta el cielo! 
¡Que pretende volar sin tener alas!   
 
A fierce desire leading to delirium, an inability to reach the heavens without 
wings, results in a sort of Phaeton-Icarus like failure. Like in the opening quatrain, 
there is a question called out, yet this time, an indirect answer is energetically 
announced.  Even though the little worm’s great desire overcomes him, he only 
attempts to fly; we are to assume a miserable failure as earthly worms do not 
spontaneously grow wings. Throughout the entire poem, the poetic voice’s 
escalating exclamations encourage and maintain the upward movement. The great 
rhythmic upswing in this closing question, permits a pause for a final space and time 
for an answer. The reader meditates on high. S/he momentarily ponders the desire 
to raise the poetic voice’s actual voz in order to extol Poetry’s virtues; but then in a 
swift and crashing descent is taken back to earth. This last question and answer 
series function nearly like the poetic voice’s last attempt to search out Poetry. While 
the answer given is one of failure, it is not of despair. The voice may fall earthbound, 
but we never see its collision with the ground. This is precisely because we know 
that the little wingless worm tries to fly, but we never directly know if this effort is 
made. Perhaps the poetic voice is perpetuating her promise to continue the search 
for Poetry whose aesthetic she so greatly desires to sing. 
Stewart examines this idea of promise in poetic language. She explains that 
“the sound of poetry is heard in the way a promise is heard” (104). She arouses the 
concept of poetry and the sounds it implies function as a sort of illocutionary act, as 
defined by J.L. Austin and John Searle. Such a speech act would be thus defined as 
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“commissive” in that it commits the speaker, or in this case, the poetic voice or even 
reader, to a future action to take place, that is, a promise.  
Stewart: 
When I promise I create an expectation, an obligation, and a 
necessary condition for closure. Whether we are in the 
presence of each other or not, the promise exists. Whether, 
you, the one who receives the promise, continue to exist or not, 
the promise exists. Others may disappear, you or others may 
no longer remember, or deserve, or make sense of that 
promise—nevertheless, the promise exists. (104)  
 
Perhaps this “promise,” as directed toward this apostrophic person is the 
reader. Or maybe it is the subject in question, such as Poetry itself. It is precisely this 
reflection that promotes the pause, the moment of silence that is created in the 
mind’s eye (or ear) of the reader. 
METONYMIC MYSTICISM IS MYSTICALITY 
All of the apostrophic devices give way to a soundlessness in Agustini’s 
poetry that opens her verse up for the reader/speaker to give in to the silenced 
moment and movement the poetry creates. Such a rhetorical strategy I label as 
mysticalist. Once the verse is hence opened up, where does the reader move to? And 
in what direction or with what guidance? Vendler explains the verticality of the 
apostrophic address as being “directed to a person or thing inhabiting a physically 
inaccessible realm conceived as existing ‘above’ the speaker” (2). Often, this 
movement is described as toward God or Parnassus or some other higher being that 
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would naturally require the use of the apostrophe to begin with. In Agustini’s poems 
a superior being is not referenced, but the apostrophic devices earlier discussed do 
forcefully lead the reader to an extralinguistic place outward and upward.  The 
intensity, force and connection between self (and other) with which Agustini writes 
is an exceptional example of mysticality.   
This human and poetic will is boldly evident in “¡Poesía!”. The eighteen 
exclamation marks and four questions that open and close the poem provide the 
perfect environment for this exterior motion so yearned for by the poetic voice’s 
clamoring. Each exclamation invites the reader to incrementally increase the 
excitement and fervor with which s/he reads, which tails the previous and next. 
Even the anaphorous use of “Eres el/la…” that begins six lines of the twenty-four 
encourages this movement via its repetition. She unquestionably defines Poetry 
apostrophically as saying “You are” on these six occasions and chooses a variety of 
natural, environmental elements as metaphor. They include: 
  Tú eres la sirena misteriosa… 
  ¡Eres la estrella blanca y luminosa!... 
  ¡Eres la brisa perfumada y suave… 
  ¡Eres la inquieta y trinadora ave… 
  ¡Eres la onda de imperial grandeza… 
  ¡Eres el cisne de sin par belleza… 
 
All of these sentences are coupled with the continuation of Poetry’s 
description, a resounding likening to the natural world, set to words invoking the 
apostrophic presence of Poetry. Paradoxically though, Agustini achieves what 
perhaps might be the first evident apostrophe in the title of the poem itself—the 
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subject called upon, i.e. Poetry, is being represented, metonymically, by the poem 
“¡Poesía!” itself. It is important to note her clamoring to Poetry as an entity existing 
through immortality that can be wholly conceived of in this one poem, so aptly 
named. The poetic voice beseeches this muse or creature to know it, to sing it. It is a 
mystical desire to forgo earthly methods (the worm) in favor of the divine right to 
Poetry itself. If as E. Allison Peers explained “…the Spanish mystic’s primary care is 
to know himself, and this to him is an inseparable part of his great ideal…” then 
Agustini’s poetic voice boasts no other objective than to know Poetry. The poetic 
voice searches with urgency, but after each “You are” apostrophe, it turns up empty-
handed, straining its voice and invoking a moment of necessary silence to grieve this 
loss (that is, illeité). There is no passivity of the poetic voice in “¡Poesía!” nor in 
Poetry—it is ardent and incorrigible. The use of the constant questioning and 
repetitive exclamations may force the reader to imbibe this intensity without 
reprieve. There is never a union with Poetry or the full knowing of its voice, only the 
constant and elaborate search to gain its essence. Agustini’s poetic voice, like that of 
the Spanish mystics, is “all energy, activity, strife” because “only in the state of Union 
can true rest be found” (Peers 44). 
This relationship Agustini is describing via the poetic voice she presents is 
consumed by this constant state of yearning because it states, simply, “cantarte 
anhelo.” The poetic voice searches to transcend the limits of the written or spoken 
word in an attempt to redefine the limitations of Poetry’s definition, by song. Helen 
Vendler accurately problematizes the poet’s desire vis-à-vis the apostrophe. She 
questions, “[b]ut what is the poet (any poet) to do who wants not to express such 
relations but to redefine them, who yearns, for example, to adopt a more intimate 
relation to God than that offered by the church” (Vendler 3). Again, while a union 
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with God is neither the intention nor the objective, Agustini's poem achieves a 
majestic redefinition of knowledge in its search of an essence.  
Poetry as an immortal "beingness" or "illieté" transcends time and space and 
religion. All of these redefinitions Agustini provides of Poetry encompass knowledge 
that is immanent, yet desires transcendence. Poetry is, according to Agustini, a siren, 
a star, a breeze, a bird, a wave, a swan, a flower, and a pearl. Poetry is that which 
exists in the natural world. And yet, even after this profane pursuit of defining 
Poetry as each of nine different natural phenomena, Poetry cannot be found. The 
poetic voice is left open-ended, with the only resource left to move 
extralinguistically, outside the poem to a new space and to a new interlocutor. 
Precisely through these means, Agustini achieves a mystical trajectory toward an 
immortal Poetry that proves divine and sacred, though restricted to the immanence 
limited by language, that is, sans transcendence. This mysticalist approach through 
apostrophic Poetry, though invisible to the reader’s eye, is achievable through 
mystical language producing an intimacy effect (Vendler 5).  
Through the analysis of Agustini’s poem, I have demonstrated the influence 
of mystical rhetorical language on poetry and the use of apostrophe to introduce an 
element of the “outer” that will be evident in my chapter analyses. In my first 
chapter that follows, I will discuss in detail my definition of mysticality as well as 
Spanish philosopher María Zambrano’s theory of poiesis, contributing to poetry as a 
vehicle of apostrophic engagement with a mystical "other" that is immanent but 





Chapter One: María Zambrano’s Poiesis: A Movement toward 
Mysticality in Latin America 
MYSTICISM 
Noted religious studies scholar William James aptly observes that mysticism 
is only essentially comprehended by the mystic him/herself; only the experiencer 
can philosophically identify an experience as mystical or not and that an outsider 
attempting to define such a notion is, at best, lost in the mire of knowledge beyond 
that which is humanly immanent. He admits, “[o]ne may say, truly, I think, that 
personal religious experience has its root and centre in mystical states of 
consciousness...my own constitution shuts me out from their enjoyment almost 
entirely, and I can speak of them only at second hand” (Variety of Religious 
Experience 301). If, as James establishes, the mystical experience is fundamentally a 
spiritual but also physiologically constitutional experience, then it is not necessarily 
an intellectual experience, but rather one of feeling. Such an experience that is 
rendered noetically unintelligible is also paradoxical; it is an enlargement of 
perception and condensation of the intimate that occurs simultaneously where, 
according to nineteenth century English priest Charles Kingsley, “the ‘real soul’ [is] 
imperceptible to [one's] mental vision, except at a few hallowed moments” (Variety 
of Religious Experience 298). While James admits his failings in understanding 
mystical proficiency, he and Kingsley both describe a favorable approach to 
“outsiders” writing about mysticism. If every human being possesses a waking, 
rational consciousness, there lies beneath it potential forms of consciousness that 
require the application of a certain stimulus” (308). Thus, at the precipice of these 
“hallowed” measures of time, every human being can avail him/herself of this 
 32 
 
consciousness if the parameters are correctly set and developed.  
James's interrogation of these so-called “achieveable” mystical states of 
(sub)consciousnesses by the average person inform my expansion of mysticism's 
long-standing, time-tested definition. James, among other scholars of this branch of 
religious study such as Michel de Certeau, Evelyn Underhill, E. Allison Peers and in 
more recent scholarship Amy Hollywood, Gershom Scholem and Luce López-Baralt, 
discuss the primary characteristics of mysticism as such: 
An intimate knowledge of the self to achieve union 
with/consciousness of God. Ecstatic union with God is sought 
and is necessarily transient, passive and separate from the 
sentient being in wakeful consciousness. The discursive 
intellect is both active and passive as the mystical experience is 
both a state of feeling and knowledge. The experiencer 
succumbs to the “One” and relinquishes all bodily control. 
(135)6 
All facets of the mystical experience are ones in which the experience itself is 
authoritative over the person, yet across different religions, there is often a 
prescribed methodology to achieving this state. For the purposes of this analysis, the 
Christian and Jewish states of mysticism are of most interest. Many medieval 
European Catholic mystics such as Italians Catherine of Siena (1347-1380) and 
Angela of Foligno (1248-1309) and Germans Meister Ekhart (1260-1328), and 
Christine of Stommeln (1242-1312) describe their personal mystical experiences via 
their interpretations of scripture and their descriptions of God’s oneness and 
presence during moments of rapture. Meister Eckhart, the famed 13th century 
                                                        
6 This definition is my own based on the scholars’ work previously mentioned. 
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Dominican German scholar, considered by many including James to be one of the 
first mystics, (though widely considered an apophatic writer) indulges in the notion 
of the “Spark of the Soul” where “the intellect touches infinity” and man as the image 
(imago) of or being according to God (Tobin, Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preacher 
128). It is this image, or piece of soul, that contains the divine imprint, a constant 
experience: a light, a temple, a beam, a spark. Even St. Thomas of Aquinas (1225-
1274), his Italian contemporary, defines mysticism as the knowledge of God through 
experience.7 Through his quinque viae (five ways), Aquinas lays out how we know 
and experience God by explaining physical phenomena we witness in the natural 
world. Thus, Eckhart’s “divine imprint” is thus explained by Aquinas’s “evidence of 
God” in motion, causation, necessariness, gradation and ordered tendencies (Summa 
Theologaie q.2). Now that we have considered the presence of God, as described by 
Eckhart and Aquinas, I turn to how mystics specifically express this presence. 
In his seminal work The Mystic Fable (1982), Michel de Certeau discusses the 
evolution of mysticism from the early medieval period to the late 17th centuries 
during the time of the Golden Age mystic writers in Europe. De Certeau explains, 
“[t]he mystical body is the intended goal of a journey that moves, like all 
pilgrimages, toward the site of a disappearance” (79). In the corpus mysticum it is 
precisely a body—a mystical/hidden body—that is sought. If Christianity then was 
founded, as de Certeau argues, upon the loss of a physical body, Jesus Christ and 
consequently his physical and geographic genealogy, then mysticism is the attempt 
to overcome this physical and spiritual void (Mystic Fable 81). It is, therefore, the 
experience of this body that mystics so intensely pursue, discover and write about. 
The Christian body's mystical experience is “an initial privation...that goes on 
                                                        
7 Here I reference St. Thomas Aquinas’s work Summa Theologiae (1265-1274) 
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producing institutions and discourses that are the effects of and substitutes for that 
absence: multiple ecclesiastical bodies, doctrinal bodies, and so on” (81). The lack of 
body fuels the search for one.  
The role of women mystics in the late medieval period has been often 
denigrated and gendered along a binary cleavage, that is, the mystical experience in 
the female body opposed to the male body. According to Amy Hollywood in her 
book Sensible Ecstasy (2002)–where she discusses many 20th century 
(predominantly French) psychoanalysts' treatment of medieval Christian mystic 
women—they are categorized in one of two ways: either mystical encounters are 
“simply associated with femininity or with women...or a distinction is made between 
good and bad, acceptable and unacceptable, non-pathological and pathological 
forms of mysticism, with the first category in each case associated with masculinity 
and men and the second with femininity and women” (Sensible Ecstasy 8). From this 
early period onward, a mystical encounter described by a pious women was 
belittled and reduced to a pathologically determined health lapse, often controlled 
by devil-induced hysteria. Women were often precluded from formal monastic (or 
otherwise general) education because their mystical writings were (and by many 
scholars continue to be) cited as effusive, perhaps even maudlin. In Hollywood's 
opinion they were considered “affective”; women were more “porous and 
imaginative...and therefore open to possession (whether divine or demonic)” (9). It 
is to say that many High medieval female Christian mystics were identified as 
visionaries, but their vision was firmly rooted in their meditative, solitary and 
liturgical practices, not the discursive intellectual, canonical practices/heuristics of 
their male counterparts (Meister Eckhart would be an example).  
To consider the process a mystic endures, I turn to Evelyn Underhill’s book 
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Mysticism (1977). She details the various points of “the mystic way” where she sets 
out and justifies a theory of mystical consciousness and the organic growth process 
through which a mystic passes. These such stages include: 1) the awakening of the 
self, 2) the purification of the self, 3) the illumination of the self, 4) voices and 
visions, 5) introversion, part one: recollection and quiet, 6) introversion, part two: 
contemplation, 7) ecstasy and rapture, 8) the dark night of the soul; and 9) the 
unitive life (xiv). As we see, the process is highly unique to the individual mystic, 
who, for Underhill is “…like other persons of genius, is man first and artist 
afterward” (453). Underhill portrays what a mystic might say if s/he were to 
describe the process: 
Union with reality—apprehension of it—will then upon this 
hypothesis be union with life at its most intense point: in its 
most dynamic aspect. It will be a deliberate harmony set up 
with the Logos…Ergo…union with a Personal and Conscious 
spiritual existence, immanent in the world—one form, one half 
of the union which I have always sought: since this is clearly 
life in its highest manifestation. (35) 
A mystic has transcended the “sense-world,” functioning always with the “hunger 
for the Absolute” (41). There is an expansion of consciousness, including an acute 
awareness of the Divine. Christian mystics travel constantly on a quest, Underhill 
says, which embodies unity in diversity, and stillness in strife. Though intimately 
world-changing, a mystical experience for a Christian mystic possesses paradoxical 
qualities: stillness and contemplation must be kept to produce ecstasy and rapture. 
And eventually, this ecstatic state leads to the complete disappearance of selfhood in 
the divine, and the “substitution of a Divine Self for the primitive self” representing 
 36 
 
this “unitive life” or state of “lived divinity” (408). Christian mysticism, here, is 
represented by acute moments of mystical rapture brought on by quite prayer and 
contemplation. Afterwards, some mystics go on to live the “unitive life,” though 
strictly speaking, this ultimate, lasting phase is not requisite for Christian mysticism.  
By-in-large Jewish mysticism takes on a much more scriptural approach. The 
esoteric discipline of Jewish mystical thought, the Kabbalah, includes analysis of the 
Zohar, a collection of sundry Jewish texts, including mystical interpretations of the 
Torah. De Certeau describes the difference of the Jewish tradition in the importance 
of the Text, which “does not cease writing” (81). It is a living body that is morphed 
and displaced by the proliferating mystical interpretations of Jewish texts. Gershom 
Scholem presents a pantheistic view of mysticism in Major Trends in Jewish 
Mysticism (1941) where he describes appearance of mysticism as a religious art of 
interpretation. He contends that mysticism is a “definite stage in the historical 
development of religion and makes its appearance under certain well-defined 
conditions” (8). He describes the first stage of proto-Religion where Nature is man’s 
relation to God, namely, man can conceive of God only through the natural, earthly 
elements. There is no prescriptive path to God by way of an institutionalized 
religious organization; instead, there is just man’s personal experience: “man 
encounters God at every step” (9). Then, as Religion is established, Scholem 
identifies a “vast abyss” between man and God that man fears, respects and 
reconciles only within the doctrinal confines of the Religion. Mysticism, then, is 
Scholem’s answer to man’s confrontation with this abyss that he neither ignores nor 
feels coerced to deny. Mysticism “pieces together fragments broken by religious 
cataclysm, to bring back old unity which Religion has destroyed, where the world of 
mythology and that of revelation meet in the soul of man” (8). Because there exists a 
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certain chronology of events for mysticism to take shape, it is therefore 
“incompatible with certain other stages of religion” and while I will later argue that 
“modern” mysticism exists on a spectrum with more flexible characteristics, 
traditional mysticism, according to Scholem, is indeed separate from other states of 
religion, though still connected to a streamlined state of religious consciousness (8). 
Much scholarship is dedicated to understanding the meaning of “union”; the 
primary difference between Christian and Jewish mysticism is that the former can 
experience it more personally and in durative fashion, and the latter is often 
regarded as the mystical interpretation of the Zohar. If mysticism is meant to 
transform religious knowledge of the believer/experiencer into a novel “living 
experience,” then Christian mystics describe confined states of ecstasy, which may 
last for thirty minutes (in the case of Saint Theresa) to three days (in the case of 
Christine of Sommeln) to even periods of one to two years where the presence of 
Jesus was acutely felt and lived. Jewish mysticism, on the other hand, seems to 
exude more malleable qualities, defying any clear categorization in terms of mystical 
texts or mystics themselves.  
To tease this out further, I will briefly discuss the debate about mystical 
union in kabbalist studies. Hartley Lachter addresses the notion of the mystical 
place in the Zohar (Paradox and Mystical Union in the Zohar 2004).  He argues that 
the Zohar repeatedly emphasizes the separateness and unity of God, man, and 
world. He presents the following argument: “the paradoxes and contradictions 
regarding God, and the concomitant sameness and otherness of the self and God, are 
incorporated into the presentation of mystical experience. The kabbalist is capable 
of mystical union with God because he is, in the end already one with God” (137). 
The chief definition of Jewish mysticism, then, appears to be the broad notion of 
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paradox. If man and God are equally separate and the same, then it follows that 
mystical experience could be either highly personal and intimate or wholly divided 
and intellectual. Lachter points toward the idea that union with God is within reach 
for a kabbalist precisely because s/he is a kabbalist, i.e., is a student or practitioner 
of Jewish mystical thought. And as such, the inherent unity with God would suggest 
that further study of the Zohar would increase the feeling of such unity. In the Zohar, 
the term devekut, or cleaving, is commonly used to refer to the idea of a mystical 
union. According the Merriam-Webster, cleaving, as with a substance like wood, 
implies sharp division, but the definition also includes that of loyal adherence 
(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cleaving). However, Lachter 
suggests that it is a “kind of desired proximity to God, but stops short of actual 
union” (140). Here, Lachter nuances the meaning of union, suggesting instead that 
the desire to be close to God is what engenders the paradoxical and simultaneous 
spiritual harmony and separation, and not the mystical union itself. Lachter goes on, 
“[i]n this way, the Zohar never ultimately answers the question of how the world 
and human self can come to be from the infinite. The response is a poetic paradox 
rather than a rational resolution; the infinite and the finite are always united and 
separate simultaneously” (138). Lachter’s use of the term “poetic paradox” is useful 
for the following chapter analyses as I will be only concerned with poetry and lyrical 
prose. What Lachter aims for though, I believe, is the idea that the paradox is 
perhaps aesthetic and/or lyrical in nature, much like poetry itself. Rationality might 
be a part of the Kabbalah, but a rational resolution is not. That which is infinite and 
finite are always possibilities for the kabbalist. This constant state of agreement and 




It is also possible for a kabbalist, accordingly, to see mysticism as a constant 
state of revelry and ongoing presence; there no one single act of revelation. Lacther 
explains, “[f]or the Zohar, mystical union is a drive for the return of everything to 
the primordial transcendent depths of the Godhead from which it never left” (139). 
Kabbalist scholars use passages from Biblical texts collected in the Zohar and, in 
homiletic fashion, make mystical interpretations as was the case for second century 
Rabbi Simeon ben Yohai who interpreted scripture in Aramaic. The Zohar is thus a 
collection of writings, including fragmented stories, oracles or secret revelations 
that is not defined by one (nor many) text(s) nor to a canon of accepted scripture. 
Scholem offers this insight: if the Torah is “a living organism animated by a secret 
life which streams and pulsates below the crust of its literal meaning” we can 
assume the metaphorical interpretations are many and omnipresent (Major Trends 
14). A famous parable from the Zohar, re-written by 21st century Mexican Jewish 
author Angelina Muniz-Huberman in her book En el jardín de la Cábala (2010) 
exemplifies this interpretative quality; it is entitled “The Four Sages in Paradise.” 
 She tells the story of four learned men and how only the fourth—who chooses the 
mystical interpretation of words and encompasses multiple ways of knowing—is 
capable of entering the pardés or garden/Paradise. It is fascinating to also consider 
how she narrates this story, which breaks down the word pardés into its component 
consonant parts (P, R, D, S), each possessing a symbolic meaning regarding the 
interpretation of words, making it triply symbolic: 
P=peshat represents the literal understanding of words. This 
sage dies because he is unable to advance his knowledge.  
R=remez or allegorical meaning. This sage falls victim to 
fantasy for having believed literally in allegory. 
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D=derashá, or Talmudic interpretation. This sage becomes 
apostate after gaining so much knowledge. 
S=sod or mystical understanding. This sage could approach 
knowledge from various angles and thus was granted entry 
into the garden. (32) 
 
This parable warns of the solely literal, allegorical, or scholarly interpretation 
of words. In this way, she evokes the Zohar in the desire to not just use one 
approach to understanding words nor one approach to meditation on God. To help 
understand this, I turn to Paul Ricoeur, in his discussions of hermeneutics, who 
observes the narrative aspect of novels and their emplotment. In this series of 
plotting events, there is usually a clear referent, or as he puts it an “ostensive” 
referent (The Rule of Metaphor 21). However, the purpose of this ostensive referent 
is to evoke that which is essentially non-ostensive, that which cannot be delimited to 
the confines of linguistic signs. I think this notion fits appropriately with the present 
discussion of Muñiz-Huberman's exploration and understanding mystic Judaism 
beyond just her own writing. 
Moshé de León recommended these four steps (detailed above) for any kind 
of reading, above all, the kabbalistic reading, to truly understand the hidden 
meaning of words.  The (un)knowability of God is of particularly importance to 
kabbalic inquiry. Moshé de León, medieval Spanish kabbalist, termed regarded by 
scholars like Heinrich Graetz to be the redactor of the Zohar, offers a similar parable 
to express the interpretive quality of scripture with regards to the knowability of 
God. This kabbalistic parable is helpful in understanding the concept of knowability 
of God and follows as such: when Rabbi Simeón attempts to define the four elements 
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as parts of God's image—fire, earth, water, air—to his travelling companions, they 
become so exhausted of the same repetitive explanations, they abandon Simeón, 
who then worries and regrets having attempted to explain the earth's origins and 
significance. By questioning whether one can really understand these elements, 
Simeón successfully demonstrates the unknowability of God and His creation, and 
that we must be content to accept this. In Jewish mysticism God can disclose himself 
in two ways: Either He chooses to disclose his undisclosability or that which man 
can come to understand is only what God chooses Himself to disclose to him. During 
the chapters that follow, the notion of the unknowability of God will emerge, 
particularly in the analysis of Jewish authors, Fijman and Lispector.  
PHILOSOPHY OF THE SELF AND BEING 
Before discussing this chapter’s primary author, Maria Zambrano (Spain, 
1904-1991), and her philosophy of poetry vis-à-vis the poet and the creation of 
meaning, I find it useful to discuss some of her notions of the self, together with 
Hegel’s processes of being and becoming. Discussing the philosophical notion of 
being from the first-person perspective, Zambrano notes that there are boundaries 
regarding the sovereignty this “I” commands. Under the mandate of this sovereign 
being are “emisarios subordinados y a menudo clandestinos [que] transmiten 
órdenes hacia las murallas que defienden lo que se llama la persona, el 'ser' 
entendido como toma de posesión de la realidad, ante todo de un espacio y de un 
tiempo” (Soñar 39). As it were, Zambrano establishes that there is a centrality to 
being/self, or the human psyche, and then a series of underlying controls/attentions 
that often go unseen yet cautiously control boundaries of the central being. They 
make this being a part of “possession” not just of reality, but of a real space and a 
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real time. It is precisely this situation of being in a space and time that is considered, 
as Zambrano I think is suggesting, to be both an interior knowledge of being and its 
sovereign right and the exterior knowledge of its boundaries. Herein lies the 
paradox of the mystical inquiry that is couched in profound knowing of the 
interior—that which is immanent—while reaching for those moments in time and 
space that are at the limits of the exterior—the transcendent. James makes a similar 
observation regarding this paradox, but instead of grounding his theory in poetry, 
he does so in psychology. If we substitute consciousness with being, Zambrano and 
James are flirting with this very same notion of the essence of religious knowledge 
and how one comes to achieve it. James explains: 
I cannot but think that the most important step forward that 
has occurred in psychology since I have been a student of that 
science is the discovery first made in 1886 that...there is not 
only the consciousness of the ordinary field, with its usual 
centre and margin [here compare Zambrano's sovereign being 
with its boundaries], but an addition thereto in the shape of a 
set of memories, thoughts and feelings, which are 
extramarginal and outside of the primary consciousness 
altogether [here the transcendental, the mystical], but yet must 
be classed as conscious facts of some sort, able to reveal their 
presence by unmistakable signs. (Varieties of Religious 
Experience 233) 
In essence, both James and Zambrano identify that which is known to the 
individual and that which exceeds the limits this individual knows.  In James's 
Lectures XVI and XVII on mysticism he details his own definitions as well as those of 
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other mystics and mystic scholars by setting forth this set of tenets where 1) an 
unreachable is identified but never fully “known”, and 2) the ability to “reach” is 
only known to the mystic him/herself. Though he does not consider the role 
Religion plays, I turn also to Hegel's discussion of being vis-à-vis states of becoming 
to explore the philosophy that predated and informed this formative distinction for 
Zambrano, that is, the difference between poetry and philosophy.  
In Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) his famous dialectic is established 
stressing movement and change over stasis. The stages of becoming are in constant 
flux and thus the world's human population possesses indeterminate moments of 
“being” along this grand stage of becoming. Any meaning, truth, significance or even 
self-consciousness is never fixed; thus, stasis is never present. Hegel questions then 
how we acquire self-consciousness. His Master-Slave dialectic explains in detail the 
existence of one self-consciousness only by the recognition and contentious 
interaction with the other. However, on the philosophical plane that precedes this 
Master-Slave relationship, there is the notion that one must confront one's limits, 
with the “not-self” as Hegel puts it, which permits the identification of what is “self” 
(45). The confrontation of boundaries arises again as a common thread. Again, 
Hegel's discussion here is not concerned with any conventional Religion, but his 
distinction between the self's “body” and this body's limits is a useful one as it 
pertains to the phenomenology of mysticism. If the self can identify what belongs to 
it, it can presumably recognize the boundaries that contain and define it. Here, 
James's set of “extramarginal feelings” and Zambrano's “sovereign being” are 
explained by Hegel's discussion of the self's labored encounter with its limits. Even 
de Certeau argues that this very same recognition of self is present in memory; as 
Amy Hollywood suggests, “it recalls something that is not a past; it awakens what 
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the body does not know about itself” (Sensible Ecstasy 201). It is precisely what this 
body does not know about its own self when the limits are ascertained and 
evaluated and, in some very special cases, a poetic and perhaps also mystical 
experience is born. 
ZAMBRANO'S POIESIS 
Maria Zambrano's principal philosophical offering—poetic reason—is a 
response to vital reason (razón vital) presented by her longtime mentor and 
colleague José Ortega y Gasset (Spain, 1883-1955).8 Living an exiled life, traveling 
often with her sister it is argued that Zambrano (Spain, 1904-1991) was confronted 
with this borderland lifestyle between two different philosophical, political and 
societal worlds. It was Ortega y Gasset's opinion that “necesitamos toda una nueva 
filosofía, todo un nuevo repertorio de conceptos fundamentales y aborígenes. 
Estamos iluminados por una nueva fluoruración” (La aurora de pensamiento 14). 
Zambrano struggled, however, with her teacher's belief in the modernity before 
them. She believed this new philosophy was neither new, modern, nor a “reforma de 
la Razón,” but rather she sought a reasoning that was broader than reason itself, a 
concept that “se deslice también por los interiores, como una gota de aceite que 
apacigua y suaviza, una gota de felicidad” (La aurora de pensamiento 15). Fleeing 
Spain in 1939 into the south of France at the imminent victory of Franco's 
nationalists, Zambrano eventually found her way to the Caribbean and Mexico 
before returning to Europe where she would live a good deal of her life in Rome and 
Paris. Perhaps it was this confronting of a new despotic, political order in her 
homeland that fuels her desire for a reason that is not just “modern” but also 
                                                        
8 Consult José Ortega y Gasset’s work El tema de nuestro tiempo (1923) for more information about 
vital reason( razón vital o raciovitalismo) as well as historical reason. 
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metaphysical, internal, interior. Something congenital that, for each person, “[t]iene, 
ha de tener muchas formas, [y] será la misma en géneros diferentes” (15). This new 
philosophy is poetic reason, which valorizes the role of being, the metaphysical, 
one's intuition.  
It does not surprise us that her father, Blas Zambrano (Spain, 1874-1938), a 
great Spanish thinker and friend of Antonio Machado, was one of Spain's greatest 
humanists of the twentieth century, having founded intellectual discursive groups 
with Machado, Mariano Quintanilla and poet Juan José Llovet, as well as the Human 
Rights League established in Paris in 1897 (Algunos lugares 38). Though her father 
was chronologically a member of the Generation of '98, Zambrano disagreed with 
one of its founding members's philosophical treatises: Ortega y Gasset's idealization 
of the world as something manageable by philosophical doctrine and domination, 
i.e., vital reason. Arguably, in her most trenchant critique of her esteemed mentor, 
she characterizes his philosophy by describing it as a “endiosamiento totalizador, 
por su idealismo descarnado, por su olvido del hombre concreto, por su 
distanciamiento y aislamiento del mundo real y de las otras manifestaciones de la 
cultura, como literatura, arte, etc.¨ (La aurora de pensamiento 16). This philosophy, 
she explains, does not live in the real world, nor is it applicable as such because it 
functions independently. If we consider the way rational philosophy explains its 
surroundings there is a fundamental role that God plays. This philosophy imitates 
and attempts to overtake God's omniscience. This is put forth principally by 
Descartes's theory: if there is nothing the human mind cannot conceive or 
dominate.9 It is all-encompassing and thus, knowledge of reality is possible through 
reasoning. Hence, intuition is unnecessary. Here, Zambrano would insist that 
                                                        
9 See René Descartes’s work Meditations on First Philosophy (1641). 
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instead, we not change reality, but rather the way we perceive it to allow for the 
rebirth of understanding through the sacredness of the human/humanity/human 
experience. Hers is a philosophy that attempts to know the world rather than seeks 
its domination; it is the journey that is valued, not the objectified mastery of 
knowledge. 
To further explain this philosophical praxis, I turn to Zambrano's 
aforementioned work Algunos lugares de la poesía (2007), where she extrapolates 
the poetic words to construct a philosophy of poetry by examining the birth of 
poetry (poiesis), the crisis of the word, relations of time and poetics, poetry vis-à-vis 
ethics and history, and the poetry of Gods. Zambrano’s discussions of poetic reason, 
more specifically poiesis, examine the exteriority of poetic words versus the 
interiority they are meant to express; the function of Zambrano’s poiesis is to 
engender this spirit as a rejection of more secularized philosophy. Here, I offer 
Zambrano's bare bones definition of poiesis: 
Apegados a cultivar discernimientos y a ahondar diferencias, 
habíamos olvidado la unidad que reside—y sostiene—en el 
fondo de todo lo que el hombre crea por la palabra. Es la 
unidad de la poiesis, expresión y creación a un mismo tiempo 
en unidad sagrada, de la cual por revelaciones sucesivas irán 
naciendo, separándose al nacer—nacimiento es siempre 
separación—la poesía en sus diferentes especies y la filosofía. 
(61)   
Zambrano explains that the poet is exactly the person who claims the ability 
to push the limits of the self to be capable of exploring these limits. Poetic reason 
carries a great discursive advantage over vital reason: the ability to allow for the 
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unsaid, “...de todo lo que se esconde en el silencio; la palabra de la poesía temblará 
siempre sobre el silencio y sólo la órbita de un ritmo podrá sostenerla, porque es la 
música la que vence al silencio antes que el logos” (102). Vital reason, conversely, 
relies of the reasoning, on the responsibility of the philosopher to monopolize the 
process. Zambrano professes, “[e]l otro camino es el del poeta. El poeta no renuncia 
ni apenas buscaba, porque tenía” (Filosofía y Poesía 17). The poet simply has. S/he 
possesses the capabilities to make this knowledge possible for himself through the 
poetic word and the poetic word only.  She goes on to explain, “[t]enia por lo pronto 
lo que ante sí, ante sus ojos, oídos y tacto, aparecía; tenía lo que miraba y escuchaba, 
lo que tocaba, pero también lo que aparecía en sus sueños y sus propios fantasmas 
interiores mezclados en tal forma con los otros, con los que vagaban fuera, que 
juntos formaban un mundo abierto donde todo es posible” (18). Is this open world 
of revelatory possibility, of uninhibited intellect and knowledge, is poetry not also 
the “beyond” of the Hegelian self-consciousness dialectic? In Hegel's rhetorical 
terms, Zambrano's poet accepts and recognizes the confrontation of his/her limits 
and is able to identify the poet-self, the being-in-poetry, de facto, what belongs to 
the self. I contend, then, the poet's creation is also this ongoing process of “poetic 
being” that form the stages of being leading towards a full self-consciousness, or 
poiesis.   
Zambrano’s supposition is that the poetic word generates something beyond 
the meaning of the word itself and thus transcends communication. She discusses 
the logos of the word itself: 
...el cuerpo de la palabra, en poema o pensamiento, se vuelve 
irreal: la extensión la posee, y en vez de germinar, prolifera. Un 
logos proliferante sustituye al logos que germina...en esta 
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poblada extensión, la sombra del reino, y sorprende y 
maravilla el encontrar palabras, pensamientos, fragmentos, de 
una deidad nada maléfica: remite al orden perdido que en la 
actividad poética es al par el orden propuesto, que se ofrece 
con sólo mostrar su ausencia. (94) 
This notion of poiesis as a simultaneous poetic expression and creation, of 
being and becoming, is a proliferating logos, that is, a reasoning that is continuously 
burgeoning and multiplying, to a degree unknown. In this uncertain proliferation, 
Zambrano describes the body of the word as something that rediscovers its order, 
its logos. According to this logos nothing is idealized or mechanized and as such, 
“[n]ada tendría que desaparecer. El universo físico no tendría por qué envejecer 
sostenido y aun abrazado en una forma” (96).  
Zambrano argues that the poetic word “es una pura trascendencia que hace 
olvidar que sea palabra, audible, visible, corpórea por tanto” (49). For Zambrano, 
poetry is both transcendent and transcendence, representing the birth of words as it 
leaves behind its own awareness of their presence (56).  It is this way we achieve 
being and fundamentally an alternative to logic/philosophy. Because Zambrano is 
frustrated by the limits of rationality, of the mechanics of reason, she presents that 
there is something purely creational and primal about poetry; language is magical 
and. in a Babelic twist, not only is divinely given, but even after the human 
appropriation, is still divinely controlled. Poetry unifies our being with the life that 
we experience through language and thus language boasts this transcendental 
origin.  Zambrano spends much of her work detailing the differences between 
poetry and these limits of transparent rationality (philosophy); however, she abides 
by their common birthplace. She suggests, “[e]l origen común de filosofía y poesía es 
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la poiesis” (52). This poiesis is fundamentally an inspiración—namely, inspiration, 
creation, inhalation, or the taking-in of something invisible. The unity of poiesis is 
expression and creation at the same time in sacred unity, from which successive 
revelations will be born, separating themselves at this birth (as birth is always 
separation). This separation produces poetry (in its different species) and 
philosophy. Poetry and philosophy are born of this sacred inspiration, which comes 
forth from a sort of primordial soup-ocean that is pre-historic and pre-lingual. That 
moment in which philosophy becomes expressive, goes beyond philosophy, and 
what is left a surplus in terms of what it wants to convey logically. Something more 
is generated, that is, that which transcends communication. She explains, “[a]sí el 
poeta en su poema crea una unidad con la palabra, esas palabras que tratan de 
apresar lo más tenue, lo más alado, lo maś distinto de cada cosa, de cada instante” 
(Zambrano, Filosofía y Poesía 21-22). For Zambrano philosophy does not provide 
the answers to life, and thus poetic words are this alternative to logic. 
THE DEATH OF GOD IN LITERATURE 
In discussions of mysticism there is the inevitable questioning of the purpose 
of life vis-à-vis death. Is life merely a Bataille-esque death drive?10 Is it a “living 
toward dying” approach so favored by Spanish Catholic mystics Saint Theresa and 
Saint John? Dovetailing with Hegel's being-becoming paradigm, Zambrano's unique 
philosophy offers death as a “...una preparación para la muerte y el filósofo es el 
hombre que está maduro para ella” (Zambrano, Filosofia y Poesía 56). I question to 
what degree a mystical interpretation roots itself solely in a religious framework. Is 
                                                        
10 Here I refer to George Bataille’s Inner Experience (1943) where he sets up the notion of the “death 
drive.” It was his first philosophical treatise, followed by Guilty (1944) and On Nietzsche (1945), 
together comprising his volume, Summa Atheologica. 
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it, de facto, couched in religious terms? Or are there other possible ways to 
conceptualize mystical qualities of literature? Zambrano definitely argues that it is 
poetry and by this virtue, the poet, that first encounters and confronts the sacred. 
Bataille offers us one of his poems in “Part Five: Manibus Date Lilia Plenis” of Inner 
Experience entitled God: 
  With warm hands 
  I die you die 
  where is he 
  where am I 
  without laughter 
  I am dead 
  dead and dead 
  in the pitch-black night 
  arrow shot 
  at him. (165) 
There is the evident preoccupation of death, of darkness, of finitude and yet 
infinity. The poetic voice favors apostrophe in metaphysical wonderment. The poem 
evokes an enveloping of emotional and physical being while nebulizing life and 
death—a death three times dead. If dead is finite, then what is the purpose does 
declaring it threefold? Death, then, and the aspiration to it in mysticism, is 
something which I consider to be a state, an evolution of being. Here, it is infinite, as 
a state of slow movement, of space, void or not, that can be manipulated or engaged 
with. Thus, a mystical approach to life, and its progression to death, does not need to 
be constrained by a God-centered mysticism; but rather it is parsed out into a 
philosophical conceptualization of mysticism as it relates to literature.  
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Zambrano describes in her book El hombre y lo divino (1955)  “toda muerte 
va seguida de una lenta resurrección, que comienza tras del vacío irremediable que 
la muerte deja” (229). In this philosophical treatise Zambrano is describing the 
processes of the divine and looking at a somewhat anthropologic transition from 
paganization to gnosticism to more modern, organized religion; one of the 
fundamental basis she uses to explore these ideas is death.  She goes on to explain, 
using the decadence of the Roman empire as a metonymic expression of 
historical/cultural death, that history has simplified death to be a linear experience, 
simplistic and finite. But, she argues “mas, en realidad, el proceso de la muerte del 
Imperio romano se funde con la vida, no con la de los países reconocidos como sus 
hijos directos, sino con lo que hoy llamamos ‘cultura occidental.’ Un abismo se abrió 
un día, más hondo que el de la extinción del poderío imperial. Fue cuando los dioses 
quedaron bajo la luz del Nuevo Dios, único, y comenzaron a entrar en una lenta 
agonía” (230).   From here there was a transition from paganism to a singular God 
looking toward to future “viviendo en función de Él” and between these two 
conceptions of life emerges the notion “vivir una muerte: vivir un morir.” I am not 
suggesting categorically that Zambrano is a mystical philosopher in stating this vivir 
un morir, that she writes in a Teresian styled concept that living is akin or equal to 
dying. But rather that his contrast of archetypical death with that of one identified 
rather as transcendent/movement/life, is useful in examining some of García 
Marruz's work, which will be discussed in Chapter Two. Fascinating to consider is 
the transition to an institutionalized Religion that considers the flux of life and death 
as transient and also variable, and coterminous in many ways. It is not the stagnant, 
isolated, linear death of the pagan years.  
The last point I will discuss is Zambrano’s consideration of death in relation 
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to religious nascence, codified by Zambrano in terms of “la nada,” nothing(ness). 
 First, Zambrano explains this somewhat gnostic nada and its roots in defying the 
convention of death as end to life (what I discussed earlier). Nada is “una luz nacida 
en la agonía [que] es la temporalidad que se consume y puede dar por ello una cierta 
aproximación de muerte superada; de muerte consumida también al par que la vida 
y la muerte. Pues la muerte no es el contrario, ni la negación de la vida en su 
integridad. ” (176).  Could this nada be the the very mystical state of awareness, 
connection, or unification (with God) that produces this light? A light born from the 
agony that is not just experienced, but consumed, digested. It is a nada that 
overcomes death itself, Zambrano suggests, that is in some way equal to life and 
death simultaneously. I argue then that this “muerte superada” most closely 
approximates the state of mystical ecstasy achieved only by the contemplative state 
prior to the mystical union and then the passive ecstatic state afterward. I use the 
term mystical state to a degree that is different from a strictly Christian 
understanding; rather, I believe this state, which I will further detail as “mysticality” 
more closely resembles the philosophy of Georges Bataille's notion of inner 
experience in his eponymous work. He codifies the difference between an inner 
experience and mystical state, establishing a dislike for the term mystical, based on 
the grounds that mysticism is a de facto confessional state, tied to a prescriptive 
Religion (Bataille 3). He explains that the inner experience he refers to is “vague, to 
any confession whatsoever” and resists isolation from other experiences or 
categorization by religious framework. I think the best definition he offers is put 
forth in the endnotes where he states, “...inner experience is linked to the necessity, 
for the mind, of putting everything into question—without any conceivable respite 
or rest. This necessity came to light despite religious presuppositions, but its 
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consequences are all the more far-reaching if one puts them aside” (175). His 
argument, then, is rooted in the philosophical questioning of being, rather than the 
strictly religious one, though he does not deny the overlap. He takes issue with the 
pre-ordained rite of passage a mystic endures before reaching the ecstatic state, 
explaining that a “‘mystic’ sees what he wants—this depends on powers which are 
relative. And in the same way, he discovers—what he knew” (175). Bataille's mystic 
therefore is encountering a self that is already known, native to the ser; thus I 
believe Bataille's inner experience to be a simultaneous discovery of Zambrano's 
nada that offers the Zambranista “light” and understanding of the originario. Bataille 
quotes Hegel, referencing his inner experience: 
Such minds...when they abandon themselves to the disordered 
unrest of their souls, imagine that by masking their 
consciousness of self and by overcoming their understanding 
they are the chosen ones to whom God gives wisdom during 
their slumber; in fact what they conceive and bring into 
the world during this slumber, are dreams... (175) 
To this definition, however, I add a further caveat. Bataille suggests that the 
inner experience is in-dwelling and experienced without the necessary effort a 
mystic puts forth. I question what difference there really is between these two 
philosophies. Here, I offer the term mysticality. I posit that the asceticism, strife, and 
devotion to a desired mystical state can be engendered by a person who identifies as 
religious but who chooses to use this mysticality as a means to a non-religious end. 
Mysticality, then, is like Bataille's inner experience that thrives in a constant state of 
questioning, but whose religious antecedent does not preclude inquiry or discovery. 
I offer that it is precisely the religious identification that permits the person to avail 
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himself of the philosophical journey and uneasiness (mystical state) that is 
contemplated in Bataille's “experience.”  
It should be noted that Zambrano's philosophy here could be pan-religious, 
though she does not specifically identify a doctrine. She does foreground, however, 
the Christian's consideration of death and what it means to conquer it: “...para el 
cristiano, la salida de las tinieblas está abierta a un camino ya descubierto y trazado” 
(El hombre y lo divino 177). Thus, the reckoning with death and the afterlife is, for a 
Christian, a pre-ordained path which ends in Judgment Day, standing “desnudo ante 
Dios” (177). This does not surprise us, as it is in keeping with Christianity's 
foundational paradigm that commitment to Jesus the Savior will reunite you with 
God. It is at this precise moment, when confronting death, that Zambrano's 
fascination with this nada comes to play:   
Y desde ese momento, comenzó a surgir la nada. La nada que 
no puede ser ni idea, porque no puede ser pensada en función 
de ser, del Ser.  La nada se irá abriendo camino en la mente y el 
ánimo del hombre como sentir originario. Es decir: en los 
infiernos del ser. (177)  
This nada I believe is a recognition of the poiesis of the self. If this nada is, as 
I previously stated, a state that supersedes death, it is omnipresent and everlasting 
part of the ser. It provides man with the ability to be originario, that is, native, 
indigenous. But native to what? Arguably, it is a recognition and re-taking of the 
self—a unification with the self's most intimate native innateness—upon the 
confrontation with death. This is why nada is so paramount for Zambrano to one's 
own subjectivity: one's own perception is shaped. Here, then, a return to one’s own 
intimacy, to the interior self/origen takes place.   
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AN ARGUMENT FOR MYSTICALITY 
Now that I have laid out these discussions of mysticism and philosophy, it 
now time to begin amplifying what mysticism means to me and to the authors I will 
investigate in this analysis. By expanding the semantic value of “mysticism,” I can 
incorporate my own new term, “mysticality”; I explore where it exists on this 
spectrum, lying somewhere between Mysticism/Religion (as defined in more 
orthodox terms) and Religiosity. Here are the loci at either extreme and the 
characteristics inherent to each definition: 
       
Mysticism         Mysticality 
<--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------> 
Orthodox Catholic or Jewish mysticism   Mystical rhetoric/language 
Union with God      Symbolic communion or 
         union with ‘other’ 
The Divine       The profane divinized 
Mystical approach and ends     Likely mystical approach 
           only 
 
If a mystic, as earlier discussed, is in constant search of a body, either 
through ecstatic experience or biblical exegesis, then it is my intention to prove that 
mysticality—and not necessarily mysticism—uses poetry as the medium by which 
to search for this body. Here, I rely heavily again on Hollywood, specifically with 
regard to the “emotional, bodily and excessive forms of mysticism” (Sensible Ecstasy 
5). French feminist and psychoanalytic scholars Hélène Cixous, Catherine Clément, 
Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray as well as Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and 
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Jacques Lacan have all discussed mysticism at different points in their work, 
specifically as it related to feminism and hysteria. Because I push for this term 
mysticality and am insisting on the extra-mystical writing offered by my authors in 
question, then I must flesh out these “bodily” and “excessive” types of mysticism 
that other scholars discuss. In my argument, however, the excessiveness can still be 
rooted in a psychoanalytic (and feminine) desire; the end result (the written word) 
is meant to neither achieve nor propagate mystical thought alone. Rather, the 
desired side effect is of a more secular nature: political poetry, ontological poetics, 
or revolutionary/feminist doctrine. In other words, a mystical literary approach—or 
personal religious beliefs of the author—permits a body of written work whose 
effects are infallibly religious, yet not necessarily mystical in the traditional sense.  
Hélène Cixous's discussion of the intersection of femininity and mysticism 
considers the pathological marker of “hysteric” to actually be a re-taking of the 
psychoanalytic repressed desire, to the degree that she still writes using the term 
“hysteria” as medical lexicon. However, as Hollywood observes, “Cixous's argument 
leads to the conclusion that mystics, in that they are religious, are obsessive-
compulsives, whereas in that they are hysterical, they are artists and 
revolutionaries” (Sensible Ecstasy 4). Hollywood identifies this classification as a 
transvaluation of values, “a radical reversal of the deployment of medical and 
psychoanalytic categories...” (4). While Cixous's observations are astute and game-
changing, I argue for a movement beyond this transfiguration of 
medical/psychoanalytic lexica. Why must we consider only the examples of 
traditional mysticism and the way women writers, for centuries, have survived 
writing them(selves) in Mysticism proper? Is a poet confined to convicted mysticism 
just to be able to evoke mystical writing? If mystics write, as James explains, in a 
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“mystical state of consciousness,” then what do we call those that write mystically, 
without knowledge or intent of mystical constitution? Certainly, there is a place card 
for them within the mystical logos. The authors I will consider in Chapters Two, 
Three, and Four all share some foundational characteristics: they are personally 
religious (only one self-identifies as mystical); they employ poetic expression 
(either in poetry or prose) to explore mystical rhetorical notions; the sacredness of 
profanity/mundanity is highlighted over the Divine itself—thus instituting a 
transvaluation of divinity; and ontology is a central theme to each author's work 
(and for me specifically, the ontology of mysticism).  
A more recognized example of an author's interpretation of mystical values 
can be cited in Borges's short story “El Aleph.” His interest in Jewish mysticism—
evidenced by his poem “El Gólem,” “Death and the Compass,” and “The Other 
Death”—is well-known but Borges is not a mystic, nor is he necessarily a mystical 
writer. Ontologically speaking then, what renders a written work mystical? In 
Borges's story, when the narrator descends into the cellar, he closes his eyes, open 
them, and see the Aleph. The Aleph has been described to him as a point in time and 
space that contains all other points: “el lugar donde están, sin confundirse, todos los 
lugares del orbe, vistos desde todos los ángulos...todos los lugares de la tierra están 
en el Aleph, ahí estarán todas las luminarias, todas las lámparas, todos los veneros 
de luz” (166). Borges, like James, recognizes his failure as a writer to aptly 
communicate the Aleph's essence in this meta-textual revelation: 
Arribo, ahora, el inefable centro de mi relato; empieza, aquí, mi 
desesperación de escritor. Todo lenguaje es un alfabeto de 
símbolos cuyo ejercicio presupone un pasado que los 
interlocutores comparten; cómo transmitir a los otros el 
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infinito Aleph, que mi temerosa memoria apenas abarca? 
(Borges 168). 
He recognizes an anxiety in confronting this analogous, transitory experience 
and his neophyte presence as inadequate. Therefore, he relies on the mystics to help 
explain, though he himself is not a mystic: 
Los místicos, en análogo trance, prodigan los emblemas: para 
significar la divinidad, un persa habla de un pájaro que de 
algún modo es todos los pájaros; Alanus de Insulis, de una 
esfera cuyo centro está en todas partes y la circunferencia en 
ninguna; Ezequiel, de un ángel de cuatro caras que a un tiempo 
se dirige al Oriente y al Occidente, al Norte y al Sur. (No en 
vano rememoro esas inconcebibles analogías; alguna relación 
tienen con el Aleph.) (169) 
Borges offers a series of inconceivable relationships that to the non-mystic 
are paradoxical, yet to the Aleph are contiguous, ineffable, and ever-possible. And 
though the diameter of the Aleph is only a few centimeters, its cosmic contents do 
not suffer a reduction in size whatsoever. What his eyes perceive is simultáneo yet 
what his pen writes (in the aftermath) is necessarily sucesivo because language only 
functions in this linear manner (169). If Borges calls on the mystics to 
philosophically explain, or, at the very least, to effectively narrate, the protagonist's 
encounter with the Aleph, does there need to be mystical conviction or union to 
understand this analogy? Borges knows that the mystics are the ones who best 
comprehend and express an enigma such as the Aleph, yet there is no union with 
God or ecstatic state (in the rapturous, traditional sense) experienced. How do we 
codify, then, the protagonist's intimate exposure with the Aleph? If it is not mystical, 
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by mysticism's standards, this is where I argue mysticality plays a crucial role. The 
experience is mystical-like, yet not religious; intense but not ecstatic; there is 
awareness of the infinite cosmos but not an innate understanding of it. Mysticality, 
then, aims to provide an alternate identification for this sort of writing, which I will 
exemplify with the works of Fina Garcia Marruz, Cintio Vitier, Jacobo Fijman, and 
Clarice Lispector.  
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Chapter Two: Fina García Marruz: What is a Catholicist Poet? 
INTRODUCTION 
Before I begin the textual analysis of features of mysticality in the poetry of 
Fina García Marruz, I will briefly take a broader view of the poetics of humanity. I 
am interested in poetic moments of union—or ecstasy—that poets such as García 
Marruz explore thematically in their work. Let me consider for a moment, however, 
similar moments in daily life outside that which is poetically described. The noted 
twentieth-century American psychologist Abraham Maslow changed the way the 
world saw his field in first describing people-in-need as clients, instead of patients, 
as had been the establishment precedent. In his famed hierarchy of needs, he 
outlines the basic structure of human behavior, beginning at the bottom with 
physiological necessities (shelter, food, sex); next comes safety (in self and 
employment); after which we see love/belonging; self-esteem; and finally, the ever-
elusive self-actualization atop the rest. The idea, then, is that higher levels are 
achieved only when prior levels are securely attained. Poetically speaking, and with 
regard to writers in general, I do not suggest that this linear pyramid of reference 
serves as a guide to poets, nor should it inhibit their poetic intentions or abilities. 
Still, I am interested in what Maslow described as “peak experiences,” where the 
happiest, most stress-free moments of life are felt and enjoyed. These moments have 
often been labeled as religious experiences; yet, I seek out their logos in the non-
religious sense as well. These peak, euphoric moments embody the most idyllic 
confluence of experiential ideas: stimulation, mindfulness, effortlessness, loss of self, 
harmony, and expressiveness. They are perfection; a kind of perfection unique to 
every individual. Yet, like the writing, recitation, or reading of a poem, they are 
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transient in nature. Maslow famously admitted, “In some great moment, man can be 
perfect, it's possible. But for five minutes” (www.npr.org “How did Abraham 
Maslow?”). With this in mind, I embark on the following poetic analysis recalling the 
peak experience of optimal performance in creativity as a means to mysticalist 
poetry and expression. 
These peak performances, together with the concepts of mysticality laid out 
in Chapter One, will now be applied to the early work of the Cuban essayist and poet 
Fina García Marruz (FGM) (La Havana 1929-).11 Many scholars of her work, 
including Carmen Ruiz Barrionuevo, indicate that there is a certain mysticalist 
quality to FGM's early poems in Las miradas perdidas (1944-1950). Author of the 
introduction to FGM's most recent 2011 anthology, ¿De qué silencio, eres tú silencio? 
(Salamanca 2011), Ruiz suggests the following: 
El punto de partida para García Marruz está también en una 
comprensión de la poesía como una actividad mágica que en 
algo recuerda a la mística, y al proponer lo exterior como 
objetivo, 'está traspasando su sustancia misma', por lo que ya 
no se puede hablar de poesía sino de religiosidad. (26) 
 
Thus, these magical, mystical poetics, such as FGM’s in this case, attempt to 
understand that which is exterior to the poetic voice. Her poems harmonize poetics 
with religiosity, a harmony for which she has become famous as noted by Ruiz, in 
addition to Jorge Luis Arcos, Robert Lesman, Emilio de Armas, among others. These 
analyses examine the mysticism, inner experience, and inner exploration of the 
exterior in FGM’s work. Similarly, it is for this eminent supply of mysticalist qualities 
                                                        
11  From now own referred to as FGM. 
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that I choose FGM's early poems. However, my investigation differs from these 
previous studies in that it assays the presence of the divine in the mundane and the 
degree to which profanness contributes to and causes mysticality. I believe FGM’s 
early work exemplifies my notion of mysticality and therefore have elected to 
examine it in my first poetry-focused chapter. These early poems encircle an 
intimate space to FGM, often simple daily items, toils, and memories as well as 
imagery reflecting the larger intimacy of the island itself, Cuba. Lesman describes 
FGM's nostalgia not as political, "sino celestial; el impulso restaurativo de su 
nostalgia se orienta hacia lo más allá mientras la nostalgia restaurativa se obsesiona 
por recuperar, aquí y ahora, lo que se anhela" (Lesman 83-84). I conclude, then, that 
FGM's nostalgic celestiality reaching for some type of "beyond," perfectly suits an 
approach that incorporates mysticality, instead of mysticism.  
In addition to the religiosity of her poetics, I will also consider FGM's role as a 
central member of Orígenes, the Cuban literary movement of the 1940s and 1950s, 
particularly as only one of two women to be cited among the group's members. 
Hélène Cixous’s and Luce Irigaray’s notions of women writers and mysticism will be 
analyzed to examine the way in which these women seek transcendence through 
mystical means and love of God. I, as others have, will discuss one of FGM's most 
cited poems "Una dulce nevada está cayendo," which opens Las miradas perdidas 
and echoes the symbology used by fellow Cuban writers Julián del Casal and José 
Lezama Lima (Ruiz 31). However, FGM's “dulce nevada” is infused with new sounds 
and intimacies, new movements between the interior and exterior, and the 
infiltration of divinity into the mundane. In order to examine how FGM manages this 




FINA GARCÍA MARRUZ AND ORÍGENES 
During the pre- and proto-periods of Orígenes production—that include the 
end of Latin American and peninsular romanticism, the beginnings of modernismo, 
as well as the Generations of ’98, ’14, and ‘27—poetic works identified as pure 
poetry (poesía pura), social poetry (poesía social), as well as modernista poetry 
would come to influence Orígenes, especially one of their most foundational 
members, José Lezama Lima. According to critic, Enrique Saínz, Lezama dialogued 
with Spanish ’27 poet Luis Cernuda and his notions of corporeal mysticism. As with 
the Generation of ’27's desire to counterbalance ideological dualisms, the poets of 
Orígenes sought to foment a creative individualism within an artistic and literary 
community that defended the rights of the nation and the national under the guise 
of Catholicism.12 But a rupture was necessary. Lezama was described as having 
broken cleanly with pre-existing poetic ideals: “su espacio y sus fuentes no estaban 
en relación esencial ninguna con la circundante atmósfera poética. Su tiempo no 
parecía ser histórico ni ahistórico, sino literalmente, fabuloso” (Saínz, “Espacio 
Laical” 101). Fabuloso here emits many meanings: fabulous, regarding the 
extraordinary; relating to fables as in the stylistics and thematic preferences of the 
modernista poets paying poetic homage to the works of the ancient Greeks and 
Romans; and the mythical and/or mystical, reaching out to an “aventura metafísica o 
mística,” one of the tenets of the Orígenes group. Having been present during the 
burgeoning period of the group’s lifetime, María Zambrano, among others, called 
them “un grupo de poetas cubanos”  that had more “unidad de aliento más que 
grupo” (Alfonso Reyes, “Correspondencia” 344-345). But to distance Orígenes from 
                                                        
12  See Alvaro Salvador’s 2008 article in Letral, “Los escritores hispanoamericanos y la 
generación del ‘27 on the Generation of ’27.  
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the previous artistic movements, Cintio Vitier (CV) proposed his own description of 
Lezama’s work in what would become a canonical text for the group’s manifesto, 
Diez poetas cubanos: 1937-1947: 
…de la elegía, la rosa, la estatua (típicas de la generación 
anterior, y persistentes aún en otros poetas 
hispanoamericanos) sucede entre nosotros un salto, que 
diríamos en ocasiones sombrío de voracidad, hacia más 
dramáticas variaciones en torno a la fábula, el destino, la 
sustancia; el justo y transparente endecasílabo es abandonado 
por un verso imperioso e imprevisible; una poesía de deliquio, 
en fin, da paso a una poesía de penetración. Comprobamos así 
cómo el intimismo esteticista…se abre a la aventura metafísica 
o mística, y por lo tanto muchas veces hermética. (Saínz, 
“Espacio Laical” 2012)13  
A swift abandonment of the stagnant stylistics of the past (hendecasyllabic) 
is exchanged for the unpredictable, yet imperious preferences offered by Lezama 
himself: a poetry that penetrates (masculine, aggressive) versus one of delicacy 
(feminine, faint) (101).14 It is, at its core, a version of poetic expression that looks 
and seeks out the inward path—through a poetic ontology—so much so that this 
poetics becomes enclosing, even secretive, private, and reclusive. Worthy of 
mention, however, is the addiction of the origenistas to ensuring their poetry was 
not exclusive of other poetic forms or readers; its purpose was decidedly not to 
incite more dualisms between the divine and the mundane, the refined and the 
                                                        
13 Cintio Vitier now referred to as CV. 




plebian, described by Saínz as the “sterile” division in poetic fields. Rather, the 
desire is to penetrate the self, to “encontrar su unidad esencial y alcanzar entonces 
su verdad más profunda” (Saínz 296).  Amid this poetic ontology, there is the 
methodology by which to achieve personal intimacy: Catholicism. I turn again to 
Saínz’s description: 
Los poetas origenistas, desde una religiosidad católica que se 
nos evidencia en sus más importantes textos poéticos y 
ensayísticos, nos han dejado una obra que nos conmueve por 
su riqueza y su honda espiritualidad, más allá de sus aciertos 
formales o de la reiterada sobreabundancia de sus numerosas 
páginas…hallamos una singular asimilación [en las obras de 
Lezama, FGM y CV] de importantes líneas del pensamiento 
católico universal, labor integradora…[e] incorporativa de un 
saber espiritual de procedencia múltiple. (102) 
    
A deep spiritual (and Catholic) meaning infuses the pages of the origenista 
literary corpus, a thematic thread that ties together this group's ontological search. 
But apart from the Orígenes poets being themselves Catholic, I question why this 
pervasive Catholicism is called on time and time again for the origenistas to serve as 
the vehicle by which to reach this desired intimacy, that is, transcendence. Why does 
institutionalized religion serve as this foundational paradigm in the post-avant-
garde, pre-revolutionary setting, when often times the poets seem to eschew 
dogma/dogmatic principles? FGM explains in her La familia de Orígenes (1997) the 
importance of Dante to their poetic struggle, even more so than Verlaine was to the 
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modernistas.15 Here enters the idea of catholicity, according to Saínz, which both 
modernistas and origenistas sought: “…[una] universalidad que habría de integrar 
vida y muerte, cuerpo y alma, Poesía e Historia” (102). What matters most is the 
universality of Catholicism, not its exclusivity, thereby underscoring the value of 
spiritual harmony when facing the greatest dichotomies of religion: life and death, 
body and spirit. The questioning turns away from a traditional approach in which 
the believer uses Catholicism first to ask and negotiate these mortal questions and 
instead prefers an avenue where the believer first pursues these questions and then 
mediates meaning by way of Catholicism. 
THE WORK OF FGM AS POET, ESSAYIST, AND FEMINIST 
To bridge the historicity of FGM’s work with the poetic selection and analysis 
that follow, it is important to note the chronology of the chosen poems. FGM 
publishes in 1951 Las miradas perdidas, a book of poems composed between 1944 
and 1950, selections of which are also published independently in the literary 
journal Orígenes, edited by José Lezama Lima and José Rodríguez Feo. In the mid 
1930s, Juan Ramón Jiménez and María Zambrano both visit Cuba—the former 
organizing poetry festivals in the Teatro Campoamor in which FGM and CV 
participate. Additionally, FGM spends time with Chilean poet Gabriela Mistral. FGM, 
a young, prolific, ebullient poet merely in her twenties, makes a lasting statement in 
the artistic and intellectual community in La Habana—her most recent anthology of 
poetry was published just in 2011, indicating her continued importance. It is during 
this time as well that she personally meets José Lezama Lima and in the year after, 
1947, at age 24, marries CV, with whom she shares her life until his death in 2009. 
                                                        
15Paul-Marie Verlaine (1844-1896) was a French poet, representative of the fin de siècle, Symbolist 
movement, which influenced the Latin American modernismo developing at the same time period. 
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FGM is additionally an academic, having completed her doctoral degree in 
social sciences at the University of Havana in 1961. Beginning the year after, she 
took on the role of researcher/scholar at the Biblioteca Nacional de Cuba. And for 
ten years, between 1977 and 1987, she worked at the Centro de Estudios Martianos, 
heading up the publication of the critical edition of Martí's Obras completas (1982). 
While I will not be discussing the post-revolution literary period in Cuba, it is 
noteworthy to mention FGM's vast publications of essays during the 1960s and 
1970s, predominantly those regarding Martí's work (Los versos de Martí (1968, 
Havana) and Temas martianos (1969, Havana)) as well as philosophical treatments 
of poetry and her collaborations with husband, CV, (Poesías y cartas (1977) and Flor 
oculta de poesía cubana (1978)).  
Thus, in consideration of FGM’s poetic publications—and keeping in mind 
her role as female, wife of CV, and Orígenes figurehead—I  turn first to a corpus that 
both precedes the revolution but also, significantly, reflects FGM’s arrival on the 
literary scene as a neophyte, yet as one with considerable agency and talent. 
Therefore, all the selections detailed below from Las miradas perdidas echo these 
formative years during the 1940s.  
MYSTICALITY AND CATHOLICITY. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE CATHOLIC TO FGM? 
I argue that FGM successfully writes about the sacramental precisely by 
reflecting intimate moments and experiences outside the Church and its dogma. As 
discussed in Chapter One, the use of a mystical rhetoric gives way to the 
phenomenon of mysticality, which allows FGM to make her poetry more liturgical 
without being dogmatic. Therefore I argue that her poetry represents the practical, 
ceremonial, and social (liturgical) aspects of Catholicism instead of the more 
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abstract, theoretical, and convictional parts of Catholic thought. As Catherine Davies 
astutely points out in her book A Place in the Sun? (1997), “[a]lthough a Catholic 
reading is important, is sometimes seems to miss the point” (93). The close readings 
that follow attempt to unpack FGM's mysticality as this new literary, 
phenomenological, and religious approach and to specifically divorce it from 
mysticism, using an apophatic theological strategy.16 FGM describes sanctity in the 
mundane, divine in the ordinary, and Godliness in earthliness. Here, the “-ity” of 
mysticality, therefore serves my purposes better, rather than the –ism of mysticism, 
much in the way I have employed the term “religiosity” instead of religion—just as I 
suspect Davies would argue as well—to explore FGM's poetry. The -ity challenges 
the dogma by necessarily placing it outside that which is dogmatic, yet it still 
espouses principles found within the Church. In a similar fashion, as mentioned in 
Chapter one, Thomas Aquinas takes up an apophatic approach to address God in his 
quinque viae (five ways) of knowing the existence of God, all of which deduce His 
presence by assumptions based on observation. FGM need not provide proofs, 
though poetically speaking, she does exactly this. I turn to CV's comments on his 
wife's work in the introductory remarks of Diez poetas cubanos (1986): 
...los poemas no constituyen para ella fines en sí mismos, sino 
sencillamente y estrictamente caminos o instrumentos que 
sirven al  progreso del alma y la visión. La poesía es lo que 
abre nuestra capacidad de ver; sus más  perfectas 
cristalizaciones no pueden sustituir el objeto a que el propio 
rapto poético tiende, o sea, la intemperie de la realidad, el ser 
                                                        
16Apophatic theological strategy refers to the via negativa, or the belief in humanity's limited 
understanding of an infinite God due to our own finiteness. 
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virginal de lo exterior que es al mismo tiempo la más inefable 
intimidad de la Creación. (184)  
The long-time scholar of FGM’s work, Jorge Luis Arcos, examines closely the 
role of the exterior in her poetic corpus, asserting that she often “trata de expresar 
lo inapresable a través de lo paradójico,” an ethos particularly pertinent in FGM's 
poems, “Sonetos de la lluvia” where she declares “esa música que soy que no abarco” 
(Arcos,  En torno 112; García Marruz, Las miradas perdidas 9). In this approach to 
determine a poetic interiority—poetically and religiously—there is often a 
rhythmic, tidal coming-and-going: a declaration of what is for the poetic voice and 
mutually what is not. That is, the via negativa, becomes a type of phenomenological 
discourse by which FGM examines Zambrano's poetic reason. Beyond what Edmund 
Husserl would identify as essential objectivities, I suggest, as does Ivette Fuentes, 
what Merleau-Ponty describes as “phenomenology of perception.”17 If we first 
perceive and then bridge this gap between our perception and the written narrative 
of this perception, then we can create a poetic ontology, as perhaps FGM does in her 
early work. Merleau-Ponty's central notion of the primacy of perception offers a 
dialogic relationship between the body and the mind and their connection with the 
world, rather than a dichotomy of one versus the other (Phenomenology 25). A 
diachronic inter-subjectivity between body and mind underscores the importance of 
the two, especially of the body and the role it plays. Arguably, FGM uses this same 
perceptive body to experience the phenomena of subjectivity, of experience, and of 
poetic embodiment.  
                                                        
17Taken from a paper given by Ivette Fuentes at conference on FGM in Havana, Cuba, November 




Paradoxically, though unsurprising in FGM’s technique, these body and mind 
phenomenologies are simultaneous and coterminous. To exemplify this notion of 
poiesis as it demonstrates a sort of exteriority of self, and the creational conundrum 
that it describes, I turn to a selection of FGM’s poems, where I argue she attempts to 
access this exteriority and approximate or draw closer to the essence of Zambrano’s 
poetic language. Arcos insists that FGM’s poetry “… se manifiesta con una particular 
intensidad, pues ella siempre se sitúa frente a la realidad desde una perspectiva 
poética, lo cual hace que tanto su pensamiento crítico o ensayístico como su obra en 
verso o sus prosas poéticas, encuentren su raíz fundacional y unitiva en la poesía” 
(103). FGM’s poetic reality becomes her poetic philosophy, or alternatively, her 
poiesis. 
Arcos further describes this unifying poetics of her early work by stating that 
she always chooses “una ética, una filosofía, una ideología, un universo axiológico, 
expresados en ese pensamiento y transfigurados en su objetivación poética a través 
de la individual perspectiva del escritor” (En torno 103).  An axiological universe 
constructed by FGM would be, then, one where the poet and poetic voice 
problematize (by questioning) and evaluate (by versification) the values and value 
judgments made in verse. In the following first two stanzas of her sonnet "Una dulce 
nevada está cayendo," there is first a presentation of this axiomatic space, more 
abstract, where the poetic voice situates herself, and then a transition to the voice’s 
own subjectivity within this space: 
  Una dulce nevada está cayendo 
  detrás de cada cosa, cada amante, 
  una dulce nevada comprendiendo 




  Un monólogo lento de diamante 
  calla detrás de lo que voy diciendo 
  un actor su papel mal repitiendo 
  sin fin, en soledad gesticulante (De qué silencio 109). 
 
First, the poetic voice offers the philosophy that behind each thing there is a 
silence, a whiteness, that falls, sweetly; here a universal observation as it is 
encapsulated by each worldly thing. Then, this snowfall is identified behind each 
lover, a more concrete, intimate subject, but unspecified nonetheless; the chosen 
approach is both distanced and inclusive. Life is anthropomorphized, and as a 
protagonist in the poem, it is limited in its self-actualization. FGM creates here a 
universe where the world is perceived as a silent snowfall, latent and exterior to the 
poetic voice, but present. At this moment FGM begins the inward turn, invoking a 
(meta)monologue and the first person ([yo] voy). Now, instead of the hidden space 
behind things or lovers, there is the “behindness” of her own voice containing a 
slow, diamond monologue. A diamond, while perhaps glittery like snow, is hardened 
and durative, unlike its ephemeral sky-fallen poetic counterpart. This behindness is 
compared to a bad actor mindlessly repeating his own words, opposed to the sweet 
snow sharing (and understanding) life’s complications. Even though the poetic voice 
created this axiology and located herself within it, hers is a reality that is expressed 
in mere un-witnessed gesticulations in solitude. Perhaps she questions “where do 
these words fall?” and “what meaning do they have outside of this universe?”.  There 
is a meditative, universal approach followed by a self-realization. She describes an 
exterior by way of examining her interior; that is, she attempts an approach to a 
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poetically-fashioned universe, to a grander meaning within it, by way of a inward 
gazing upon her own meaning, voiced or not. Here, I argue that her methodology is 
mystical by way of the via negativa, yet her ends are rhetorical and poetic. The last 
two stanzas portray the internalization of this universe within the poetic voice’s 
reality: 
  Una suave nevada me convierte 
  ante los ojos, ironistas sobrios, 
  al dogma del paisaje que me advierte 
 
  Una voz, algún coche apareciendo, 
  mientras en lo que miro y lo que toco 
  siento que algo muy lejos se va huyendo. (109) 
 This internalization is palpable; it penetrates her. It converts her into the 
landscape itself, into the dogma of the Cuban countryside, into the faith of her literal 
environment. Regardless, though, she is suddenly devoted to this new force, not 
doctrinal, but consuming and converting. Upon the conversion to this new “faith” 
there is a grasping of what is, what is tangible, that which she sees (miro) and 
touches (toco) and alternatively what is not, feeling/perceiving something that is 
escaping (se va huyendo). This axiological universe is created; a paradox is formed; 
the poetic voice questions and struggles within it; and there is simultaneous 
experimentation of this paradox. A resolutely mystical poet/poem might often find 
God smiling at the poetic voice at the sonnet’s end.  However, FGM garners poetic 
brilliance in using this mystical rhetoric—including the archetypical paradox, 
dogmatic belief and constitutional conversion—all while ending the sonnet with the 
poetic voice’s inability to sense (physically) this behindness that escapes visuality 
 73 
 
and tangibility. Is it God’s presence? Or his absence? While possible, my argument 
for a reading of mysticality proposes that God’s presence may or may not manifest 
itself, but the union with a(ny) presence, in this case, poiesis, is what counts.  
By what mechanism, then, does FGM look to her interior, vis-à-vis her 
Catholic faith, to her own intimacy with herself and with God to examine the process 
of poiesis? She considers otherness, often expressed by suffering—a method 
hallmarked in Catholic tradition to encourage empathy—and this otherness is 
reflected thematically by her poetry. She often focuses on the mentally handicapped, 
children, the homeless, and those that are marginalized in Cuba, and instead of 
evangelizing, she reaches out by way of poetic voice and stands with them and 
suffers with them. They are those who are outwardly visible to her, but their 
suffering is rendered unreachable in that only empathy is emotionally possible; 
there is no physical analogy. Thus, the poetry is for FGM the vehicle by which she 
approaches this hermetic suffering.  As in the poetry of Jiménez, an attentiveness to 
that which remains outside (exteriority) results in a greater intimacy (interiority).18 
She even chooses Jesus as a societal subject in co-suffering in a poem entitled 
“Transfiguración de Jesús en el Monte.” She doesn't theatricalize or sensationalize 
this Biblical narrative. Rather, the poem is intimately descriptive, with daily smells, 
“las calles empinadas y estrechas olían a comida simple y brutal” and day-in-the-life-
of descriptions, “el paso lento de los fariseos y el paso rápido de los mercaderes.” 
She engages in a biblical discourse by re-writing it in her own words and making it 
mundane and operational at this quotidian level. It is almost as if she were 
commuting to work during the late Roman era and happened on Jesus’ 
                                                        
18 Here I refer to the aforementioned Juan Ramón Jimenez (1881-1958), Spanish poet who was 
renowned for his use of “pure poetry”; he heavily influenced the Orígenes group. 
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transfiguration at the side of the road. It is both metonymic (Jesus’ transformation 
as representational of poiesis) and metaphoric (Jesus’ suffering is her suffering). 
Perhaps this quotidianizing of Jesus’ transformation is an attempt to 
reconcile FGM's belief with her poetic expression, to phenomenologically express 
the perception of the body. This is her poetic rendering of a parable which gives it 
personal meaning for her. She refers back to the Bible often, but not in an orthodox 
or theological way. She describes the Israeli town near where Jesus’ transformation 
occurs, describing it as a familiar conversation, “y las casas sucedían como las 
razones de una discusión de que ya conocemos todas las partes” (144). By including 
the first person plural (nosotros), FGM accesses and appeals to the congregational, 
liturgical side of the reader. And in so doing she invokes the quotidian aspect of the 
experience of religion. In this way, I find that her voice is not necessarily limited to 
the Catholic tradition—though espousing it—but rather it is both intimate and 
universally public at the same time precisely because of this act of quotidianization. 
She finds union in just the things that a traditional mystic considers mundane. Thus, 
FGM suggests a kind of quotidian transfiguration to express the innate divinity of 
the mundane. Unlike a mystical Christian poet, who feels and responds to the 
beckoning of Christ and her union with God, she is fascinated with life and the 
possibilities that life offers in moments of compassion. Perhaps it is a 
deconstruction or a de-Catholicizing of Catholicism—that is, eminent importance 
placed on what occurs outside the Church and its rites. In emphasizing the non-
sacramental, FGM allows its very own sacralization. Carmen Ruiz Barrionuevo 
comments that, for FGM, “el acto creador no responde a una tesis, como el arte 
social, del que se desliga…” (De qué 23). FGM’s artistic muse, as it were, would be 
her personal Catholic project embodied in the social reality in which she found 
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herself. Arcos adds, “…la autora [FGM] esgrime en sus textos la defensa del carácter 
simbólico del arte, así como la superación de las fragmentaciones de las vanguardias 
y del purismo en la poesía…en la poesía pura se produce la separación de la esencia 
de aquello que la encarna, es decir la realidad” (La pobreza 150). If the origenista 
project sought the essentialness and enhancement of being in poetic form, then FGM 
offers a pristine vision of this poetic reality in going beyond poesía pura owing to its 
commitment to exteriority.   
FGM indeed makes Christ part of her own “reality.” She selectively discusses 
Christ, the mortal, not Christ the Messiah, before his transfiguration, prior to 
crucifixion, (though the poem’s title echoes the miraculous transformation): “he 
aquí que Jesús ha tomado de la mano a Pedro, a Jacobo y a Juan, y los ha llevado al 
monte” (García Marruz, De qué 144). Jesus is presented as a member of humanity, 
and in consideration of founding tendencies of the Orígenes group, both the 
individual and the participatory are favored over theoretical aesthetics or trending 
literary movements: 
Así pues el manifiesto sustentador del quehacer origenista se 
perpetuó en el punto medular de la cultura, entendida como 
defensa de la libertad del hombre, en su ser individual y 
participativo, entraña y raíz de sus formas de decir y actuar, 
ajenas a la imagen circunstancial requerida o deseada… 
(Fuentes www.cubaliteraria.cu).  
If the function, then, of origenista poetry is to foreground the mission of 
poetic humanitas within a Catholic framework, then FGM chooses to advance this 
project by rendering it quotidian, accessible, and human. As Arcos suggests, “el 
misterio de la poesía es el misterio de la encarnación, misterio cristiano por 
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excelencia, el del verbo se hace carne” (La pobreza 151). FGM embodies Christ and 
poetic words in reality. 
To further reflect on FGM’s ability to quotidianize—and how this relates to 
mysticality—I must examine her own considerations regarding how a poet/poem 
becomes mystical. In a 1991 essay “San Juan de la Cruz: la Palabra y el Silencio,” 
where FGM discusses San Juan de la Cruz’s use of words to communicate silence, she 
puts forth a pertinent question that considers the potential innate mysticality in 
poets of all types. She wonders, when accessing something new about oneself, “en 
que entra, o empieza a entrar, aquello que nos excede y sólo por eso nos alegra y 
aquieta,” how does the poet manage this simultaneous satisfaction (alegra) and 
assurance (aquieta) regarding that which is always beyond (nos excede) his/her 
comprehension (San Juan 8). How do we parse out mystical poetry from poetry? Or 
is all poetry subscribing to some degree to mysticism?  
Preceding this question, however, how does FGM define a mystical poet? Her 
thoughts on the matter are somewhat polemical: “Toda poesía, aun la negadora, ¿es 
de entraña mística? Toda mística, aun la arribada a vía iluminativa, ¿es de entraña 
poética?” (8). Indubitably she classifies San Juan as both poet and mystic, but her 
suggestion proves that as both a poet and a critic of poetry herself, she locates a 
certain crux of poetry’s purpose: if a (religious) poet’s ontological presence is 
manifest in a poem, does that make it mystical? I do not believe her to have wholly 
answered this question in her essay as the purpose was to merely present this idea 
more than offer a precise resolution. However, my interest lies primarily in this 
problematizing, which serves to explicitly highlight the coalescing of religious 
writers and their religious poetry. It is not simply a linear production, that is, a 
religious writer produces a religious poem. Perhaps it is better queried: does a 
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religious writer produce a religious poem? She turns also to Zambrano’s “saber del 
alma” to explain: a poet (religious or not) seeks this “saber del alma,” and this is 
particularly the case for the origenistas: 
y este ‘saber del alma’ no se opone a la luz intelectual sino que 
la traspasa, no toda ciencia negando sino ‘toda ciencia 
trascendiendo’….Así este ‘sé bien’ no lo es sólo de lo poco que 
sabemos sino de lo mucho que ignoramos, saber que es un ‘no 
saber’ sino aquello que esencialmente nutre toda sabiduría y 
que en forma tal nos excede. (11)  
What we know of ourselves must also encompass what do not know; a poet’s 
work then is to nourish him or herself on this search for his/her interior. If it so 
happens that a given poet’s nourishment is Catholicism, then his/her work may or 
may not give way to mystical poetry. If, as is the case with FGM, catholicity is the 
chosen sustenance, Catholicism permits mystical fusions among the poetic words. 
How, then, do Catholicism and its views on the afterlife present themselves in 
FGM’s work? Arcos underscores FGM’s fidelity to both the self and to death, 
particularly in the book of poems Visitaciones (1970), asserting that the latter “no es 
sino una forma de consumación” (En torno 166). As precisely this act of culmination, 
I examine an earlier poem, “Vendrá la muerte” from Las miradas perdidas. It is the 
culmination of the poetic voice waxing nostalgic about two experiences of death: the 
physical and the spiritual. Themes of sound(lessness) and sleep recur as the poetic 
voice finds acceptance in knowing death comes for her. With assurance the poetic 
voice states that death will arrive at an unexpected moment: 
  Vendrá la muerte a transformar el lila 
  reminiscente de tus trajes idos, 
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  sorpresa será el cesped conocido 
  y la taza en tu mano ya dormida. 
According to Arcos, “[l]a muerte [marruciana]…es abordada directamente 
como un misterio que afecta su condición humana y que, como todo misterio, se 
busca comprender” (167). Death’s appearance is familiar (tus trajes idos) yet 
surprising to the common objects surrounding the chosen tú (cesped conocido, taza). 
It partners with FGM’s presentation of the human condition; death does not destroy 
life, coming to transform, rather than to take away. FGM works immediately to set 
an atmosphere of comfort and familiar intimacy—the image of a friend asleep on the 
sofa, coffee cup still in hand. What is the essence of these daily things she illustrates 
poetically? Using them as a methodology, the poetic voice soaks them in and moves 
through them to finally move past and transcend them. They are the way to the 
“exterior no externo,” giving way to the interior. She states in her famous essay, “Lo 
exterior en la poesía”:   
Reparemos que sólo hay dos realidades absolutamente 
exteriores a la imagen que de ellas tenemos o nos hacemos: 
nosotros mismos y Dios. He aquí dos imprevisibles poéticos, 
dos desconocidos. ¿Es que, hasta hoy, se habían constituido 
alguna vez en objetos para la poesía? Es evidente que no. (16) 
 
FGM argues that her work—and largely that of the origenistas as well—
reflects this exposition of ourselves and God (two unknowns) in poetry for the first 
time. She pursues transcendence without divorcing her poetry from reality; hence 
the inclusion of the “daily” and “known,” precisely to serve as a foil to (and to aid in 
approaching) the two “imprevisibles poéticos, dos desconocidos.” 
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She continues with images of morning routines of anthropomorphized 
household items, “el sonido y la dulzura de la madrugadoras cucharillas,” inserting 
familiar touches to show affinity to tú on the other side of the apostrophe (tu bata 
oscura): 
  Barroco el reverbero que encendía 
  la seda antigua de tu bata oscura, 
  no dorará el sonido y la dulzura 
  de la madrugadoras cucharillas. 
 
In the first two stanzas the voice harkens to a familiar outsider, beyond the 
words themselves, but she turns inward, to the self/yo in the final two tercets of the 
sonnet:  
  Perderé tu manera de llamarme 
  que me hizo desear aún otro rato 
  en la tarde más fiel poder quedarme 
 
  Y en traje nauseabundo y desasido 
  perderé la honda sombra, que no el árbol 
  perderé lo que había ya perdido. (122) 
 
With physical death comes the inability to communicate as before, a loss she 
laments but recalls with favor (me hizo desear). The sonnet closes with the spiritual 
death, alluding to a two-fold loss (lo que había ya perdido).  A pending loss of what 
was previously lost indicates a reconciliation of what at one time was possessed and 
dispossessed; that is, something that the poetic voices knows intimately but carries 
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no longer. FGM employs a variety of verb tenses, yet excludes the present—the 
future and past are favored.  Speaking to the origenistas’s aforementioned 
atemporality, the ubiquity of the types of death becomes embodied by the lilac, by 
the apostrophic tú and by the first person yo. If poetry is as FGM describes much 
later in an essay, “Hablar de la poesía,” “[l]a poesía no estaba para mí en lo nuevo 
desconocido sino en una dimensión nueva de lo conocido, o acaso, en una dimensión 
desconocida de lo evidente,” then the two unknowns (ourselves and God) are 
approached poetically only by a new dimension that is already manifest (4).  
Here, Wolfgang Iser's discussion of the relationship between the text and the 
reader offers an alternative access point to FGM's work when considering the poetic 
relationship to the exterior. In Iser's fundamental chapter in his The Act of Reading: 
A Theory of Aesthetic Response, “Interaction between Text and Reader” (1978), he 
discusses more broadly the structure of reader-response theory. It is extremely 
useful to examine how he views this particular relationship, even though it is not 
specific to poetic or philosophical texts: 
Communication in literature, then, is a process set in motion 
and regulated, not by a given code, but by a mutually 
restrictive and magnifying interaction between the explicit and 
the implicit, between revelation and concealment. What is 
concealed spurs the reader into action, but this action is also 
controlled by what is revealed; the explicit in its turn is 
transformed when the implicit has been brought to light. 
Whenever the reader bridges the gaps, communication begins. 
The gaps function as a kind of pivot on which the whole text-
reader relationships revolves. Hence, the structured blanks of 
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the text stimulate the process of ideation to be performed by the 
reader on terms set by the text. (293)19 
Here, I challenge the consideration of a relationship only between text and 
reader and move it to the author-text relationship with the author as reader. Iser's 
communicative gaps are filled in by FGM's ideation of what a divine relationship 
could mean and how it could manifest itself poetically. In an effort to explore the 
diaphanous relationship between the implicit and the explicit, FGM writes the 
transformative, transcendental possibilities in poetic texts. 
FGM manages this textual relationship in addition to the casual, stoic, yet 
unencumbered relationship with the divine and the presence of the divine by 
writing about daily activities that humans experience. As she often favors death 
thematically, though it is not something one experiences daily, it is universally 
familiar, as is expressed in “A una recién difunta” where she says “Lo más raro, 
después de todo, no es morirse. Es no haber podido terminar el dobladillo de la saya 
que dejamos sobre la mesa, oh qué confiados” (64). The unfinished garment can 
obviously represent any unfinished project/business in one’s life, and lamentations 
of life’s incomplete narrative are unsurprising on a deathbed. Here is where I think 
FGM is innovative: the poetic voice takes on a perspective that is ontological 
perhaps in its “reverse” positioning. Instead of describing the two conventional 
views of death 1) uncertainty or fear of death, or 2) even the sweet welcoming of 
meeting one’s Creator, she instead directs the poetic voice to look back at life from 
death, describing her observations of life as both divinely ironic and strange. We are 
naïve, she says, to think that the exiting of life is what’s strange. It is the mundane 
                                                        
19  Stress is my own. 
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details of life that can be reflected upon and, from death, be appreciated and thus 
considered divine.  
If the mystic, at times, revolves his/her writing around death, I must consider 
mysticality in relation to  FGM’s engagement of death in relation to religious 
nascence, codified by Zambrano’s term “la nada” (nothing, emptiness, nothingness, 
vacuousness) in the poem titled “Nacimiento de la fe.” I will again cite Zambrano’s  
nada and its roots in defying the convention of death as the end to life. Nada is “una 
luz nacida en la agonía [que] es la temporalidad que se consume y puede dar por 
ello una cierta aproximación de muerte superada; de muerte consumida también al 
par que la vida y la muerte. Pues la muerte no es el contrario, ni la negación de la 
vida en su integridad” (176). This sonnet begins with a great distancing of God, 
where we are witness to the not-knowing of the poetic voice and the complete 
negation of the physical body’s capability to know or accept God. There is an abyss 
that gives rise to an insurmountable impasse: 
  Nada podría hacer que mereciera 
   tu altivez o tu jubilo, Dios mío,  
  solo puede tu amor llenar el frío  
  abismo que al nacer mi carne hendiera. 
 
We then transition to an explanation of this perceived impasse in stanza two, 
during which the poetic voice furthers the notion that she does relinquish her body 
to God’s will: 
  Mas no porque esta cal perecedera 
  de mis huesos haciendo su albedrío 
  no sume ver tu cuerpo bendecido 
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  se ha de escandalizar lo que en mi espera. 
 
In the third stanza, as is conventional with sonnets, there is a change in tone 
where the poetic voice accepts this gift of unknowing, though her soul is still 
impenetrable.  
  Ahora que sé, Señor, lo miserable 
  de esta dádiva y del incierto juicio 
  que puedo hacer de mi alma impenetrable. 
The poem closes with the poetic voice seeing and believing: 
  Ahora creo, Señor, en tu Mirada 
  en mi obra y su oscuro sacrificio, 
  con esa fe que se alza de la nada. (54) 
 
It is the belief in the nada that permits the belief in God. The sonnet both 
begins and ends with the word nada. It is replete with words with meanings of 
uncertainty: frío, abismo, hendiera, perecedera, miserable, incierto juicio, 
impenetrable, oscuro sacrificio. Zambrano’s infiernos del ser are painted beautifully 
in this poem and unexpectedly faith is born. 
Here, the ubiquity of Zambrano’s poiesis is patent; however, I believe that the 
poet’s struggle with God and notions of la nada and abismo together with concrete 
figures of religion like Jesus and physical churches, which are often protagonists in 
her poetry, enrich her work with these polarities. I do not believe they are destined 
to polarize negatively but rather serve to enhance the approach of plurality to God 
though she only subscribes to one sect of one religion, Catholicism. By infusing her 
critical approach with this poiesis, she can achieve a plurality of meanings poetically 
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and religiously through items which the traditional mystic would find mundane. 
In another poem, “Ama la superficie casta y triste,” recurrent images of the 
lilac, the traje, and atemporality are again revealed. The poem reads as follows: 
 
Ama la superficie casta y triste  
Lo profundo es lo que se manifiesta  
La playa lila, el traje aquel, la fiesta  
pobre y dichosa de lo que ahora existe  
 
Sé el que eres, que es ser el que tú eras,  
al ayer, no al mañana, el tiempo insiste,  
sé sabiendo que cuando nada seas  
de ti se ha de quedar lo que quisiste.  
 
No mira Dios al que tú sabes que eres  
-la luz es ilusión, también locura-  
sino la imagen tuya que prefieres,  
 
que lo que amas torna valedera,  
y puesto que es así, sólo procura  
que tu máscara sea verdadera. (De qué 14) 
 
That which is patent and superficial is constructed by what is invisible and 
profound. Paying homage to the ancient Greek lyricist, Pindar, she quotes him, “Sé el 
que eres”: Be what you are. Yet, FGM again moves through and past these words, 
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thus transcending Pindar’s suggestion. She insists on an addition in the first verse of 
the second quatrain, “Sé el que eres, que es ser el que tú eras,” recalling again the 
atemporal nature of her project coupled with a suggestive glimpse of an ontological 
enterprise. What you are, she explains, is being what you were and then when you 
are gone, what remains is what you made of yourself (“cuando nada seas / se ha de 
quedar lo que quisiste”) (110). She observes the effects of an ontological inquiry on 
tú but makes herself visible—in speaking directly to tú and commanding actions—
thus illustrating the origenista fundamentals of individualism and participation in 
poetry itself. According to critic Giorgio Serra, “[l]a poesía de Fina García actúa a 
modo de intermediario entre la realidad y el observador, con el fin de llegar a 
percibir lo inmanente, lo que se encuentra detrás de la realidad de los hechos y los 
objetos. El objetivo de tal labor trascendente es rescatar tanto lo exterior como lo 
profundo de la caducidad” (“Lo religioso” pendientemigración.ucm.es). FGM 
mediates observed reality and pure reality by infusing meaning into these facts and 
objects. Both the surface and the depths offer support during this quest. 
Furthermore, FGM begins this hendecasyllabic sonnet with the eponymous 
verse and commanding voice, “Ama la superficie casta y triste” only to immediately 
turn from the exterior to the occult/interior in the next verse, “Lo profundo es lo 
que se manifiesta” (110). In parallel fashion, in another eponymous poem “Privilegio 
tristísimo y ardiente”, the poetic voice demands: “[a]caba de una vez, que ya hace 
frío…y contesta por Dios, quién soy, qué he sido” (123). Rumination on what is and 
what has been is manifest in both poems, thus a re-taking of the humanitas in a 
poetic reality, questioning the role of FGM’s so highly favored Catholicist approach. 
It is by way of this Catholicist phenomenology that the poetic voice, like that of 




LA CUBA SECRETA DE FGM Y ZAMBRANO 
In her work María Zambrano: entre el alba y la aurora (2004), FGM discusses 
Zambrano’s philosophy as well as her arrival in Cuba. She frames Zambrano’s 
poiesis by using words like ausente and desnudez,  Zambrano's own  philosophical 
terms, “[v]ivía en un estado pre-natal, en el que, inevitablemente, iba a ser presa de 
delirios, y recorrería galerias oscuras, empujando puertas semiabiertas…” (30). 
There seems to be a constant search for a sendero by which Zambrano seeks out a 
practice by which to adentrarse. Here we see emerge the atemporality for which the 
origenistas became so famous: FGM recounts that Zambrano had described herself 
as follows:, “huía…del tiempo humano,” that, “quería vivir justamente el mundo de la 
Niña--¿no llamaban así a la República, en otro tiempo?—a la que no habían tampoco 
dejado madurar” (30). If the origenistas were forged in the notion of poetic 
atemporality, then how do we reconcile this poetic ideal with the socio-historical 
reality that comes a mere eight years after the publication of Miradas perdidas? Do 
the two diverge at some later point? Or does this assume they were at some nascent 
point joined and perhaps these two movements in time grew to be mutually 
exclusive? Regarding Spanish mistic San Juan de la Cruz, FGM declares, “[n]o niega 
ninguna de sus tres potencias: memoria, entendimiento, voluntad, sino las remonta 
a su fuente, la Trinidad divina, transformando así, enamoradamente, la memoria en 
esperanza, el entendimiento en fe y la voluntad en la caridad que todo lo obra” (San 
Juan de la Cruz 9). Duanel Díaz has commented specifically on the conflation of 
origenistas's religiosity and regime fidelity.  He describes accurately the previously 
held belief in the “Revolutionary Event” instead of the more suggestive government-
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incited “eternal Revolutionary Regime” that Cubans were experiencing. Propaganda 
in Havana reveals exactly this: an ongoing revolutionary state, according to Díaz, a 
sort of static mise-en-scène that is at the same time dynamically tied to the “Event” 
56 years its predecessor.  
In his development of a theory of trauma, Dori Laub, M.D., makes an 
interesting case for the listeners of a narrative of “extreme human pain,” here, 
specifically with reference to those listening to verbal accounts from Holocaust 
survivors (Bearing Witness 57). It is useful to extrapolate here to see just how 
Cubans—particularly those who were precisely not yet alive during the time of the 
revolution—might bear witness to the aftermath of the revolution. Laub explains, 
“The victim's narrative—the very process of bearing witness to massive trauma—
does indeed begin with someone who testifies to an absence, to an event that has 
not yet come into existence, in spite of the overwhelming and compelling nature of 
the reality of its occurrence” (57). For those who did not live through the revolution, 
the event of the revolution necessarily does not come to exist until it is “given birth 
to” by the victim/experiencer him/herself. The emergence of the narrated story 
codifies the experience of the event, so that there is then cognition and witnessing of 
the event. The event-narrators can be considered in the Cuban context to be both 
the concealed family and friends in private gatherings in addition to the overt, 
public, government-stylized propaganda. Both these sources insist that the Cuban 
listener bear witness to the event on a constant basis and face this stormy narrative 
as an “in-process” 56-year-event. Laub further details the role of the listener-
participant: 
By extension, the listener to trauma comes to be a participant 
and a co-owner of the traumatic event: through his very 
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listening, he comes to partially experience trauma in 
himself…the latter [participant] comes to feel the 
bewilderment, injury, confusion, dread and conflicts that the 
trauma victim feels...it [is] henceforth impossible [that] 
witnessing can indeed take place. The listener, therefore, by 
definition partakes of the struggle of the victim with the 
memories and residues of his or her traumatic past...feel[ing] 
the victim's victories, defeats and silences, know them from 
within, so that they can assume the form of testimony. (58) 
 The revolution is characterized a massive rupture, politically, socially, and 
historically. At the moment it occurred, arguably those pushing for Cuban 
independence/nationalism would not have agreed lexically with “trauma.” 
Notwithstanding, the unfolding of decades of isolation, lack of resources, and 
government-controlled access certainly reflects the traumatic pain experienced by 
Cuba over the past half-century. If the Revolution itself is, as a single event, as many 
critics including Díaz have suggested, a utopian-socialist-messianic rupture, then 
Cuba lives in sort of “negative space” of the Revolution, contained within the umbra 
of the event itself.  
Díaz explains that the relationship between the anticipation of the Revolution 
and the death of Castro: “La congelación temporal que reflejan las calles de La 
Habana sería la contraparte del Evento que fue la Revolución, y a la vez la espera por 
ese otro acontecimiento futuro que será la muerte de Castro” (Hasta 2). To further 
his point, Díaz quotes Žižek’s perceptions of today's Cuba, “It is not that the 
revolutionary Event was ‘betrayed’ by the Thermidorian establishment of a new 
order; the very insistence on the Event led to the immobilization at the level of 
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positive social being. The decaying houses are the proof of fidelity to the Event’” 
(Hasta 2). Though aptly chosen, this term “fidelity” raises some questions regarding 
who is considered to be fidel; given the prevalence of black market goods, 
widespread lack of resources, omnipresent propaganda, and the surge in the 
establishment of local cooperative markets, this would suggest that it is the 
government alone who retains “fidelity to the Event.” The defunct businesses and 
destroyed landscapes that the people suffer on a daily basis are the mere 
consequences of police-state-like control and lack of physical mobility. If there is 
indeed a contiguous consumption of the Revolution, we cannot simply presume that 
all Cubans are selectively and willingly part of it. If for Alain Badiou, “an event is the 
creation of new possibilities,” then certainly the Revolution acted as such: a 
stimulus.20 The question of whether or not it is a continuing set of stimuli, again, 
relies on—and begs the question—Whom is it serving well? Or is it really serving 
anyone well? 
In Antonio José Ponte's collection of essays, El libro perdido de los Origenistas 
(1992), he discusses, somewhat quixotically, the foreseeable “lost book” of this 
generation from a metatextual, cartographic perspective.  The book serves my 
analysis to briefly examine what Ponte considered to be “missing” in order to see, 
retrospectively, how FGM fit into the revolutionary narrative. James Buckwalter-
Arias writes about Ponte's essays in his book Cuba and the New Origenismo (2010): 
The figure of the lost book, however, appears at least initially 
to elude this prose cartography. The Lezama and Diego 
narratives Ponte discusses, in fact, are not about defining a 
terrain or getting one's bearings but about losing a cultural 
                                                        
20 See Alain Badiou’s book Being and Event (1988). 
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heritage or an irreplaceable account of cultural origins. The 
map and the book, then, might be thought of as contending 
epistemes. The first denotes certainty and precision while the 
second denotes absolute loss and disorientation. (166) 
If Ponte's essays are in search of a bygone cultural heritage or mythical story 
of origin using literal and narrative mapping as a source of epistemology, then I 
argue that FGM writes these Cuban epistemes by way of a religious mapping. By 
serving the Orígenes project a healthy dose of introspection, both artistically 
religious and phenomenological, she offers what I think Ponte could see as this first 
glimpse of a sound cartography. FGM provides a jumping-off point for the reader-
poet. Buckwalter-Arias goes on to explain:  
Whereas José Eugenio Cemí and the other cartographers very 
confidently 'vuelven exacto...un bosque encantado,' the 
characters in the Eliseo Diego and Lezama Lima narratives are 
at a loss, unable to retrieve that mythical, metaphorical book 
that embodies a cultural essence, or literary cubanía. In Ponte's 
1992 essay, the libro perdido—precisely because it is 
irretrievable—does not hold out the promise of reconstituted 
wholeness. (166)  
Ponte seems to be searching for this wholeness, however, in re-taking the 
literary characters of Lezama and Diego. It is, as Buckwalter-Arias suggests, 
“irretrievable”; nevertheless, Ponte must have felt something was askew. I believe, 
then, that the earliest publications of Orígenes poetry, specifically the formative 
work of FGM, to be evidence of these epistemes. If her poetry communicates the 
experience of the poet (according to FGM), to help them approach the divine unity of 
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all things, then why can't FGM's miradas perdidas embody this cultural cubanía? 
 
FGM'S ROLE IN THE REVOLUTION  
Before I discuss the role of FGM in pre-revolutionary writing, specifically as 
an origenista as well as a foundational female, I will examine three discussions: 1) 
The connection of FGM's poetic quotidianness to the daily mantra of (pre)-
Revolutionary rhetoric (and the degree to which regime fidelity is distinct from her 
own religiosity), 2) How the political climate of the 1940s and 1950s affected her 
writing, and importantly, 3) What her writing embodied in the poetry and essays 
after 1959 as Castro-ism took firm root.   
Diaz quotes René Depestre writing for Revolución in 1960 that Castro's 
idea(l) had initiated, “...la batalla del libro y de la cultura” whose protagonist sought 
to: 
eliminar las fronteras entre el sueño y la realidad, la poesía y la 
vida...el pueblo cubano—añadía Depestre está justamente 
comprometido en una alta aventura humana en la que el sueño 
más luminoso y más dulce está a punto de inundar todas las 
riberas de la vida diaria. En la imaginación popular la 
Revolución es comparable... a esa Dulcinea del Toboso que 
tanto vale como la más alta princesa de la tierra. (13-14) 
Díaz's use of Dulcinea to describe the “ostensible” desired confluence of 
revolution and poetics, of regime and idealism sensationalizes, romanticizes, and 
even fictionalizes the relationship by using Don Quijote's misgivings as a point of 
comparison. Arguably, the objective of any revolution, including the French one, was 
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to fight for a greater ideal, especially when considering the formative role the Cuban 
example serves as a model for the rest of Latin America. If Díaz suggests that the 
honeymoon of the Revolution lasted (at least) through the special period and that 
“poesía y nacionalismo colaboran al punto de prácticamente confundirse,” I 
question the harm in such a relationship (Límites 321). The familia de Orígenes was 
deeply mired in this rhetoric, of Cuban writers fighting for their independent voice. 
If the origenistas are the third generation of Cuban writers post-Independence who 
become the first group to dialogue with European philosophy, then it is 
unsurprising that their cultural and theoretical approaches are joined with their 
artistic liberty. During the first half of the twentieth century, Cuba lives the Machado 
dictatorship in the early 1930s, US-involvement in the Batista coup in 1952 and 
afterward, and as Catherine Davies points out “a background of corruption, violence 
and anarchy...[t]hese were the years of increasing US involvement in Cuban internal 
affairs, [There were] mafia gangsters in the Hotel Nacional, roulette tables, 
prostitutes, gun-runners, consumerism and crass vulgarity, and—as far as the 
educated Cubans were concerned—profound despair” (91-92). She then poses a 
provocative question, which I argue challenges Diaz's suppositions that the 
origenista corpus developed hand-in-hand with the Revolutionary doctrine, so that, 
even today, they cannot be divorced. Davies wonders, “Would there ever be [for the 
origenistas] social reform, national and economic independence, political liberty?” 
(92). I would add to this list “artistry, poetic expression and poetic liberty.” 
In FGM's brief consideration of Zambrano's formation under Ortega y Gasset, 
and her differentiation as previously discussed in Chapter One regarding poetic 
versus vital reason, she comments on her mentor’s particular emphasis on 
quotidianness: “...aquella misma atención preferente por 'las cosas' que están a 
 93 
 
nuestro alrededor y había dejado atrás el idealismo, y que con grandes signos de 
admiración--”¡Santificadas sean las cosas!--, proponía Ortega” (García Marruz, María 
Zambrano 43). The sanctity of Ortega y Gasset's things undoubtedly strays far from 
any religiously charged philosophical ideal. However, his suggestion unpacks a 
theoretical approach that he shares with FGM's work, which relates to a Gestaltan 
worldview. The famous Ortegian formula, “Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia,” dovetails 
beautifully with FGM's confluence of the divine and the mundane, by seeing their 
threshold not just blurred, but erased, to reveal the sanctity of “things.” It is during 
this tumultuous time that FGM writes, as the poet who imbued the Orígenes corpus 
with Catholicism, to find a method of Cuban artistic expression. Does it not surprise 
us that religion, a stalwart poetic muse, surfaces? And further, that FGM searches for 
this religiosity within that which she experiences, within the daily Ortegian 
“circunstancia”?    
FGM AS A FEMININE, ORIGENISTA POET 
At this point, I will now discuss some aspects of French second-wave 
feminism, particularly Cixous and Irigaray, in order to further my myticalist analysis 
of FGM’s work by carrying out a feminist reading. It is of utmost importance to note 
that FGM was only one of two female poets identified as belonging to Orígenes, Cleva 
Solís (1926-1997, Cuba) being the other.21 If FGM is often cited as the poet with the 
characteristically Catholic(ist) infusions, then her femaleness and her role of 
“religious facilitator” and foundational member must be considered. As Catherine 
Davies points out, “one of main purposes of the [Cuban] Constitution of 1902 was to 
separate the church from the state...it is perhaps surprising, then, that the Catholic 
                                                        
21  See www.cubaliteraria.cu to see a list of writers included in Orígenes. This 
website is edited by Ivette Fuentes. 
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religion should have figured at all in the work of women writers prior to the 
Revolution” (A Place 90). How then, did FGM put herself, a woman, into the poetic 
text within a context that eschewed religion and, presumably, feminine 
participation? French feminist and philosopher Hélène Cixous argues in her article 
“The Laugh of the Medusa” (1975) that “[w]oman must put herself into the text—as 
into the world and into history—by her own movement” (1942). Cixous’s 
presentation of her work is self-described as non-feminist, that is, she tries to resist 
the enforcement of the Freudian phallocentric structure as describing the difference 
of sex as either having or lacking the phallus.  Thus, she urges women to write to 
both contest and to contradict this phallocentrism and its logic. Female writing is an 
assertion of the female body and thus, can only be written by women. Taking into 
consideration my arguments for FGM's physical constitution of poetry, by 
expressing poetically what is quotidian and mundane, she uses this female body to 
inscribe this meaning.  
Importantly, I do not argue that FGM was strenuously reaching for a feminist 
presentation, but rather, that her work significantly affected and influenced the 
Orígenes corpus. Furthermore, her role as a woman was never much recognized by 
her counterparts, even her husband. Hedeen makes this point well problematizing 
how FGM’s work propelled the Orígenes project in the name of creating a “national 
literature”, though one that ignored her gender: 
En definitiva, el proyecto de nación que adelanta Vitier en Lo 
cubano en la poesía conlleva una homogenización que tiende a 
borrar las singularidades de las mujeres y, en definitiva, a 
descartarlas como sujeto social. Esto se advierte claramente 
cuando, al abordar la obra del notable poeta cubano del siglo 
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XIX, José María Heredia (1803-1839), señala que [e]n medio de 
la naturaleza y del mundo femenino de la familia criolla, que es 
también esencialmente naturaleza, irrumpe el torcedor varonil 
de la historia; en medio de la edénica delicia natural, [...] 
aparecen los problemas de la conciencia: el escrúpulo, el 
eticismo, la indignación. (74)  
Hedeen suggests, then, that CV, in recalling Heredia, signals a delimited case 
of Cuban national literature that perhaps not only discourages but rejects any 
“female project.” A female voice or presence, not to mention female authorships 
would cause only problems of “the conscious”. Whether or not any discussion of 
FGM’s gender was purposeful, it is noteworthy that her role as a woman was never 
discussed, either by CV himself or other Orígenes authors. Hedeen, however, argues 
that in FGM’s earlier work, that is, Las miradas perdidas there is considerable more 
discussion of the contemplation of poetry rather than “acción poética” itself. Here, I 
believe she means that FGM’s early work did not consider politics or social issues as 
much as her post-revolutionary commentary might have, including the 
aforementioned essays at the beginning of this chapter. She posits that Arcos errs in 
defining FGM as a poet vis-a-vis CV,  “[y] de ahí que no se sostenga la afirmación de 
Arcos sobre 'la íntima correspondencia del pensamiento poético tal y como aparece 
transfigurado en la poesía [de García Marruz], con muchas de las ideas cardinales de 
[“Lo cubano en la poesía”] de Vitier'" (170). I suggest, on the other hand, that FGM 
does in fact make a political mark through the use of her femininity, specifically, her 
body, as I will now discuss. 
Let us consider Cixous’s essentialist or "somatic" view of female writing: she 
argues for an “essence” of woman as “multiple” and “open to the other,” meaning 
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that she sees women as inherently bisexual. She opposes the Freudian binarism of 
women as lack and men as presence in terms of the phallus. Thus, she opposes this 
“traditional” feminism because women’s sexuality is multiple—women’s sexuality is 
not confined to just the penis as it is for men, and thus, there is a plurality of 
possible sexual meanings and behavior inferred. This inclusiveness opens up the 
interpretation for the act of writing as a bursting forth, as an intellectual eruption, 
that both includes and supersedes the body, and for FGM, permits transcendence. In 
order to further develop FGM’s “writing women,” I cite again Hedeen’s feminist 
study on FGM’s work as gender and nation-based. 
Hedeen discusses FGM’s “counter-discourse” as a female, neo-colonial 
subject:   
Su poesía se nos revela así como un contradiscurso, como un 
ejemplo de las maneras complejas en que retos a un discurso 
dominante o establecido (específicamente esos de un centro 
imperial) puede ser montados desde la periferia, siempre 
reconociendo la poderosa “capacidad absorbente” de los 
discursos imperiales y neoimperiales. (Ashcroft et al. 56) Claro 
está, se trata de un contradiscurso de doble filo, pues García 
Marruz escribe desde su condición de género y desde su 
condición de sujeto neocolonial, en la búsqueda consciente de 
la transformación de ambas subordinaciones sociales. (“La 
cubana en la poesía” 171) 
FGM is often characterized as the female voice that embodies the Orígenes 
ideals, particularly by her husband during the pre-revolutionary period. I propose 
that her work moves beyond just reciting Orígenes ideals because often, her role as 
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the (female) leader of this movement is overlooked as purely intellectual, without 
taking into consideration her sex. Notably, FGM writes within a framework that 
permits her to be a scholar and literary leader, and her poetic discourse permits her 
a position that is uniquely hers. Hedeen and Catherine Davies both explore the idea 
of FGM as underappreciated due to a variety of factors: her somewhat introverted 
personality, her marriage to CV implying a certain “decorum,” and her poetry’s 
resistance to being categorized (though, here, both scholars reference FGM’s work 
post-revolution) (Davies, A Place 90). 
FGM'S MATERNAL GENEALOGY 
FGM’s feminism encapsulates Cixous’s ideas of “women writing for women” 
because she shows her eminent knowledge of the female discourse of life—she 
writes about her aunts, mother, fashion, and domesticity. Yet, she simultaneously 
proves her intellectual prowess in male arenas by also directing and dedicating 
poems to other writers such as Jiménez, Che Guevara, and Lezama. Her desire to 
transcend is first served and established by examining as much as possible in this 
earthly world as a woman. Her argument for the place of the woman as an 
intellectual contributes to her understanding of the cosmos. Cixous says of woman, 
“[f]or once she blazes her trail in the symbolic, she cannot fail to make of it the 
chaosmos of the personal…” (Laugh 39). Cixous speaks of “what touches you, the 
equivoice that affects you, fills your breast with an urge to come to language and 
launches your force; the rhythm that laughs you, the intimate recipient who makes 
all metaphors possible and desirable” (41).  
Davies sees FGM writing in a maternal genealogy, citing Kristeva's notions of 
the “maternal semiotic, the music and rhythms of poetic language affording a 
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momentary glimpse of the inexpressible pleasure of the pre-oedipal union" (A Place 
97).  What then, about the quotidianness of FGM's poetic creation from the 
specifically female perspective? Discussing Emmanuel Levinas, Luce Irigaray argues 
against this Idea/Father episteme; rather, she suggests that the mother need be 
rescued to resurrect female language and female subjectivity. Davies accurately 
points out that it is best not “to confine García Marruz's poetry to Catholic readings,” 
and I posit that FGM instead attempts this symbolic recovering of the female in 
Catholicist poetry (A Place 95).  Mysticism, to Irigaray, blurs the borders between 
body and soul, immanence and transcendence, so that the “sensible” is established. 
A sort of figurative Catholic Eucharistic transfiguration takes place: that which is 
immanent becomes divine and the body can transcend through poetry. 
Further, Irigaray explores the notions of biological essentialism in that, as 
Hollywood points out, “nothing is simply 'given'; there is no such thing as an 
unchanging, a-historical ground: neither the body, nor sex, nor nature itself...the 
body itself...[is] a-historical artifact” (“From Lack to Fluidity” 189). FGM's poetry, 
then, is a “right” to this amorphous genealogy, rooting itself in the memory of the 
maternal where “She” may be recalled.  
Never is this maternal genealogy so clear as during a poem titled “Teresa y 
Teresita” (204) where FGM journeys through the life and works of Teresa de Ávila 
(Spain, 1515-1582) y Thérèse de Lisieux, “Teresita” (France, 1873-1897), both 
known for her simplicity and horror of pretense.22 Teresa is famous for her strength 
of character and doctrinal bravery; FGM uses the terms fortaleza, robustez and 
huesos desnudos, decidedly traditional masculine traits, to describe the first Teresa. 
                                                        
22This poem “Teresa y Teresita” is from FGM's later publication Visitaciones (1970) which, clearly, is 
post-Revolution. However, for the purposes of this female-centered argument, I found it useful to 
include it in this section.  
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Teresita is often described with heightened fragility, as Teresa's youngest daughter 
(más pequeña hija) who prefers secretos and naïveté—decidedly traditional 
feminine traits. As a result, this maternal lineage is established concretely, with the 
mother providing virile logic and the daughter, affeminate emotion, echoing 
Cixous's inherent bisexuality in women. FGM is particular to note, however, that 
both the saints exalt ordinary life (ama su vida ordinaria) and participate in daily life 
(participación en lo común), calling the elder Teresa the saint of all that is material. 
Importantly, FGM proposes that these two saintly nuns sought out this 
quotidianness, perceiving it as “el más levantado misterio”. She declares that these 
women contemplate the mystery of the mundane and, within it, discover “el aire de 
tu vuelo” that awakens love for God (208). By choosing two resolute mystics as 
poetic subjects, FGM makes the turn towards mysticality foregrounding their 
ordinary desires and quotidian execution. This amalgamation of characteristics of 
mother Teresa and daughter Teresita offers the final proposition that we learn from 
them both because "se complete con la lira y toda enemistad de lo / alto y lo bajo 
concierte el acorde del órgano" (210).  
I will examine a poem also analyzed by Davies to suggest an alternate view of 
the role of this feminine heredity. Here FGM does not just retrieve the maternal, 
where the home and the mother are the poetic voice's “previous experiences”, but 
rather, she inscribes into her poetry a female quality that marks it as sexually 
different (Davies 109). It is precisely this sexual difference, I'd like to suggest here, 
that renders mysticality possible for FGM. And while Irigaray would suggest that 
bodily sexual difference permits the recognition of the mystical other and union 
with it, I assert that FGM's sexual difference does not only permit mysticism 
necessarily. The body is inscribed in the poetic, cultural, literary, and social language 
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that FGM uses from where she explores what femaleness means in the Orígenes 
context. Davies posits that FGM's poetic work is “firmly grounded in a woman's 
experience of ordinary, domestic routine, interspersed with moments of profound 
insight” (95).  I want to push this further to say that it is precisely the daily 
experiences (either traditionally “female” or “male”) that allow for these “moments 
of insight”. They are not mutually exclusive, nor does the former exist independent 
philosophically from the latter. Here is FGM's sonnet titled “Y sin embargo sé que 
son tinieblas”: 
  Y sin embargo sé que son tinieblas 
  las luces del hogar a que me aferro 
  me agarro a una mampara, a un hondo hierro 
  y sin embargo sé que son tinieblas. 
 
  Porque he visto una playa que no olvido, 
  la mano de mi madre, el interior de un coche, 
  comprendo los sentidos de la noche 
  porque he visto una playa que no olvido. 
 
  Cuando de pronto el mundo da ese acento distinto, 
  cobra una intimidad exterior que sorprendo, 
  se oculta sin callar, sin hablar se revela, 
 
  comprendo que es el corazón extinto 
  de esos días manchados de temblor venidero 
  la razón de mi paso por la tierra (Miradas 18). 
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Davies proposes that the poetic voice's “memory” is rooted in the home and 
in the world of the senses, specifically in “the mother's hand disappearing into the 
car” further arguing that “the vision of infinity is not the presence of God” but rather 
the presence of the mother (A Place 109). Conversely, I do not consider the presence 
of the mother and God, again, as mutually exclusive. The poetic voice can distinctly 
understand “los sentidos de la noche,” a historically mystical time-space, because of 
the mother, the car, and the beach. It is through these comprehensions that the 
presence of the Other is accessed. These daily phenomena permit connection with 
transcendence, and FGM uses this mystical rhetoric to achieve it. 
Just as Irigaray argues for the disruption of borders of immanence and 
transcendence in mystical thought, FGM disrupts the threshold: of light and 
darkness, of sound and silence, of past and future. The tinieblas are luz; revelation is 
occultation (se oculta sin callar, sin hablar se revela); and the long-gone is the future 
(el corazón extinto...de temblor venidero). By confounding the material differences 
she encounters, FGM uses mysticality to write the female conception of the cosmos. 
And if normative speech is where women fail to “speak” as Cixous contends, the 
moment where woman begins to write is crucial. FGM's crucial moment, then, is 
where the joining of the immanent and the transcendent takes a verb, such as 
"occurs" or "materializes." It is a struggle against the physical body itself and in 
which women fight eternally to open their mouths to speak. Because the female 
body does not function within this expression, it therefore is not an effective type of 
communication, so writing is, thus, a truer form of speech. It is more organically 
connected to the sexual body. Presence for female subjects, Cixous posits, can derive 
from knowledge and from the woman’s cosmic awareness, and, for FGM, from 
woman's cosmic awareness of the immanent, not confined to one main object, like 
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the penis, as would be the case for men.  
THE FEMALE BODY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH GOD 
Cixous sees a potential to imagine woman otherwise, beyond the 
phallocentrism in which she is inscribed. Woman can exist and stretch beyond being 
a commodified (and commodifying) essence and can draw her own strength of the 
female through writing. FGM offers a poem titled “El bello niño” where she focuses 
on the epistemic privilege entitled to children (here, a male child) over adults: 
  Tú sólo, bello niño, puedes entrar a un parque. 
  Yo entro a ciertos verdes, ciertas hojas o aves. 
 
  Tú sólo, bello niño, puedes llevar la ropa 
  ausente del difunto, distraída y remota... 
 
Only children have the ability to enter the “'park' of knowledge and culture” 
and to take on the appearance of myriad images, as Davies argues, whereas the adult 
is given mere entry to undisclosed/unidentified “verdes...hojas o aves” (Davies, 
Place 111; García Marruz, De qué 115). Here, FGM's poem dovetails with Cixous's 
argument that the patriarchy has led women against themselves: “They have made 
for women an antinarcissism? A narcissism which loves itself only to be loved for 
what women haven’t got! They have constructed the infamous logic of antilove” 
(Laugh 54-55). Cixous calls for a rejection of this division, for a liberation of the 
“New Woman from the Old” through writing. FGM also calls for a rejection of a 
division between male and female that privileges the former. Certainly, FGM seems 
to be lauding the magic and mystery so enjoyed during youth that is not only lost 
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but adulterated with maturity. But FGM criticizes the male child for his innocence: 
  …Yo llevo la ropa maliciosa 
 
  del que de muerte sabe de amarga inocencia. 
  Tú no sabes que tienes toda posible ciencia. 
 
  Mas ay, cuando lo sepas, el parque se habrá ido, 
  conocerás la extraña lucidez del dormido, 
 
  y por qué el sol que alumbra tus álamos de oro 
  los dora hoy con palabras y días melancólicos. (115) 
It seems unlikely that a child would be reprimanded for his/her naïveté; after 
all, this is the hallmark of youth and what the poetic voice yearns for nostalgically in 
the initial verses. Thus, I argue that it is this boy-centered logic that stands as an 
obstacle. The female, the poetic voice, can imagine the Cixous “otherwise”: death and 
bitter innocence. It is only inside this park that the boy has access to “the magic of 
the exterior”; yet the poetic voice knows already what he is losing, because when the 
park disappears, he will finally come to know what she already does: “toda posible 
ciencia...[y] la extraña lucidez del dormido.”   
Cixous adds, “[t]o write. An act which will not only ‘realize’ the decensored 
relation of woman to her sexuality, to her womanly being, giving her access to her 
native strength, it will give her back her goods, her pleasures, her organs, her 
immense bodily territories which have been kept under seal…” (51). How does FGM 
figure her own body, or more broadly, a female body, into her own words? For 
Cixous, as discussed earlier, that which is inspired bursts forth in the body in a 
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manifestation of language and metaphor:  
Text: my body—shot through with streams of 
song…the…mother… fills your breast with an urge to come to 
language and launches your force: the rhythm that laugh you; 
the intimate recipient who makes all metaphors  possible and 
desirable; body (body? bodies?), no more describable than god, 
the soul or the Other; that part of you that leaves a space 
between yourself and urges you to inscribe in language your 
woman’s style. (62) 
FGM chooses mysticality to express the Cixous “mother,” as this vehicle by 
which to express her “woman style.” For FGM, the body that is no more desirable (o 
describable) than God, is exactly what beseeches her to inscribe in language her 
writing. Her body, thus, moves beyond itself and the words become something more 
than what is immanent.  
Here, I take a moment to turn to FGM's poetic expression as an Orígenes poet, 
particularly with regard to the subject matter of the mundane. For FGM the ethos of 
learning is literally universal. It can be completed in any shape or forms. When 
Cixous remarks of womanist writing: “To write and thus to forge for herself the 
antilogos weapon. To become at will the taker and the initiator, for her own right, in 
every symbolic system, in every political process,” she speaks exactly of a female 
writer like FGM (Laugh 73).  Her antilogos weapon is her femininity which she uses 
to seize a new insurgence of writing and of learning.  
FGM’S DEDICATION TO SOR JUANA 
Here, I will briefly introduce a poem of FGM's dedicated to Sor Juana and, in 
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conjunction, make some final remarks on the work of both poets. Beyond being 
female authors, both FGM and Sor Juana write about the mundane; they also write 
specifically about and, I argue, for women as well. In her famous Respuesta a Sor 
Filotea (1691), Sor Juana demonstrates shrewdly how within the stereotypical place 
of the woman, the kitchen, is born an unmatched narrative.  She quotes, “[b]ien dijo 
Lupercio Leonardo, que bien se puede filosofar y aderezar la cena. Y yo puedo decir 
viendo estas cosillas: Si Aristóteles hubiera guisado, mucho más hubiera escrito” (De 
la Cruz 93). Sor Juana forges her own antilogos weapon—that which is decidedly 
feminine (cooking)—and turns it into a place of metaphysical erudition. Learning 
about scientific processes, the “filosofías de cocina” serve the greater understanding 
of God and what (S/H)e places before us on this earth. Cixous agrees that 
“[w]omen’s imaginary is inexhaustible, like music, painting, writing: their stream of 
phantasms is incredible” (Laugh 87). Sor Juana’s declaration that “there is no reason 
not to study what God has created” is truly a vindication of women everywhere.  
In his analysis of FGM's poem “A Sor Juana, en su celda y privada de lecturas, 
mirando jugar a unas niñas el trompo,” Roberto Méndez Martínez comments on the 
fluidity and empowerment of female expression ocurring between Sor Juana and 
FGM: “...se encarga de reflexionar sobre la condición femenina y sus vínculos con el 
intelecto, estorbada por un mundo que la relega al hogar o a la sombra y desde debe 
crecer en sabiduría a partir de la observación de pequeños detalles, ya que se le 
priva de los grandes espacios de estudio y expresión (uneac.org):   
  Mira el trompo. Sus círculos desgana 
  olvidado de sí y ensimismado.  
  Así los astros en Dios, así olvidados  
  del tacto de Su mano, cada vez más lejana.  
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  La breve pompa de la rosa vana  
  o el viento, en alusiones delicado, 
  le muestra en lo que torna lo esperado:  
  si de nieve, la verde edad lozana.  
  Qué extraño este vivir compadeciendo  
  vida que es muerte, muerte que es la vida.  
  En la mudanza oye cómo Su aliento crece.  
  Lo sabe antes del cuerpo y su medida,  
  no en lo que permanece siempre huyendo,  
  sino en lo que, huyendo, permanece. (De qué 187)  
  
     
According to the last two verses, belief in God for Sor Juana is found not in 
the body, nor in its physical expression, but in what remains in its “escaping.” God 
might be constantly escaping us in his mudanza, but what remains is the 
contingency of life. Furthermore, FGM comments on Sor Juana's classic 
“living=dying,” but this recollection occurs in the second half and close of the poem. 
The first half, conversely, is dedicated to Sor Juana's excellent capacity to extract 
intellectual gain from her daily surroundings: a toy (trompo). In contrast to the bello 
niño, here we know Sor Juana is observing a group of young girls. This simple 
spinning top escalates her vision upward, towards the stars. Watching the top spin, 
Sor Juana sees the stars of God, far from His/Her touch. But what does still remain is 
the top itself, the girls, Sor Juana´s cell, and her lack of books. It is from daily life's 





This chapter aimed to examine the presence of mysticality in the early poetic 
work of FGM and the degree to which it was uniquely feminine, profanely mystical, 
and Cuban. Through the analysis of a selection of poems that best exemplified these 
characteristics, I hope to have shed light on FGM’s early poetry in a novel way. In the 
following chapter, I will examine the work of FGM’s husband, CV, from the 
perspective of mysticality, particularly in reference to CV’s religious conversion to 
Catholicism and how it shaped his politically-focused poetry in relation to the pre-
revolutionary era. In order to more fully flesh out the notion of conversion and its 
relation to poetics, I will also perform a parallel analysis of the work of Jewish 
Argentine poet Jacobo Fijman and how he works Catholicism (a faith in which he 
was baptized at age 32) into his poetry. Chapter Three is additionally unique in that 
I make a comparative analysis between Cuba and Argentina during political periods 
marked by social unrest and imminent socialist-influenced governments vis-à-vis 




Chapter Three: The Conversions of Cintio Vitier and Jacobo Fijman: 
Christian and Jewish Re-workings of Mysticality 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I will argue how both Cintio Vitier’s and Jacobo Fijman’s 
practice of religion offers a mysticalist poetic product. I posit that there is a 
repurposing of the function of poetry from CV’s early work, heavily influenced by 
Juan Ramón Jimenez (Poemas 1938), compared to that of his later works Palabras 
del hijo pródigo (1952-1953) and Vísperas (1953), where his conversion to 
Catholicism takes a more central stage in the poetry’s content. There is an evident 
ontological search present that strays from preciosity, metaphorical overworking, or 
overly religious references. Can this mean that his poems are still “Catholic”? In 
these later books of poems, there is something unquestionably deeper and more 
transcendent. If, for Vitier the literary word is merely an “umbral,” then what 
function does the poem serve? How does Vitier combat the limits of words, or 
better, perhaps it is this conflict that fuels him? Jacobo Fijman, a Moldovan-born, 
Argentine-raised Jewish convert to Catholicism, also experiences a similar struggle. 
In his three books of poetry, Molino Rojo (1926), Hecho de estampas (1930) and 
Estrella de la mañana (1931), this struggle is continuously present. Here, it lies 
between the two “Fijmans,” arguably the Jewish and the Catholic, but also the “sane” 
and the “ill” resulting from mental illness and poor healthcare. As a poet who is 
constantly cognizant of the divisive line between life and death, death becomes a 
quotidian state of consciousness. Ruth Fernández explains that even the “Catholic 
 Fijman” is “uno que sobrelleva aún su porcentage exclamativo y tremendo de 
místico judío” (Fernández 24). My primary purpose in this chapter is to investigate 
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in what ways each author's religious identification affects his poetry in light of 
otherness, identity as poet-self, and the larger implications of national discourse on 
this identity. 
Both poets are self-identified practitioners of Catholicism and both poets’s 
work carries, I argue, mystical overtones. The purpose of this religious identity, I 
believe, is to serve as the vehicle for their social arguments, in both cases, secular 
movements. In the case of Fijman, it is to establish creative self-expression, as a 
formidable writer, in the face of mental health struggles; thus his psychosis will play 
a role in my analysis. In the case of CV, his poetic voice promulgates the 
revolutionary doctrine linked to national identity in 1950s Havana. The basis for 
comparing their work is twofold: 1) They are both converts. I problematize the 
effect this conversion has had on their poetic output and to what degree it manifests 
mystically, and 2) They both engage in poetic treatments of the intimate 
preoccupation of the role of the poet.   
CV displays the foremost characteristics of mysticism but lacks the ‘union’ 
aspect, differing greatly from his wife, FGM and her employment of poiesis. He goes 
through two revelations/conversions. The first is the decision to use poetry to 
express poetry/art for its own sake, evident in Luz ya sueño (strong Juan Ramon 
Jimenez influences, short poems, simple titles, references to nature and the seasons, 
etc.). And the second conversion is to use his poetry for political ends. He is 
criticized for claiming that poetry is the only national narrative, though my analysis 
will be directed more at how his work dovetailed with political goings-on rather 
than make an ethical determination about its influence. 
Thus, for both Fijman and CV poetry serves as a testimony to not just their 
faith but to their methodology of arriving to said faith. Their method, then, of 
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arriving to faithfulness is via poetry by confirming Godliness in their daily lives. It 
helps them overcome a certain non-conformity each experiences during his life, 
being in many ways an outcast (for Fijman, his self-described estados místicos 
caused others to label him psychotic, and for CV, his desire to establish and own a 
Cuban literary lineage was a result of an abandonment by his own father). Thus, 
these sentiments of alienation produce a merging of faith and poetry. Fijman and CV 
both look for a logos, and the method of arriving to such a logos is via poetry. 
Therefore, I argue that their logos is faith. Beyond just this conversion to and 
practice of faith, I contend that both CV’s and Fijman’s work is a pathologization of 
an ontological, spiritual, and/or social crisis each man experiences. For Fijman, it is 
due to his strangeness and social discord and others’s (mis)understanding of his 
creative process due to his psychosis. For CV it is related to his bastardness. The 
nature of CV’s “extrañeza” is multifarious: his mother was sent to the U.S. to give 
birth because his father did not officially recognize him. He is therefore “alien” by 
birth and by familial affiliation. Thus, CV’s approach to teasing out a national 
identity is intimately tied to his own search for self. Because he is ontologically 
“disadvantaged,” he attempts a nation-wide appropriation, to make his work 
ontologically- and nationally-meaningful. Cuba experienced a long period of 
illegitimacy, sired by U.S. intervention and occupation. CV, himself, was fathered by 
a Cuban, Medardo Vitier, but in a way marked by the U.S. and thus reared 
somewhere "in between." In both cases, however, this faith expressed via poetry 
confirms Zambrano’s poiesis, in that the poetic writing is simultaneously 
symptomatic of their condition and their own treatment, self-prescribed. Their 
poetry both pathologizes their problems and cures the pathology. Both writers’ 
poetic journeys exemplify the overcoming alienation, an alienation that is endemic 
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to their “ser” but also to their homelands as during both men’s lives, dictatorship in 
the form of Batistato and Peronism ensued.  
VITIER’S CUBA 
First, I will offer a brief biography of CV and his ties to his wife, FGM, and her 
work during mid-century in Cuba, particularly surrounding the time of his 
conversion to Catholicism in 1952 and the publications thereafter.  Changes 
throughout his life, I believe, propel his quest of faith; his poetry comes to be a 
testimony to those moments of transformation and how those different conversions 
warrant a new type of poetic expression. Two of his drastic, stylistic, and thematic 
discourses on poetics, Palabras del hijo pródigo (1952-1953) and Vísperas (1953), 
are, according to Sainz, a “diálogo que alcanza una densidad conceptual 
profundamente auténtica, de búsqueda e indagación ontológica, ajena a cualquier 
tendencia preciocista o de regodeo formal” (8). There is something unquestionably 
deeper and more transcendent, an unexpected intellectual yearning for a landscape 
and a history that seemed impenetrable and enigmatic to the poet. Poetry, for CV, is 
not a playful thing, not a game. It is a rigorous methodology of knowledge and 
penetration in the daily and immediate “ser.”   
In order to better understand the selections of CV’s poetry in this chapter, I 
will briefly offer information regarding the Cuban revolution as it pertains to CV’s 
work. Fulgencio Batista serves as elected president of Cuba for the first time 
between 1940 and 1944. Notably, in the same year as Batista’s office departure 
(1944), the Orígenes journal is formed, lasting until 1956. Of course Batista again 
serves as president for the second time, in a coup d’état organized in 1952, this time 
supported by the U.S. government (naturally, not Communist). As previously 
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mentioned CV converts in 1952 and Palabras and Vísperas are published in 1952 
and 1953, accordingly. CV was witness to the drastic changes in leadership from 
presidents to foreign-instigated takeovers. It seems unsurprising that CV publishes 
prolifically during this era, particularly two books of poetry with politically 
suggestive, foretelling titles (in translation): Words of the Prodigal Son and Vespers. 
During the early-1950s Fidel Castro is unsuccessful in overthrowing Batista 
in the Cuban court system, so he resorts to building an armed revolution. Castro 
resolves to launch an armed revolution. To this end, he and his brother Raúl found a 
paramilitary organization known as “El movimiento” stockpiling weapons and 
recruiting around 1,200 followers from Havana's disgruntled working class by the 
end of 1952 (Bourne, Fidel 68-69). In 1953 during attacks in Bayamo and at the 
Moncada Barracks in Santiago, many of Fidel’s soldiers are killed or executed by the 
Batista regime and the brothers Castro are both imprisoned. After being freed from 
prison in 1955 due overwhelming political pressure, Fidel and Raúl flee to Mexico to 
organize, meeti Ernesto “Che” Guevara, and eventually name themselves the 
Movimiento de 26 de Julio (M-26-7) in honor of the barracks battles. Perhaps the 
most notable of the M-26-7’s attacks occur in the Sierra Maestra mountains where 
about twenty of Fidel’s over eighty men survived retaliation by government troops. 
They retreat into the mountains, gaining rural supporters over the years, eventually 
successfully taking over Santiago on New Year’s Eve 1958 and Santa Clara onNew 
Year’s Day 1959, forcing Batista to flee Cuba to the Dominican Republic.  
Near the end of Batista’s initial presidential office in 1944, CV presents his 
ideas about the genesis of the poetic work in a conference talk given at the age of 
twenty-two:  
Sólo el ceñido entero puede ser amado, y la poesía es una 
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perenne batalla que controla la tentación e infinitud de los 
rumores, lucha ceñida y rumorosa que nos pide la devoción 
por ella misma, no por sus cándidos trofeos. Pero es también 
un método, el principal en mí de contacto desnudo con el ser 
de las cosas y la existencia humana, de angustiada religazón al 
origen milagroso del idioma y el espíritu, en cuyas relaciones 
actúan como príncipes sombríos la historia y el agitado peso de 
la conciencia. ("Experiencia de la poesia", conferencia leída en 
1944 Antologia Saínz 10) 
This notion of “naked recovered contact with the essence of things” is 
certainly identifiable as one of the aesthetic markers of the Orígenes group. One of 
the Orígenes's most prominent members and representatives, CV founded the 
Centro de Estudios Martianos (Center for Martí Studies) and the Martí Room at the 
Biblioteca Nacional (National Library) in Havana. Having worked as a French 
translator as well as a university professor at Universidad Central de las Villas, CV 
was widely known in Cuba as a poet, essayist, novelist, and scholar. Born in Cayo 
Hueso, Florida, in 1921, he spent his life in Cuba and published his first book of 
poems at the age of seventeen (Fuentes, www.cubaliteraria.cu). Ivette Fuentes, long-
time scholar of FGM and CV, describes CV’s work in that, "...se acentúa en su obra el 
tema de la 'cubanidad' y eleva a categoría poética el rango de la cotidianidad, que es 
también el tema del tiempo en su dimensión existencial," investigating, as I have 
discussed with FGM and will do so with CV, the access to the interior self by way of 
quotidian exteriority. 
In his earlier essayistic work, CV highlights the poet’s desire to transform the 
world with words “para que el reino de la justicia se cumpla en la tierra, misión 
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máxima del hombre” (“Lecciones cubanas” 52). Here, notes of poetry’s prowess, the 
role of politics, and of the poet himself are given front-seat importance. In his series 
of essays—“Mnemósyne,” “La palabra poética,” “Sobre el lenguaje figurado,” y “La 
zarza ardiendo”—published under the title Poética (1968) CV searches for a method 
by which his poetry dialogues with his own cosmovision. He wonders about the 
mystical qualities of poetry, stating that they are “inseparable[s] de la poesía; en el 
espíritu, que unifica su música, no puede vencer ese germen de la diferencia, de lo 
individual o irreversible. Todo pensamiento poético tiene que partir de la unidad en 
lo heterogéneo, de la síntesis que no anula sino exalta y paradójicamente ilumina la 
fruición de lo multiple” (15). CV emphasizes poetic thought that praises lo múltiple, 
indicating a focus on the multifarious nature of the poet and his works.  
In his later essays, post-revolution, there is a decisive change in tone, as he 
considers the effects of political change. Contrary to his prior work, which promotes 
“art for art’s sake,” he considers the participatory role of the individual citizen as 
paramount, rather than view the abstraction of poetry as uniquely important.  For 
example, in his essay, “El Violín” (1968) CV explains why he asks these sorts of 
questions, revealing the political-ideological function of his aesthetic thought 
regarding “liberty.” The Castro revolution was, for CV, a source of motivation and 
nutrition for his later poetry and prose that reflected the changes endured at home: 
his house, his family, his Cuba (Arcos 159).  CV details these thoughts in “El Violín”: 
Las bodas, el hogar, el hijo, empezaron a curarme de la 
extrañeza. Si el país no tenía sentido, mi casa lo tenía. Desde su 
centro empezaba a desvanecerse aquel invasor Objeto Onírico 
que era al asunto de “Un entierro”[…] aquel devorador objeto 
onírico, surrealismo sin inconsciencia, copulación del deseo y 
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la memoria que no podía reconstruir ni engendrar la realidad… 
(196).  
Philosophical and lofty notions of desire and memory were unable to 
approximate reality, says CV. The quotidian aspects of his life in Cuba (weddings, 
children, life at home) are what the revolution reconstituted, giving it purpose, both 
politically and poetically. Hence, in CV’s arguably seminal work on Cubanness, Lo 
cubano en la poesia (1958) he discusses the search for liberty, referring to the need 
to save Cuba's dignity. In this work he reveals that, as Arcos posits, “...[un] análisis es 
la libertad a través del proceso de la poesía cubana como expresión de la fidelidad 
del poeta con su historia” (115).23 That is, freedom is derived from (Cuban) poetry, 
which, in turn, is an expression of the poet’s observation of history. Cuban poetry, 
for CV, is a spiritual journey for authenticity, one that contributes to this freedom, to 
a resuscitated worth (Vitier, Lo cubano 13). However, in a post-revolution edition of 
this essay (1972), CV makes the following remarks, forcibly highlighting a lack that 
his poetry (or broadly, Cuba's national poetry) suffered: 
  Eliminada la acción (por desconfianza o por    
   desconocimiento de sus verdaderas posibilidades)   
   quedaban desconectadas las historia y la poesía. La primera  
   representa el sinsentido y la segunda, desde luego, el   
   sentido, pero en un sentido solo platónico o profeticamente  
   verificable. (Foreword, Lo cubano 10) 
                                                        
23While Lo cubano en la poesía  was published (immediately) before the revolution, I cite it in this 
section to highlight an evident apprehension witnessed by Vitier, that something about his prior 
poetic work was seemingly lacking. His anxiety expresses that, up until this point, some sort of action 
was necessary outside the purely aesthetic limits that the Orígenes poetry presented. The 
manifestation of his poetry had been missing some component part.  
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CV’s years of writing and observation post-revolution reveal that poetry, 
despite its nationally-charged assignment, was, for CV, disconnected from history. 
He still insists that history is “senseless” and poetry “meaningful” without action. 
Perhaps this “action” he references was the revolution itself, but regardless, this 
striking observation by CV suggests a change in his cosmovision.24 Sans action, 
poetry took on a more prophetic meaning, while post-action, it acquired a historical 
significance.  
EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY ARGENTINA   
I will now turn to detailing some historical and biographical information 
regarding my second author-in-question in this chapter, Jacobo Fijman. During the 
time Fijman lives in his adopted Argentina, the country experiences years of relative 
stability, after which much political movement is afoot, including coups d’état and 
vacillation between leftist and rightist politics. Because Fijman publishes his three 
books of poetry between 1926 and 1931, I focus on the political events of this era. 
Hipólito Yrigoyen (1852-1933) is twice elected to the office of President—from 
1916-1922 and again from 1928-1930—as the leader of the Unión Cívica Radical 
(Radical Civic Union). Yrigoyen is championed as the voice of the poor and working 
class whose opponents were identified as anti-personalistas. He encourages 
programs that develop a universal education system, improved factory conditions, 
regulated working hours, and perhaps most notably, universal male suffrage, 
enacted during the former president's tenure. Solid relationships with the United 
States government and President Herbert Hoover are established at this time, 
                                                        
24Scholars such as Duanel Díaz and Zoe Valdés uggest that in his post-revoultionary work, Vitier is 
still subscribing to a castrofascismo that he does not (or perhaps cannot) overcome. It is not my 
intention to argue this point; rather, my interest is to analyze the poetry in relation to its political 
context and mystical rhetoric, not to morally override meaning. 
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although Yrigoyen maintains neutrality during WWI. Economically speaking, 
Argentina experiences widespread growth, owing to its oil and grain production, 
situating the country among one of the wealthiest in the world. Argentina’s 
fortunate economic growth was largely due to its ties to the European and U.S. 
markets. Ousted by a military coup d'état by far-right general José Féliz Uriburu in 
1930 after his second presidency, Yrigoyen dies a few years afterward. Known as 
the Infamous Decade for its electoral fraud and political scandals during the time of 
the Great Depression, the 1930s expresses a time in Argentina (and more broadly 
the West) when economic and social struggle are the most prominent features. 
Argentina, like Europe and U.S., experienced the Great Depression (Lewis, The Crisis 
of Argentina Capitalism 1990).  
The relative political successes, economic upturns, and social improvements 
are prevalent in Argentina at the time a young Fijman (in his 20s) is publishing his 
books. Despite this time of perceived stability and growth, Fijman finds himself as 
an outsider, both nationally, religiously and psychologically. He suffers from mental 
illness, which causes legal action to be taken against him, resulting in internment in 
mental hospitals. As will be discussed shortly, Fijman identifies himself as a mystic, 
as having had mystical experiences, and recognizes that others see this as 
problematic. When asked about his mental state by friend and fellow writer, Vicente 
Zito Lema, the conversation follows as such: 
Zito Lema: ¿Porqué está internado en este sitio? 
Fijman: Según los médicos debido a que estoy enfermo. 
Trastornos mentales. Yo creo sin embargo que la mayoría de la 
gente padece de trastornos mentales, incluso los propios 
médicos. ¿O acaso la mayoría de los que están en los almacenes 
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y en las tiendas es gente de razón? ¡Ninguna! Y los médicos por 
ejemplo, el que más o el que menos padece de psicosis. ¿Y es 
que alguien sabe lo que es el alma, lo que es el intelecto?  (Zito 
Lema, Pensamiento 78). 
Fijman recognizes that others see him as ill and that the State holds him in 
the hospital for lack of a better option. Fijman, however, believes that this altered 
state he experiences is intimately tied to his soul and his intellect, arguing, in the last 
line, “¿Y es que alguien sabe lo que es el alma, lo que es el intelecto?” (56). 
It is this suffering and connection to and awareness of the physical 
degradation of his mind and body that I argue catalyzes his poetry. In the view of 
Santiago Sylvester, Fijman was born, lived, and died as an outcast, a person marred 
by constant expulsion, from countries, cities, libraries, social groups, and literary 
canons (“El reloj biológico” 17). Born in Urif, Bessarabia, in what was Russian-
controlled territory in 1898 (now Moldova), Fijman, a Jew, is expelled at the age of 6 
and, with his family, moves to Argentina. Adept at drawing and music, he is trained 
in classical studies and works for a short while as a French teacher at a girls' 
school.25 Abandoning his family in 1917, he is jailed in 1921, after which he 
undergoes his first internment in the mental hospital, Hospicio de las Mercedes, 
where he is given electroshock therapy. Able to find journalistic work after his 
release at newspapers, Mundo Argentino and Vida Nuestra, Fijman experiences what 
might be considered his first break: he meets Argentine writer, Leopoldo Marechal, 
who invites him to be a part of the literary magazine and group Martín Fierro. The 
                                                        
25 Sources vary regarding the age when Fijman arrived to Argentina, some say in 1902 at age 4 and 
others in 1904 at age 6. Fijman himself is inconsistent in this matter. I am citing Alfredo Arias’s 
complete work Obras (1923-69 1: Poemas (2005) where Arias indicates the year was 1904 as Arias 
offers the most comprehensive work to date about Fijman’s published and unpublished works. 
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character Samuel Tesler in Marechal's novel Adán Buenosayres (1948) is based on 
Fijman.  
Between 1922 and 1925 Fijman resides in Urugruay, Paraguay, and Brazil, 
and after returning to Argentina begins friendships with literary critics, writers and 
artists, among then Oliverio Girondo and Marechal. He was often expelled from 
churches due to his raucous worship and was once thrown out of a Belgian 
monastery after insisting to be admitted when he visited in 1927 and 1928. In 1930 
Fijman is baptized in the Catholic faith after his first trip to Paris where he meets 
Bohemian, surrealist artists/writers Antonin Artaud and André Breton, though the 
extent to which he spends time with them is unknown (Arias 2). In the early 1930s 
literary journals Número and La Nación publish some of his work, including some 
poems from his book, Estrella de la mañana (1931). Número was a Catholic venue 
for poets, which imaginably influenced his conversion to Christianity. Many 
influential writers in Buenos Aires were either converting to or (re)affirming their 
faith in Catholicism (e.g. Ignacio B. Anzoátegui and Osvaldo H. Dondo), and given 
Fijman’s association with them, he was likely influenced by their faith-driven 
decisions (Arias 2). Critic María Amelia Arancet Ruda affirms the presence of a 
“Catholic renaissance” where a group, including Fijman, called themselves “los 
Cursos de Cultura Católica,” eventually founding Número as well as Criterio among 
others. Número’s founder, Julio Fingerit, was also a Jewish to Catholic convert like 
Fijman (Arancet Ruda, “Hecho de Estampas, de Jacobo Fijman: Poetización de un 
proceso” 31).  As this Catholic circle of writers was on the ascent The Sociedad 
Argentina de Escritores (SADE) took an interest in Fijman, allowing him a stipend 
while he was living at Hospital de las Mercedes, later to be referred to simply as “Dr. 
Borda” (Arias 3). Despite his close connections with Catholic writers, he still 
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affirmed his own brand of Catholicism, as identified by Naomi Lindstrom. After his 
return to Argentina, he becomes fascinated by medieval paintings and iconography, 
especially of the Virgin Mary, and befriends popular Argentine painter, Benito 
Quinquela Martín, with whom he shares visits with evangelical Benedictine monks.  
Ultimately, as a result, he never fit in well with the Catholics, likely because, as he 
concludes, “[p]orque lo de judío no se pierde” (Pensamiento 78). It is likely he did 
not have access to a Jewish education while growing up in Buenos Aires, though he 
clearly identifies the cultural, ethnic, and religious identity of Judaism inscribed in 
him. It does appear that he was not in much contact with his family during his adult 
life, and as much of Jewish identity is tied to the family, this distancing further 
pushes him to an in-between state of religious individuality. 
Beginning in 1929 and through the early 1930s Fijman publishes well in La 
Nación and Número. When he is unable to find work, however, he resorts to playing 
music in the streets to make ends meet. In 1942 he is expelled from the National 
Library in Buenos Aires by library director and widely-known anti-Semite Gustavo 
Martínez Zuviría, known by his pseudonym Hugo Wast, for disorderly conduct. 
Fijman is taken again, to Dr. Borda where he lives the rest of his life—with a stay at 
Open Door and some brief excursions to meet with friends—until 1970 when he 
dies. Two years before his death, poet-playwright-psychoanalyst-lawyer Vicente 
Zito Lema seeks out a friendship with Fijman and acquires the ability to publish 
some of his works as well as El pensamiento de Jacobo Fijman o el viaje hacia la otra 
realidad (1970) (which as already been referenced), in which Zito Lema includes a 
sort of Q&A with the poet. Zito Lema came to be an important confidant, intellectual 
colleague, and legal caretaker of Fijman, who often took the poet to his private 
house on the weekends. As a lawyer, Zito Lema specialized in human rights issues, 
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specifically those of persons affected by psychological ailments. It is due to Zito 
Lema’s close friendship and artistic curiosities that we know much about Fijman 
and his life. In just the year before Fijman’s death in 1969, Zito Lema publishes the 
first edition of Talismán, a journal dedicated to “Jacobo Fijman: poeta en el 
hospicio,” which would lead to decades’s more inquiry and writing about the poet 
and his works (Arias 4). 
Fijman makes problematic statements throughout his life in proclaiming to 
be both Jesus and God (and a saint and a priest), to be both Jewish and Catholic and 
consequently, he writes poetry that is not part of the Argentine canon. Sylvester 
proposes that, because Fijman's poetry defies categorization, it cannot be included 
in the canon; it simply does not respond to a contemporary theory, thereby 
rendering it difficult to understand. His poetry fails to correspond to something 
external to it. Sylvester explains in the preface of Fijman's posthumous Poesía 
completa (2005): 
...un poeta no tiene mucha chance de incorporarse al canon si 
su poesía no sirve para elaborar una teoría; que la poesía sea 
apta para ser leída...qué puede decir una poesía que tiende a 
sacralizar lo que toca? ¿una poesía lírica en plenta 
desconfianza del lirismo? ¿una poesía que habla del dolor 
metafísico, invoca a Dios, y, para mayor desorientación, elige 
palabras desacreditadas por su intención de perdurar una 
belleza antigua: la que nos viene desde Homero? (11-12). 
Sylvester wonders what the purpose a poem has if it makes sacred 
(sacrilizar) everything that it touches, if it uses language dissuaded by the academe. 
I conclude that Fijman utilizes his religion, specifically his mystical experiences and 
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his very own awareness of his mental illness, to showcase his agency as a poet and 
as a productive member of his environment. His msyticalist tendencies help 
establish him as a noteworthy poet, one capable of lyricism, provocative verse, 
humor, and belief.  
Fijman explains to Zito Lema in an interview conducted in Dr. Borda 
(published as Viaje hacia la otra realidad), “[t]uve experiencias místicas; de orden 
sensorial. Sentía perfumes. De incienso. Sentía olor a selvas de incienso. Y en el 
cuarto donde estaba no había ni una flor. Nada que me excitara o que pudiera 
provocarme esa sensación” (Pensamiento 22). Even in the realization of the after-
effects of so much electroshock therapy, Fijman refers to these events with seasoned 
humor and acceptance explaining, again to Zito Lema, “s]eguramente veían [los 
médicos] en mí un mal que pretendieron expulsar con la electricidad. Y ciertamente 
parece que me hizo bien. Hace años que no me resfrío” (Zito Lema, Pensamiento 21). 
Making light of the resiliency of his “electrified” body evidences Fijman's verbal 
clarity, mental acuity, sense of humor, and ability to connect socially. When Zito 
Lema asks him if he is a poet, Fijman wittily responds, “[a]quel [Zito Lema] que así 
pregunta, ya sabe, es poeta. Por qué difundir lo que los dos sabemos” (37). I 
exemplify Fijman's intellectual capacity not to defend his abilities in light of mental 
illness, but rather to showcase his capacity to nuance situations despite his 
psychosis. The quality of understanding his role as a friend, a patient, a poet, and 
practitioner of faith all contribute to his ability to employ these strategies in poetic 
verse. When asked about aspiring to be God, Fijman answers, “Dios hace otro Dios 
en la persona que quiere…la razón humana nos prohibe conocer a Dios…A nadie se 
le ocurre aspirar a Dios. Sólo a mi. Yo soy Dios. Jacobo Fijman es Dios” (Pensamiento 
47). Fijman additionally identifies the Virgin Mary as God; hence, I believe he views 
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this living experience of God as parallel to the idea that, as for mystics, Jesus is 
present/manifest in each human soul. Furthermore, in Fijman's short story “Dos 
días” he talks about “Cristo Rojo,” and explains that Saint Paul teaches him to: 
ser como otro Cristo, es decir, Cristo está en uno. La total 
identificación. Yo lo sentía como una cosa cierta, no 
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que había estallado en todo el mundo. Cuando los policías me 
golpeaban les grité: Soy el Cristo rojo. Siguieron con sus golpes. 
Cada vez más frenéticos, enfurecidos. Antes que me 
desmayara, me pegué a la pared y dije: Yo soy el anunciado. El 
cuento lo escribí después. (37-38) 
Here, Fijman describes his reaction to being beaten by police; and to survive 
the event psychologically, Fijman chooses the revolution as a way “out.” Thinking 
about the “red” revolution helps him identify with a cause and gives purpose to 
standing up to police, enduring physical abuse.  
However, Fijman points out that being Christ and “red” Christ were for 
different purpose. The latter, as previously explained, was connected to the 
revolution while suffering physically at the hands of the police. The first “total 
identification” with Christ where one “loses him/herself” in Him—and for Fijman it 
is a true state of being, not just a literary rhetorical device (“cosa cierta, no 
literaria”). One could then argue that the constant state of living “mystically” in the 
Jewish tradition is present here. Of course, the usage of Christ and Christ's existence 
“in one” is itself a very Catholic notion, yet Fijman's conception of grace is arguably 
pan-religious in that he draws from Christianity and Judaism to identify the motives 
for his poetics. Lindstrom affirms the conflation of Fijman's Christian and Jewish 
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tendencies: “A pesar de su evidente entusiasmo por estos elementos provenientes 
de las dos religiones que conocía, no los emplea en su contexto original, sino que los 
transforma de manera radical para integrarlos a su propio sistema de creencias 
sobrenaturales y prácticas discursivas. El resultado ni es judío, ni es católico, ni es 
una fusión de las dos cosas, sino que constituye un sistema formulado para 
acomodar y coordinar las preocupaciones fundamentales de un solo individuo, 
Jacobo Fijman” (“Discurso profético” NP). Thus, a unique “Fijmanism” is born, giving 
rise to what Lindstrom argues is the prophetic and messianic discourse in his 
poetry. I argue additionally that Fijman's ability to accept the mystical tenets of both 
religions and the subsequent development of his own ideology are further measures 
by which Fijman writes mystically and profanely.  As Francine Masiello observes, 
Fijman considers himself to be “the first interpreter of life, and an authority on 
sacred knowledge” (Jewish Writers of Latin America 41). As earlier discussed, while 
he claims God to be the Virgin Mary as well as himself, one can choose to view this 
as mere heresy. However, I conclude that this presence of God is the source for his 
mystic identification as well as his mysticalical tendencies. His aspiration to be 
(with) God is patently present in his poetics, as will be discussed. 
When asked about his conversion, Fijman explains: 
No es conversión de judío a católico. Es simplemente la 
aceptación de la religión católica, apostólica y romana. Porque 
lo de judío no se pierde. Esta conversión es una concepción de 
la gracia. Dios seguramente ha encontrado méritos para 
convertirme. Para concederme ese conocimiento y esa fe. 




If he does not convert in the traditional sense, he seems to be amalgamating 
religious doctrine to develop his “Fijmanism.” Notably, this conception of God, 
knowledge of God, and faith in God are likened to an illness. And this sort of illness, 
even cancer, Fijman suggests, is a “state of madness.” Thus, Fijman's perspective, 
and consideration of his own illness, reflects an experience to which any human can 
relate: corporeal disintegration caused by physical ailment leading to death. He 
argues for the commonalities between humans—the universal understanding of 
illness—instead of setting himself apart, so drastically. As a poet who suffers an 
illness, then, Fijman gives himself liberty to express himself poetically, discussing, in 
the end, the role of the poet as God. And Fijman is certainly not the first poet to liken 
his office to that of the divine.  
Like Vicente Huidobro (Chile, 1893-1948) in his seminal poem “Arte Poética,” 
Fijman recognizes the role of poet as God. I cite Huidobro's poem below: 
  Que el verso sea como una llave 
  que abra mil puertas. 
  Una hoja cae; algo pasa volando; 
  cuanto miren los ojos creado sea,  
  y el alma del oyente quede temblando. 
  
   Inventa mundos nuevos y cuida tu palabra; 
  El adjetivo, cuando no da vida, mata. 
 
  Estamos en el ciclo de los nervios. 
  El músculo cuelga. 
  como recuerdo, en los museos; 
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  mas no por eso tenemos menos fuerza: 
  el vigor verdadero 
  reside en la cabeza. 
 
  Por qué cantáis la rosa, ¡oh poetas! 
  Hacedla florecer en el poema. 
 
  Sólo para nosotros 
  viven todas las cosas bajo el sol. 
 
  El poeta es un pequeño Dios. (Poemas árticos 2008) 
The poet “creates new worlds” where poetry “is the key that opens” them. 
And the poet, as such a being in this new world, is capable of even making flowers 
bloom. A single bloom, developing from seed to stamen, is the entire life process: a 
synecdoche for the entire life cycle. Everything under the sun, Huidobro reveals, is 
for “us” poets. The poet must be, then, effectively, a small God. And not “god” to be 
confused with a pantheistic or pagan sort, but the singular, omnipotent, capitalized, 
“God.” Huidobro’s words are often cited to pay homage to the creative power a poet 
wields, in the artistic sense, not the blasphemous. Yet, as such, both Huidobro and 
Fijman make similar arguments, as the former, is in fact, claiming himself (as a poet) 
to be God. Fijman’s proclamations are deemed less “intellectual” in that he proclaims 
from the confines of a hospital. 
Similarly, both Huidobro and Fijman make reference to the role ancient 
Greco-Roman philosophers play in their intellectual treatment of poetry. 
Huidobro’s, of course, appears in the imitation of Horace’s “Ars poetica,” echoing 
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this famous poem by the Roman lyricist which detailed the “do’s and don’ts” of 
poetry and drama. Fijman ruminates in a similar fashion. When asked by Zito Lema, 
“¿Como siente la poesia?” Fijman responds, “[e]s un estado de ánimo, antes de la 
reflexión...remito a la obra poética de Aristóteles” (Viaje 51). 
Keeping in mind Fijman’s intended emulation of Aristotle, how does his 
mental illness figure into his self-described “state of reflection”? How does his 
mental illness influence or hinder his output? How does he use mystical rhetoric to 
express his soul, which Fijman himself views as the source of poetry? The avant-
garde characteristics such as synesthesia, free verse, and expression of the ideal art 
form are preferred certainly in Fijman's first colection of poetry, Molino Rojo. These 
poetic “gifts” for Fijman, are God-given. He claims to be in constant search of God, 
wanting to see Him and to feel Him. To a certain extent, I argue that Fijman even 
claims that God and the thought/poetic process are equivalents. Zito Lema 
ascertains that in his work Fijman attempts to, “convocar las esencias de lo eterno, 
los castigos, la soledad, la obra de Fijman tiene un rigorismo, una profundidad 
exasperante” (Pensamiento 37).  
CONVERSION AND POETICS 
Both CV and Fijman, as earlier discussed, experience religious conversions 
that both motivate and influence their poetics. Before turning to textual analysis it is 
essential to ask what motivated their conversions. Do their conversions share 
similarities? And what types of conversion do they go through? Religious 
conversion, according to many scholars, including eminent critic Lewis Rambo, is 
first and foremost a process, being neither a unique nor a singular event. Even in 
what would be considered “instantaneous” conversions as in those considered 
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mystical, while there might be one vision or experience that spontaneously 
motivates the conversion, a litany of events still must occur before the person is, in 
fact, converted.  I cite Rambo’s foundational meanings of conversion in 
Understanding Religious Conversion (1993):  
…a simple change from the absence of a faith system to a faith 
commitment, from religious affiliation with one faith system to 
another, or from one orientation to another within a single 
faith system. It will mean a change of one's personal 
orientation toward life, from the haphazards of superstition to 
the providence of a deity; from a reliance on rote and ritual to a 
deeper conviction of God's presence; from belief in a 
threatening, punitive, judgmental deity to one that is loving, 
supportive, and desirous of the maximum good. It will mean a 
spiritual transformation of life, from seeing evil or illusion in 
everything connected with "this" world to seeing all creation as 
a manifestation of God's power and beneficence; from denial of 
the self in this life in order to gain a holy hereafter; from 
seeking personal gratification to a determination that the rule 
of God is what fulfills human beings; from a life geared to one's 
personal welfare above all else to a concern for shared and 
equal justice for all. It will mean a radical shifting of gears that 
can take the spiritually lackadaisical to a new level of intensive 
concern, commitment, and involvement. (Rambo 2) 
Thus, there are multiple types of conversion, labeled by Rambo as follows: 1) 
intensification, 2) affiliation, 3) institutional transition (what sociologists called 
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“denomination switching”), 4) tradition transition, and even 5) apostasy (13-14). CV 
undoubtedly falls into the institutional transition category as he moves from some 
“light form” of Protestantism to Catholicism. Fijman, on the other hand, belongs to 
the tradition transition category in that he shuttles between two major faiths, one 
non-Christian and the other Christian; though of course, as previously mentioned, he 
never fully abandons one faith system for another. Importantly, I suggest that both 
writers also pertained to the intensification methodology as well. In this sense, both 
writers are united in that they feel their commitment to faith and the call to God was 
present within them primordially—in CV he says since childhood he always felt a 
propensity for the Catholic tradition, that the gospels were somehow latent within 
him. And Fijman, as is well documented, certainly felt an intensified duty to carry 
out God’s will, whether it be a Jewish or Christian God. Both men write poetry as 
their way of mediating this conversion, as Fijman indicates that “…escribir 
poesía…es mi razón la que hace que entienda fácilmente las cosas sobrenaturales” 
(“Reportaje” Talismán NP). 
There is sustained argument about who determines a convert to be sincere in 
his or her conversion. Rambo explains, “[w]ithin Judaism and Christianity, for 
instance, conversion indicates a radical call to reject evil and embrace a relationship 
with God through faith. Some scholars in the human sciences limit conversion to 
sudden, radical alterations in people's beliefs, behaviors, and affiliations. Others, 
such as A. D. Nock, make sharp distinctions between Christian and Jewish 
conversion and the form of conversion in the ancient pagan world, suggesting that 
Jewish and Christian conversion is radical, complete, and decisive, while pagan 
religious change is merely an 'adhesion,' or an addon, to a person's life” (5). Clearly, 
the aforementioned definition of paganism seems to adhere more to the Fijman’s 
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cosmovision of what it means to be a believer. What remains important is the notion 
that a relationship with God is fully embraced; Fijman’s conversion can be 
problematic in that it defies a clean label, but I do not find his lack of categorization 
problematic for poetic analysis. The rest of this chapter’s close readings rely on the 
fact that Fijman espouses his own brand of religion unabashedly and 
unapologetically inviting Jesus into his heart and affirming that He is the Son of God, 
submitting entirely to His will. For this reason, I believe Fijman to be a genuine 
convert as he sees himself as such. Rambo suggests that a convert “portrays the 
nature of conversion in terms of how far someone has to go socially and culturally in 
order to be considered a convert (Rambo 12-13). In neither Fijman’s nor CV’s cases 
do I argue that they are not socially accepted as converts. Fijman was baptized and 
any social outsiderness had been present since before his conversion. There is no 
record of CV’s baptism, yet he was certainly accepted as Catholic by his wife as well 
as by his colleagues. 
By conversion, James meant, “a regeneration or reveal of life whereby the 
person acquires assurance that the divided self has been overcome” (Burkhardt 
Varieties, xxxiii). Of course, a divided self begs the question of a future unified self, to 
which James himself dedicates much scholarship. Effectively, he discusses the 
primary focus of said unification to be between the natural and spiritual lives and 
such a unification reconciles evil “as the pervasive element in the world we live in” 
(James, “Lecture VIII” 139). James warns, however, of a potentially murky line 
between alteration and transformation. Even the divided self can go through 
alterations—transient ones—and not come out the other a transformed being, even 
though a completely new and alternative set of ideals are accepted. To make this 
distinction clear, and to understand what a transformative experience must entail, 
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James cites the President of the United States (presumably Theodore Roosevelt) and 
his weekend endeavors: 
…when with paddle, gun and fishing-rod, he goes camping in 
the wilderness for a vacation, [he] changes his system of ideas 
from top to bottom. The presidential anxieties have lapsed into 
the background entirely; the official habits are replaced by the 
habits of a son of nature, and those who knew the man only as 
the strenuous magistrate would not ‘know him for the same 
person’ if they saw him as the camper. (160) 
Here, James explains that through our ability to take part in activities that define 
ourselves as human, we are necessarily pluralistic in our self-definitions. One is not 
merely the President of the United States and nothing more. Presumably, such a 
person is can also be a Parent, Stamp Collector, Camper, Cook, and Crossword 
Puzzle Solver. Thus, the mere acceptance of another set of values does not constitute 
conversion; there must a more universal truth that supersedes any other set of 
values that becomes universal for the believer. 
Fijman and CV are adherents, though, to what Rambo describes as 
intellectual conversion, one of many identified “motifs,” others being “affectional,” 
“coercive,” and “revivalism” (12-13). He explains, “[i]n intellectual conversion, the 
person seeks knowledge about religious or spiritual issues via books, television, 
articles, lectures, and other media that do not involve significant social contact. The 
person actively seeks out and explores alternatives. Belief generally occurs prior to 
active participation in religious rituals and organizations. Mystical conversion is 
considered by some to be the prototypical conversion, as in the case of Saul of 
Tarsus. Mystical conversion is generally a sudden and traumatic burst of insight, 
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induced by visions, voices, or other paranormal experiences” (Rambo 14). Both CV 
and Fijman are arguably members of the intellectual conversion, as both were 
known to be avid readers, though texts themselves are not the only avenue by which 
they achieve conversion. Clearly social, familial, and cultural contact influence them 
both as well. Fijman, in particular, speaks Spanish and had access to a long tradition 
of Catholic Spanish mystical poetry; given his association with Catholic intellectual 
circles, it is unsurprising that Fijman finds comfort in mystical experiences, thought, 
and poetry. 
Lastly, I will highlight the emphasis of the dynamic context for both Fijman 
and CV in which their conversions take place. It is impossible to divorce their 
personal religious beliefs from the environment in which these beliefs arose. Such a 
context includes a massive “…panorama of conflicting, confluent, and dialectical 
factors that both facilitate and repress the process of conversion. When seen from a 
broad perspective, conversion is part of a human drama that spans historical eras 
and both shapes and is shaped by geographical expansion and contraction. Context 
embraces an overall matrix in which the force field of people, events, experiences, 
and institutions operate on conversion” (Rambo 16). Just as the act of conversion is 
not a sole event, the context is “more than a first stage that is passed through; 
rather, it is the total environment in which conversion transpires. Context continues 
its influence throughout the other conversion stages” (17). That is the say that the 
contexts of Fijman’s and CV’s lives, of the political forces at play, of the cultural 
components of their experiences, dynamically render their conversions alive and 
continually processing.  John Gration puts it this way: "In a very true sense every 
conversion is in context, a context that is multifaceted, embracing the political, 
social, economic and religious domain in which a person is living at the time of his 
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or her conversion. Thus whatever the meaning of conversion, it never takes place 
outside a cultural context” (“Conversion” 157). 
 Now how does language, and thus poetry, play a role in conversion? I turn to 
Peter Stromberg in his “Ideological Language in the Transformation of Identity” 
(1990) and his contribution to the Oxford Handbook of Religious Conversion, “The 
Role of Language in Religious Conversion” (2014). Stromberg states, “[o]ur access to 
whatever we understand as truth is mediated through language, and this 
generalization covers the truths about the cosmos” (“Role of Langauge” 117). I 
assert that there is a phenomenological difference between conversion of 
experience and conversion of language, where the latter informs the former. Thus, I 
turn to Stromberg’s assertions regarding the “conversion narrative,” that is, what 
features generally present linguistically on paper around the time an author 
experiences a religious conversion. Stromberg identifies the appearance of 
“conversion narrative” as an academic subject post-WWII, when scholars 
differentiated it from autobiography and the novel. Stromberg’s question regards 
scholars: How do academics study the relationship between language and 
conversion among convert writers? When do they begin weaving Biblical passages 
into their speech? What exactly are the conventions of writers who are converts? 
Meaning, just as there is the study of the novel or memoir or autobiography, so too 
was conversion narrative ranked among fields of study. I argue that both CV and 
Fijman write within this conversion narrative tradition, though as I examine their 
poetry specifically, I must focus on the relationship between poetic discourse and 
transformation. David A. Snow and Richard Machalek’s well-known article “The 
Convert as Social Type” (1983) focuses on what rhetorical changes take place within 
the convert: 1) changes in talk or reasoning where a new kind of “grammar” is 
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adopted, 2) adoption of a new “master scheme” that allows for harmonious 
inclusion of the convert’s personal history, 3) use of metaphor’s the emphasize the 
convert’s uniqueness, and finally 4) the omnipotence of the convert’s new 
convictions which often form the core of the identity (“The Convert” 261). Thus, 
what I refer to is a change in self-consciousness, which raises the question: Is 
language the marker of conversion or the means by which it occurs? Certainly when 
a massive re-shaping of self transpires and a new self (perhaps James’s unified self) 
comes to be, there must have been a powerful persuasion where a new “master 
scheme” is adopted. Accordingly, the converts’ choice of words changes as well.  
CLOSE READINGS 
ELEMENT ONE: CONFLICTIVE OTHERNESSPOETIC PRODUCT 
In the following section I will closely examine how both Fijman and CV 
poetically express their individual otherness and how this produces mysticalist 
poetry. In CV first stage of writing and publication Luz ya sueño, 1938 and Vísperas 
1938-1953, 1953) he explores the no-saber—Zambrano’s “not-knowing”—in his 
poetic expression of daily life through dualism: sameness (hogar) and difference 
[foreigness] (lo extraño). As Saínz describes the phenomenon, the Poet desires the 
“ser” in its fullest form but cannot approach it, words are merely a threshold: “El 
poeta anhela ser en su totalidad, pero la palabra le impide ese conocimiento 
absoluto, y asimismo no puede ver más que fragmentos oscuros, indescifrables, 
resistentes a la intelección de una manera que resulta imposible superar para el 
creador” (Antología 8). CV tells us that the word is merely an “umbral,” a threshold 
of darkened space behind light, as in an umbra of an eclipse. This conflict nourishes 
the poet in this dialogue with the unknown, and while it does not impede the poet 
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from continuing his tireless work, s/he is compelled by the intuition that, in this 
symbolic Christian charge, there is the possibility of finding an intelligibility that 
seems unattainable.  As will be discussed, there is an avid frenzy circling CV’s chosen 
poetic approach to achieve his famed “aesthetic, creative liberty.” 
Hegel also discusses creative liberty: “To think,” says Hegel, “is to conceive, to 
bring forth one's object from oneself, not to ... thinking I am free, because I am not in 
another but remain simply with myself (Phenomenology of Spirit 132). I will now 
examine CV’s poetic mise-en-scène regarding his own poetic creativity and ontology. 
CV offers the poem “Otro”: 
  Nunca estoy conmigo. Otro. 
 
  El otro, en el sitio que 
  dejé por tener su burla. 
 
  El otro, por dentro, afuera, 
  entre, despertando olvido. 
 
  Voy y vengo, descompuesto, 
  juguete de imán profundo, niño. 
 
  Otro. Nunca estamos juntos. (Luz ya sueño 26) 
The other is never together with the poetic voice—it remains only at the site 
that the poetic voice has abandoned. Using prepositions to describe perhaps this 
physical site (that can never really be conceived of, but that exists nonetheless), the 
other simultaneously encircles and encompasses the spot “por dentro, afuera, 
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entre.” At the same time the prepositions also serve to describe the essence of this 
other: it is at once inside and outside, in between and among. Much like the 
Borgesian Aleph, the other occupies a time-space that is both limited and infinite. 
Such a physical location is the site of the other, and the poetic voice discovers itself 
magnetized to it “descompuesto, juguete de imán profundo.” If, according to Martí, 
creation is a method of proclaiming liberty (when liberty is not achieved), then CV 
recognizes this lack of liberty vis-à-vis recognition of the other and moves to situate 
his poetic voice inside and outside of the other’s space. Marilys Marrero Fernández 
states that “creación es en ocasiones un placer, y siempre es agónico” (Con Cintio 
Vitier 36). The idea that this process is “agonizing” calls to CV incorporation of 
Christianity as a method of discourse for his poetics. 
If I consider CV’s poetic “other” that occupies a site both interior and exterior 
to the self, I will further examine the dichotomy between otherness in life and in 
death. In his book Poética (1973) CV discusses the consideration of life as 
“something indestructible”: “No creo que la noción de la muerte no aparezca 
habitualmente en la esfera clara de la conciencia por el efecto de una represión 
saludable, que determina un impulso vital (es decir, vitalmente útil), y que hace 
posible lo que Schiller llama <<frivolidad metafísica del hombre>>” (Poética 60).26 
The consideration of death, then, is perceived as a vital impetus for a metaphysical 
experience. Feeling anguish thus serves as a bridge to the metaphysical. CV believes 
that anguish always incites a feeling of culpability because, “tememos haber matado 
en nosotros la vida, crimen que el hombre puede realizar con su propia mano” 
(61). CV identifies anguish as a human moment of emotion where poetic creation 
                                                        
26Here Vitier refers to Friedrich Schiller, 18th century poet, playwright, and philosopher 
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happens. Thus, anguish, for CV, functions as a liminal space between life and death 
because life's function as well as death's are repressed: 
Sólo en el momento de la angustia...en ese momento se 
aniquilan a la vez las vivencias de la vida (como actividad 
consciente personal) y de la muerte (como cesación de esa 
actividad). En la angustia parece que el fundamento mismo de 
la muerta cesara. Pero en su estado normal...el hombre no 
actúa por frivolidad sino, en rigor, por fidelidad; lo que en él se 
revela no es simplemente una represión, un oscurecimiento o 
alejamiento institivo de la idea de la muerte. Aunque eso de 
hecho ocurra, lo que en él se revela positivamente, dándole un 
sentido mínimo siempre a su actividad es una fe, no digamos ya 
intuición, una fe radical en la vida como algo milagroso, 
espontáneo, omnipotente. (60) 
What is truly revealed when confronting death is not the mere fear of it, CV 
explains. What is positively revealed in a human being is the process of faith, 
specifically the faith in Life and in Christ. What follows is César Salgado’s 
consideration of the congruencies of the Orígenes writers: 
…Vitier…use[s] modernist and avant-garde novelistic 
technologies to process personal and historical materials in 
order to instrumentalize—that is, authorize, legitimize—an 
interpretation of Cuban literary history within an arena of 
competing narrative poetics (the testimonial novels of Miguel 
Barnet in Vitier's Cuba…) The "Orígenes novel" promotes its 
author as "witness of an era" and anointed high modernist 
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literary craftsman to elbow out or disqualify adversarial claims 
about literary prestige and experience in Cuba and abroad. It 
instrumentalizes, in Vitier's case, the rehabilitation of 
origenismo in the Revolution. (Salgado 206-207) 
Here, Salgado refers to the “rehabilitation” during the time after Orígenes’s 
publication as a literary magazine during the 1960s. He describes the writers whose 
work, “…becomes rehabilitated in the eighties and nineties as a symbol of a socially 
progressive Cuba and of a nationalist teleology of emancipation” (202). My analysis 
of CV’s work is decidedly pre-revolution; however, I underscore the idea of CV as 
“witness to an era,” in the sense of philosophical dealings and his relationship to 
national discourse in Cuba. CV processes, through his poetry, a personal and 
historical cosmovision. And, as such, I keep these notions of CV’s faith and capacities 
as this “witness” in mind when considering a few poems from his Extrañeza de estar 
(1944) in the following sections. CV favors the use of revés, in various poems: “Aquí 
donde yo sólo con mi vuelo de revés ante la cara, / con mi júbilo de crimen solitario, 
/ con mi angustia de barco feliz ante la cara” (54). And again, the same word 
appears another poem, “La tarde vuela un rato por mi revés de muerto”. The poetic 
voice describes death as a “revés de muerto” (63). Given CV’s declaration in 
Extrañeza de estar of his intention to “nacer de nuevo” through the movement of 
“autodescubrirse” and “la apetencia de autoidentificarse,” the revés takes on multiple 
meanings (73). First, the revés is CV’s poetic “vuelo de revés”, the constant pursuit of 
an auto-discovery, in which he believed so fervently. During such an ontologic-
poetic journey, mistakes are bound to occur. He cites this journey with words such 
as “vuelo” and “vuela,” both indicating flight, yet this flight is twice coupled with a 
suffered misfortune. Does he cite death as this misfortune or the journey to it, 
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marred by blunders and misunderstandings? CV explains the purpose of Orígenes as, 
“no sólo de las superficiales cabriolas del efímero y desvaído vanguardismo 
cubano…sino incluso de las mejores consecuencias que se derivaron de su impulso: 
las llamadas poesía ‘pura’ y ‘social’” (66). CV’s obsession with this impetus or push 
(impulso) necessarily makes it problematic. Saínz discusses the early CV with an 
avid “hambre de justicia, anhelo supremo de hallar un sentido totalizador, fusion de 
palabra y realidad, yo y los otros,” which Saínz later criticizes though omnipresent in 
his early work of Extrañeza de estar  (Cintio Vitier, Obras 1: Poética 8).  
Fijman also offers an interpretation of the other and how it ties into poetic 
creation/expression as well as the poetic voice’s own self-recognition. The poem is 
similarly titled “El ‘Otro’” from Molino Rojo:  
   Tarde de invierno. 
  Se desperezan mis angustias 
  como los gatos; 
  se despiertan, se acuestan; 
  abren sus ojos turbios 
  y grises; 
  abren sus dedos finos 
  de humedad y silencios detallados. 
 
   Bien dormía mi ser como los niños, 
  ¡y encendieron sus velas los absurdos! 
 
   Ahora el Otro está despierto; 
  se pasea a lo largo de mi gris corredor, 
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  y suspira en mis agujeros, 
  y toca en mis paredes viejas 
  un sucio desaliento frío. 
 
   ¡La Esperanza juega a las cartas 
  con los absurdos! 
  Terminan la partida 
  Tirándose pantuflas. 
 
  Es muy larga la noche del corazón. (Poesía Completa 68) 
Fijman’s other is comprised of his anguish that sleeps and wakes—his self 
(ser) sleeps like children whose candles are lit by the absurdos. Here, absurdos could 
be read as semantically ambiguous: potentially those afflicted by mental illness, 
those who are enlightened, or those who simply are different in some way. He cites 
the frenzied action by including the absurd, turbid eyes, contrasted to the delicate 
fingers and gray eyes. These dichotomies awaken the Other, which whispers in the 
self’s holes running along its gray hallway. This Other occupies a physical site, 
similar to CV’s, that is both contained with the self and affects it from the outside by 
whispering and touching the self with cold despondency.  
Fijman additionally speaks of death when Zito Lema questions him about its 
existence: ¨...existe la muerte. Ella también se corporiza. Pero aquí, en el hospicio, 
sus apariencias son las más terribles. ¿Acaso imaginan el velatorio de un loco...? Yo, 
sobreponiendo a todo, con ayuda divina, me considero un muerto. Vivo en Cristo. No 
es una muerte fácilmente entendible....De muerte en muerte...para los corruptos, 
muerte será la oscuridad. Nuna tendrán la visión” (32). Again, the importance of the 
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physical body is paramount: death is “corporealized.” Fijman's “Poema VI,” “Poema 
V,” and “Poema VI” in Hecho de estampas illustrate, I believe, the “vision” he believes 
himself to possess, that for those who are “corrupt” are not capable of seeing. He 
presents familiarity with death—specifically of recognizing himself as un muerto 
alive in Christ—because his body plays a crucial role, as Fernández explains that 
Fijman,  “contiene en su cuerpo muriente el aliento eterno” (29). Citing the struggle 
between body and soul is autocritical, speaking of the grace of death, not its horrors. 
 Death for him is quotidian, such that the conscious poet is the one who is aware of 
the conflation of life and death. Other poems in this same book, Hecho de Estampas, 
read as follows: “Yo estaba bajo los grandes soles, bajo los grades soles fríos…jamás 
podré seguir. Yo me veo colgado como un cristo amarillo sobre los vidrios pálidos 
del mundo” (27). His body is wasted, he wants to be removed from it, but cannot 
because it holds him back. He uses this poetic voice as representative of his body 
that he cannot escape. Illness binds him to his body and restricts him yet at the same 
time that likely allows for his mind to expand and experience. 
To exemplify this idea, I turn to “Poema VI,” in which first, the poetic voice 
falls, but is recognized as the thing which makes him unique: 
  Ha caído mi voz, mi última voz, que aún guarda mi nombre. 
  Mi voz; 
pequeña línea, pequeña canción que nos separa de las cosas.  
Then, together with another interlocutor, the poetic voice and this other are 
distanced physically from his body (represented by his voice): 
  Estamos lejos de mi voz y el mundo, vestidos de humedades 
blancas. 
While residing both far from the world, the poetic voice is simultaneously 
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near it and his voice embodies death: 
  Estamos en el mundo y con los ojos en la noche. 
  Mi voz es fría y sucia como la piel de los muertos   
  (Hecho de estampas 111). 
Fijman tells us, “[l]os médicos interpretan el dolor de manera singular. Para 
ellos es perceptivo por síntomas complejos” (44). His illness and the symptoms it 
manifests are understood by science to be linear and leading to only one thing: a 
death of “darkness” instead of one of “vision.” Thus, when Fijman writes about the 
role his voice plays in “Poema VI,” the significance it has during its last spoken word 
“mi última voz” becomes embodied in the world, manifest as a small “line” and 
“song.” His voice, like a dead body's skin, is “cold” and “dirty.” Fijman writes his own 
voice into a deceased body—the only way the voice is given these bodily attributes 
(cold and dirty) is due to its fusion with a body. Similarly, in “Poema IV”, Fijman 
describes his bodily flesh: “Herido de mi canto / por uniones de azar / toda mi carne 
mortal recoge la blanca limosna del misterio” (106). Mortal flesh is injured by the 
poetic voice's song.  
 
ELEMENT TWO: SELF-EXPRESSION AS POET: THE BODY POLITIC OF POETRY AND THE 
CREATION AND AFFIRMATION OF THE POETIC SELF 
In this section I will analyze some of CV’s and Fijman's poems to discover the 
Catholicity present in their work and how they use mystical rhetoric to achieve 
these qualities. CV incorporate imagery of the infinity of the body, together with 
distinctions between the “strangeness of being” of estar and ser. It is now my 
intention to discuss, first, how Fijman uses his body, that is, the expression of his 
body’s mundane attributes, to engender mysticalist poetry. I am chiefly interested in 
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how the physical body—an integral part of Catholic communion, the taking of the 
body of Christ—is present in Fijman’s Molino rojo and Hecho de estampas. There is 
explicit reference to the sense of loss/being lost, with words such as desert, silence, 
and desolation occurring frequently. There is an evident connection to nature—
poems of “Mañana de sol,” “Tarde violeta,” and “Molino”—with reference to the 
stars, the sun, the moon, natural materials, wood, and metal, often in combination 
with human characteristics, particularly blood. Fijman uses a mystical rhetorical 
technique to understand the cosmos, or attempting to approach God through one’s 
own body, and through the materials of the body.   
FIJMAN AND THE BODY 
To highlight this usage of the body, I turn to the narrative congruency of the 
way Molino Rojo is organized. Beginning with the poem “Canto del cisne” the poetic 
voice elucidates Fijman's personal circumstances: his illness and confinement, a 
poem that is more explicitly about his psychosis than any others. He situates the 
reader by describing his physical and psychological location, to allow the reader 
entry into the world he lives in: “Demencia: / el camino más alto y más desierto” 
(45). Allusions here to the desert may be references to Judaism and the story of 
Exodus. I believe, however, that Fijman's poetic voice orients the reader to his 
struggle: both a poetic and psychological one. He describes what the hospital's 
patients are like: an “oficio de las máscaras absurdas; pero tan humanas / Roncan 
los extravíos; / tosen las muecas.” Then, a physical rendering of the space: “El patio 
del hospicio es como un banco / a lo largo del muro”. And finally, the reader 
examines Fijman's experience inside: “Cuerdas de los silencios más eternos. / ¿A 
quién llamar? / ¿A quién llamar desde el camino / tan alto y tan desierto?” (45). 
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Within such a confined space, the poetic voice is still lost, strapped in by ropes 
(cuerdas) of “eternal silence”. Yet, his illness offers a plane of elevation (más alto) 
that is also a desert—barren and uncultivated yet vast and unencumbered. Despite 
the trying, restrictive circumstances, the madness permits transcendence to a 
desert, an openness filled with possibility.  
To further Fijman’s understanding of his physical limits, I cite, again, his 
conversation with Zito Lema, where Fijman succinctly offers his definition of human 
language, in ten words: 
Dios (immaterial) 
Alma  (immaterial) 







Pneuma (immaterial). (22)  
 
I highlight Fijman’s selection of six immaterial and four physical terms 
because he provides a panoptic of the human being’s immanent capacity. He 
chooses aspects of humanity’s physical being, the body, as well as what inhabits the 
earth: flora, fauna and mineral. Beyond this physicality, the other realm that 
humanity can perceive is that which is transcendent, where the remaining six 
elements are described detailing man’s faith, creative spirit, and intellectual 
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capabilities. In short, Fijman quite concisely describes all of humanity’s faculties in 
ten short words, using the one he left out: language. For Fijman, both the body and 
the soul are integral parts of his being. 
Many critics such as Enzo Cárcano cite Fijman's aversion to the body, 
explaining it as the corrupt trap, impeding knowledge of and union with God. 
Cárcamo affirms: 
Pero luego de Molino rojo, Fijman elige un locus de 
enunciación completamente despojado para plasmar su 
experiencia purgativa, que considera, en consonancia con la 
tradición mística católica, el único medio para acceder a la 
visión de —y a la unión con— Dios. El cuerpo, su cuerpo, es 
para él un impedimento, una ligazón demasiado fuerte con lo 
terreno, con lo corruptible. (Dios, cuerpo y poesía 48)  
If Fijman, however, explains to us that his illness is a “state of madness,” it 
must necessarily be the illness of his physical body that helps to propel mystical 
poetics. In attempting to transcend his physical body and the illness it presents, he 
uses the body as a vehicle to better understand what it expresses. Again, Cárcano 
points to the use of imagery and symbolism used by Fijman as a manner of 
distancing himself from immanence to achieve transcendance: “No se trata del mero 
y arbitrario reemplazo de imágenes corporales o sensoriales por símbolos, sino una 
evolución poética que remite a una experiencia de trascendencia, de una 
subjetividad que se prepara para la entrega y se desentiende paulatinamente de lo 
terreno” (Cárcano 48-49). Fijman's synthesis of body with illness are what I argue 
permit this “evolución poética que remite a una experiencia de trascendencia” (49).  
I examine the title of Fijman's first book of published poems Molino Rojo 
 146 
 
(1926). Fijman explicitly mentions the role his illness plays, “...la demencia, el 
vértigo, que buscaba un título para esa obra que significara mis estados y encontré 
un molinito que era rojo en la cocina, y ví en ese objeto todo lo que mí poesía quería 
expresar” (Viaje 17). He chooses red to reflect revolution, a symbolic gesture 
(previously discussed), but he also finds a daily object of his life, a coffee grinder in 
his kitchen, that perfectly encapsulates what he believes his poetry expresses. While 
also personally symbolic, I point out that the coffee grinder is a physical object, 
found among the quotidian items of one's life as inspiration and representation. 
Similarly, Fijman uses what is personally known to him, his madness, in the 
aforementioned first line of “Cantos del Cisne”: “Demencia: el camino más alto, más 
desierto” (6). Dementia, then, is the way to poetry for Fijman. He validates his illness 
and the role it plays; an imperfection of his body (illness) manifests as the 
transcendent camino, the way to God. His use of the swan, or cisne, parallels the 
avant-garde, imaginably, a nod to way he was influenced by it. Additionally, Fijman 
likely refers to the mythical/popular legend that a swan only produces one song in 
its life right before it dies. 
Fijman opens Molino Rojo by describing his internal struggle: “Me hago la 
señal de la cruz a pesar de ser judío” (4). He indicates here a betrayal—his own, 
certainly, reflecting the phenomenon of “Fijmanism” earlier discussed. Yet the 
notion of betrayal appears again when he discusses his treatment by healthcare 
workers and the system in general. He never faults them, insisting, “hacen lo que 
pueden,” recognizing their inability to see this beyond his illness as he describes the 
medical workers with whom he interacts, “[s]e acerca Dios en pilchas de loquero, y 
ahorca mi gañote con sus enormes manos sarmentosas; y mi canto se enrosca en el 
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desierto” (32).27  Importantly, Fijman puts emphasis on the body of the doctor. Here, 
he references the doctor as God in medical clothes with “gnarled, twisted hands,” 
making observation of the doctor’s (and, representatively, God’s) physicality, 
focusing on the strangling the hands perform. Fijman’s neck, like his spirit (canto), is 
grabbed and suffocated. Interestingly, Fijman parallels his observational scrutiny by 
establishing himself within the same framework as he has just described, also 
employing a word to imply twistedness: “se enrosca.”  Paradoxically, in contrast to 
the doctor’s hands, here what is coiled or wound up is Fijman’s own canto, 
something a-physical, something ethereal. His canto is generated by a part of his 
body—his lungs, vocal cords, etc.—but exits and detaches from the body upon its 
production. And canto takes on myriad meanings: Fijman could be alluding to his 
own poem “Canto del cisne,” his own song, his voice (physical and certainly 
metaphorical), his spirit, his agency, his tribute to the world around him. Fijman 
draws a world of similarities between himself and the doctors who are treating him, 
while simultaneously highlighting his own transcendence of this common 
correspondence. Fijman concludes, “[a] veces pienso si no sería que ellos me tenían 
miedo. Envidia por poseer una carga de energía superior a todo lo humano” (Zito 
Lema, El pensamiento 21). His self-declared energy is beyond what is recognizably 
human. While Fijman’s doctors undoubtedly viewed him as ill, Fijman is unaffected 
by diagnoses. He continues to write and to function, unaltered by others’s 
perception of him. 
Many of the poems in Molino Rojo express bodily experiences and 
entrapment. Titles include, “Hambre,” “Mortaja,” and “Máscaras” where themes such 
                                                        
27I will discuss Fijman’s idea of “beyond”, here, beyond death at a later point in this chapter where 
he faults those who are not capable of any particular post-mortem vision. 
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as insomnia and nudity together with bulky materials such as bricks and iron 
express the poetic voice's corporeal misgivings, solitude, and exclusion. The poetic 
voice is again capable of escape, “entre el ayer eterno y el eterno mañana” because 
“[s]us máscaras de aromas me prenderán los astros!” (46). Eternal vastness, in the 
form of the cosmos, are ignited within the poetic voice's “ser.” These examples of 
mystical language unify the poem to a greatness, an “above,” comprised of the stars. 
The masks themselves, something that serves definitely to conceal and restrict, 
permit access to the universe. An overt reference to Christianity, Fijman writes, 
“sangró mi corazón como una estrella crucificada” (47). Furthermore, many kinds of 
wood and hard natural materials underscore Fijman's adherence to Christian 
imagery, perhaps alluding to Jesus’ cross: “sándalo purisimo del sueño trabajaron la 
balsa de mi vida…el muelle de mi ser…barricas, ladrillo” (47).  
As I have argued, the role Fijman's physical body plays in experiencing 
togetherness with the outside world, I further scrutinize this emphasis on 
materiality as a link to Christianity and unity with God. By highlighting conventional 
Christian allusions such as fishing boats, sheep, pastoral scenes, and doves, Fijman 
refers us back a lifestyle of simplicity and poverty, like that of Jesus. Through 
describing the physical experience of Jesus, of what the body experiences when it is 
poor, existing in a state of constant lack Similarly, a shroud, (mortaja), another 
potentially Christian, though certainly religious reference, is likened to a tree that 
“ha cubierto de palomas mi soledad” but the poetic voice, again, furtively evades the 
constraint: “pero es en vano”, it declares. Despite the shroud, the poetic voice is 
always uncovered, “Desnudo / siempre estoy como una llanura” (47). The plains 
(llanura) are another iteration of the desert and the opportunity it presents to the 
psyche: movement and freedom.    
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Another grouping of poems in Molino Rojo—“Vísperas,” “Mañana de sol,” 
“Ocasos,” “Crepúsculo”—details the passage of time, another feature of life that 
progresses eternally but remains contained within the confines of his psyche. Again 
using to his physical confinement to his advantage, Fijman utilizes mystical language 
to achieve an exit and transcendence. In these poems, personification of the times of 
day and the poetic voice's synesthetic experiences help express mystical experience. 
The poetic voice characterizes the different times of day: “Silencios 
verdes...apretados de gozo y alegría.” Then his body reacts to synthesizing the 
experience: “Enloquece en mis ojos la mañana!”, and “Mis manos palpan el color de 
misa!” (53). The sunrise becomes crazed in his eyes and his hands palpitate the 
color of Catholic mass. The descriptions of his body experiencing nature and 
Catholicism serve to connect his body to the cosmos.  
Finally, in the last poem of Molino Rojo, “El hombre del mar,” Fijman 
describes the conflict between “hombre de los ojos” and “hombre salvaje.” Among 
these two perceptions of himself, the latter intercepted the former. He provides 
closure for Molino Rojo by explaining what the hombre del mar teaches the poetic 
voice about nature and expressing oneself: “[le] ha iniciado en las expansiones, [le] 
ha libertado de los cuatro puntos cardinales” while the hombre salvaje teaches it to 
navigate this universe, using music, a cósmica simpatía.  
VITIER AND THE BODY 
In consideration of the dichotomy presented by Fijman, I now turn to CV’s 
expression of the body. CV’s incorporation of the body reflects his notions expressed 
in Poética (1961) where he problematizes the aforementioned liminal space 
between life and death expressed by anguish. CV highlights the infinity of the body 
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and the importance expressed by its potential in the poem, “Un hombre, un cruel 
tamaño”:  “Que me oyeras, / espejo transeúnte, ávido parque o multitud / entrando 
en la infinita locura de mi cuerpo. / Oh musa del morir, / que tú me oigas" 
(Extrañeza de Estar 54).  The “pedestrian mirror” reflects the “infinite madness of 
his body.” His body, his physical ser, exemplifies the strangeness of being, later 
described by CV as “extrañeza de ser.” This grouping of poems entitled Extraneza de 
estar included in Vísperas, echoes the notions presented in the section where I 
discussed otherness, particularly as in this poem, he switches to the verb ser instead 
of estar. With estar, the strangeness of physical location is conferred upon the body; 
the body's position bears the weight of this strangeness/wonderment. And with the 
transition to ser, the body itself, rather than its positioning, expresses foreignness. 
The strange becomes literally embodied and anxiety soon develops, “Qué desazón / 
de oír la tabla fantasiosa / mientras pulso el reloj y el barco arde / y aquel eterno de 
su penuria queda” (61). The anguish experienced by the poetic voice is rendered 
maddening by the body due to “el sueño [que] transparenta mi locura” (54).   
Victor Rodríguez Núñez characterizes CV’s early work as a ravenous 
yearning: “A nuestro juicio, esa hambre de justicia, ese anhelo totalizador, esa fusión 
de palabra y realidad, de yo y los otros están ya presentes en la poesía temprana de 
Vitier” (Rodríguez Núñez 25).  It is this fusion of word with reality that permits CV 
to inscribe his body into his work. CV writes: 
Qué extrañeza de ser. Qué desazón  
de oír la tabla fantasiosa  
mientras pulso el reloj y el barco arde  
y aquel eterno en su penuria queda. (57)  
The fundamental identification of this otherness, described as the “wonder or 
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foreigness of being” is anxiety (desazón) also understood as meaning a certain 
uneasiness or discomfort. While one may be in awe of such strangeness there exists 
a simultaneous uncertainty with such an unknown, foreign feeling. To corporealize 
it, CV ascertains the locus of his extrañeza, "ese hogar en la terrible sucesión…por la 
paciencia o la maestría, sino por el fuego de lo otro, en la memoria o en el deseo" (8). 
Rodríguez Núñez explains, “[e]n otras palabras, en Vitier la dialéctica del estar 
predomina sobre la metafísica del ser. Lo exterior así reconocido ejerce una 
poderosa atracción sobre el sujeto poético" (26). CV’s poetic other exerts such a 
powerful force over his poetic subject that “dialectic” or analysis of the “wonder of 
being” achieves more importance that the “being” itself. In this way, CV moves 
beyond the limitations of the poetic body, to supersede the metaphysical self. CV 
ravenous yearning for a confluence of the self and other, while transient, becomes 
transcendent. CV identifies "nuestra ruda y ávida metamorfosis / penetrándome a 
través de su discurso como una absorta espada" (63). The unity of the self and other, 
is an avid metamorphosis, complete and overwhelming. Yet the tool by which he 
achieves this poetic harmony is an “absorta espada,” that is, a suggestion of sharp 
metal, certainly an adversarial image to union. CV, according to Saínz is “siempre fiel 
al misterio del suceder, mucho más que a una ontología del absoluto” (Antología 7). 
The sword, then, must be part of this desired mystery, paradoxical and uncertain. 
And together with CV’s known hungered yearning, it is something that constantly 
pushes the limits of the poetic body, and as such, the aforementioned poetic “revés” 
results. 
CV’s closes Extrañeza de estar with a “Nota” which couches his conclusions of 




…el estar en nosotros, ya de por sí muy extraño pues comporta 
un realizarnos en lo nuestro ajeno, en lo nuestro infinito de 
otro y en lo ajeno infinitamente propio, prestamente se revela, 
cuando el bulto mejor de la conciencia arriba, un no estar en 
nosotros sino en el mundo, creído éste como reino de 
estancias, o, dicho absolutamente, vivido y desvivido como 
Estancia. (70)  
CV explains that the body’s “self” is, in itself, strange (extraño), so much so 
that our other is infinite. So unending, in fact, that it results in a fully “no estar en 
nosotros”—a disavowal from ourselves and full incorporation into the world around 
us. Our bodies, then, for CV, become primal property of humanity, sans 
classifications of race, politics, ethnicity, etc. Rodríguez Núñez suggests, “[s]í, la 
anulación del desarraigo está, sobre todo, en la identificación con el otro, cuando el 
yo se expande en el tiempo y en el espacio para definirse en su semejante” (47). This 
poetic subject is an abstraction, is an “extra-diagetic” body, a body that transforms 
into the ether surrounding it, again akin to the Borgesian Aleph.28 And as such, 
poiesis is achieved: CV’s poetic body exists and becomes the space it inhabits. CV 
closes by positing,  
Miro otra vez al hombre sobre el mundo,  
y otra vez sólo suenan estos ojos  
oníricos sin fin de roca  
funeral y perdida criatura. (57) 
                                                        
28 Jorge Luis Borges’s aleph is discussed in Chapter One; here I refer to the notion that in his book of 
eponymous short stories, the final story tells the experience of a man who encounters an enigmatic 
spark of light in a basement. This spark full contains all moments of time and space for all eternity.  
 153 
 
ELEMENT THREE: COMMUNITY-FORGING: NATION-BUILDING AND CANON-BUILDING 
VITIER’S NATION-BUILDING POETRY 
In the final section of this chapter I will examine how Fijman and CV forge 
communities for their poetic voices as they respond to political or social pressures. 
Raul Hernández Novas offers an analysis of CV’s pre-revolutionary work with regard 
to CV’s treatment of national project/identity making. He posits, “[l]a vocación 
poética de Vitier, los temas del imposible, la nostalgia y la memoria tienen 
vinculaciones secretas con la experiencia de un vacío que el carnaval político apenas 
podía disfrazar” (“Cintio Vitier: La mirada poética” 1189) Critics such as Duanel Díaz 
discuss the political infusings of CV’s early work (Luz ya sueño and Vísperas) as a 
representative “spokestext” for what would become the nationalistic, socialist 
revolution to begin in 1959. Instead, I wish to exemplify how it is not the political 
undertones of CV’s poems that contribute to this nation-building rhetoric; rather, it 
is through creative liberty and mysticalist exposition (Catholicism) that CV creates 
political commentary.  
CV describes his own discovery of Catholicism, which informs his poetic 
renderings of Cuba.  I reiterate what I discussed in Chapter Two regarding 
Catholicism and the Catholicist poets’s way of mediating the Catholic religion and 
poetics: The questioning turns away from a traditional approach in which the 
believer uses Catholicism first to ask and negotiate these mortal questions and 
instead prefers an avenue which first pursues these questions and then mediates 
meaning by way of Catholicism. I turn to CV’s realization of the Catholic voice within 
him:  
Desde la adolescencia me sentí atraído por el cristianismo, más 
o menos heterodoxo de Unamuno y de Pascal. Me 
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sensibilizaron también mucho en este sentido San Juan de la 
Cruz  y Fray Luis de León, Vallejo, Dostoievski, Rilke, Bloy, 
Eliot, el Seminario de María Zambrano sobre San 
Agustín…supe que siempre había sabido que el Evangelio era 
verdad y que estaba viviendo desde la niñez una vida 
clandestina, oculta. (“Solo en la acción podremos vivir la 
belleza” 104) 
CV converts to Catholicism in 1952, the year he marries FGM, yet we know 
that Christianity has resonated with his spirit since boyhood.29 He describes both an 
intrinsic (internal) Christian identity (desde la niñez) as well as academic (external) 
one in which he cites all the Catholic/mystical writers who have influenced him. He 
accepts the Christian Gospels as Truth, as something “lived,” that is, a durative 
process forming what CV describes as an “occult and clandestine” subconscious. 
How, then, does a Catholic poet, well-versed in Christian mystical thought, 
express poetic liberty? And why does he use this liberty to offer political discourse? 
CV sources his theological and poetic thought in Christianity as a method of 
expressing liberty. Marrero Fernández explains that CV “proclamó que la libertad es 
lo único esencial para el ser americano…no sólo la libertad política, de las ideas, sino 
la libertad espiritual, la independencia del ser…la libertad como máxima y suprema 
aspiración del hombre, sustentada…en un arraigada concepción cristiana…” (Con 
Cintio Vitier 85). Employing a heavily Martí-influenced cosmovision of humanistic 
discourse, CV ties creative liberty to the most fundamental process of self identity. 
And this process of self identity translates into the self as part of a literary 
                                                        
29 See the earlier part of this chapter that discusses relevant political events relating to the Cuban 
revolution in 1952 and thereafter. 
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community, eventually becoming part of writing the nation-self. Liberty becomes 
the (only) necessity for knowledge of the self, fortified by a cultural, social, 
humanistic and philosophical praxis (Marrero Fernández 120). This praxis is 
codified first by CV the man, then CV the poet, and finally, CV the citizen. In this way, 
I suggest that CV, the man-poet-citizen, is capable of posing personal, ontological 
questions that mediate meaning by way of mysticalical interpretation. Instead of a 
poet using Christianity first to interpret meaning, CV prefers the aesthetics of 
personal/creative liberty to permit the development of mysticalical poetry. In his 
“Cántico Nuevo” he even proclaims that the poems are not so much “de poesía como 
de conciencia...He pasado de la conciencia de la poesía a la poesía de la conciencia” 
(“Cántico Nuevo” 50). That is, poetry first comes from the (sub)conscious (CV, the 
man), then comes from CV, the poet, and eventually to become nationalistic 
discourse (CV, the citizen). 
The role mysticality plays in this transformative poetic creation is significant 
and influential on CV’s aesthetics of poetry, particularly present in “Experiencia de 
la poesía” (1944) and “Mnemosyne” (1973). I argue that, like FGM's expression of 
the Divine by way of the mundane, CV, the poet, is possessed by things. Marrero 
Fernández suggests that “[p]ara Vitier no hay belleza general o abstracta, el poeta 
traduce el lenguaje de las cosas a través de la creación, 'el barro de la nueva 
creación, barro de la ternura humana,' moldeado y fundido por el hombre como el 
artesano” (Experiencia 129). If CV’s muse for poetic production is not general beauty 
or abstraction, then he must seek out that which is concrete and present in his life to 
provide his poetic content. He therefore uses his political and sensorial  milieu (as 
will be evidenced in his poem “Noche intacta: Hojas” from Vísperas) to influence the 
creation of his citizen-voiced, nationalistic poetry that differs so greatly from his 
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earliest work from the late 1930s.  
CV proposes in “Mnemosyne,” “[l]a poesía quiere extática penetrar”; thus, the 
poetic word penetrates his self and his surroundings as created by God (8). He 
establishes the parameters by which he writes poetry as a Catholic. As a Catholic 
poet, his work is not founded in the universal acceptance of God's omnipresence, 
because we cannot see Him. Rather, he argues, we accept His presence exactly 
because of this “ecstatic penetration” of His presence in the substance of the Earth. 
CV explains: 
...como cristianos, entendemos que la existencia no es una  
 insuficiencia infinita per se...La calidad de <<lo artístico>> no  
 debe atribuirse, como en rigor ninguna categoría espiritual, a  
una mera negación o substracción de la existencia, sino, todo lo 
contrario, a una inmersión cada vez más profunda en la 
sustancia dinámica y trascendente de lo que existe. 
(“Mnemosyne” 12) 
 
CV, then, negates the via negativa and searches for the dynamism of God's 
presence around him, stating that it is both profound and transcendental.  
The title of CV’s prose-like poem “Noche intacta: Hojas,” evokes this 
concretization of spiritual experience in the three-step movement from abstract to 
concrete with the words “noche,” “intacta,” and “hojas.” Nighttime (an often poetic 
abstraction) is made specific and complete (intacta) and then even sacramentalized 
as something tangible (hojas). Leaves, in nature, or papers on a desk, are made 
known to the reader as the poetic voice introduces the idea that the “noche intacta” 
= “hojas” with the use of the colon. The reader is already invited to conceive of the 
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poetic body of the poem to be this very same “sustancia dinámica y trascendente” 
(94). 
In the body of the poem, CV questions, apostrophically, “--Cómo explicarlo de 
otro modo? Estoy buscando ardientemente un sitio” (101). Again, the searching for a 
physical space, a logos for the poetic voice, becomes manifest. He goes on, “[c]amino, 
sobre todo. Papel, humo, fincas. También sabremos quedar inmóviles...” (101). Here, 
as differentiated from his earlier work, this poetic voice seeks a space for the Cuban 
“Casa” so often referenced in this poem, instead of a site for the poetic voice alone. A 
personal ontology is forgone in favor of a national poetic project. Casa (capitalized) 
appears three times in the poems, representing both Cuba and God's Kingdom. 
Twice the poetic voice finds himself “a espaldas de la Casa” and confronting the 
“Casa mortal e immortal,” that is the potential transience of Cuba's national identity 
pre-revolution (mortal) and the House of God (immortal) (100, 102). Near the 
poem's end, CV chooses instead “la Ciudad” to materialize Cuba (Havana): “la raza 
de los naranjos me deja absorto en la Ciudad, te deja absorto en la Ciudad, a entrada 
del silencio” (103). The orange trees leave the poetic voice and the apostrophic 
“you” equally absorbed and fascinated. The poetic voice knows only how to walk, to 
feel, and to observe Cuban life in order to know how to write about it: 
Cómo salvar a un país que no se hunde? Pero era indispensable 
que cada uno de nosotros se asomara a su ventana, y las 
contemplaciones que subían como loo?res de vigor sublime, 
porque todos habríamos de ser indígenas de una tierra de 
callados príncipes (tierra donde nadie vive) y todo amábamos 




Cuba, where no one lives, is filled with silent princes and remains a country 
that CV suggests needs saving. But why? This poem is published in 1953, and was 
written sometime likely in the 1940s or early 1950s, certainly at least six years 
before the revolution is successful. Salvation is needed, though there is no reason for 
it because “no se hunde.” Cuba is not failing. Yet it requires saving. CV suggests that 
the climate in which Cubans were living during the 1950s was not sustainable, 
though it functioned. In the country there were princes, but they were silenced. He 
insists that everyone must be a responsible member of the salvation army, going to 
Cuba's window to appreciate the “sombra clara y grande.” It is his role as a part of 
Orígenes to take part in the struggle of creating a new Cuba, identified by its interior, 
its citizens, not by its exterior, the influence of foreign governments, and the Batista 
regime. If everyone, he says, is indigenous to Cuba, they must be part of the 
salvation. He has seen the outside, and it does not offer what Cuba needs: 
  --Yo he visto la ciudad gótica de New York, desde el Agua, y el  
   llanto ha saltado a mi cuello como una bestia de lentitud  
   sagrada. 
--Yo he visto sus gigantescos edificios pasando trabajosamente 
a la fábula del Agua de ayer, y todo el rigor de su pornografía. 
--Yo he sido ese idiota invenciblemente esplendoroso en el 
agua del Hudson. (97) 
One of the primary tenets of Christianity is the need for salvation, so in this 
way CV underscores his political argument with Christian references. The “amena 
vocación” of Cubans was political and their “irreprimible vocación” was saintly (97). 
He uses Christianity to catalyze his political discourse, all the while rooting it in this 
very same “sustancia dinámica” earlier discussed. The visitors to the island wore 
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“escasas máscaras” and consequently, the poetic voice argues, “una angustia de 
historicidad se apoderaba de nosotros” (97). For this reason, the need for salvation 
becomes evident. Because of the foreign influence from the U.S., the poetic voice 
questions, “¿Estaríamos vivos, o muertos?”, a question asked “a la calma sangrienta 
del domingo y a la inmensa estupidez de indescifrable máscara” (97). This 
indecipherable mask is looming, enormous, and bloody.   
In closing the poem, the poetic voice asks, “¿Quién soy y qué me hago?”. After 
a lengthy exposition of who Cubans are, how they have been influenced politically, 
the voice wonders how he is meant to negotiate this enigma. The last supplication is 
quite prayer-like, beseeching God: 
  Sombra de los Días, 
  sombra de los Ángeles 
  sombra de la Ley: escúchame! (103). 
Saínz tells us:   
  En medio de tanto no-saber, en medio de esa extrañeza que  
   irrumpia de pronto y de inmediato no distanciaba de las  
   cosas y las tornaba aún más oscuras e impenetrables, era  
   natural la conciencia de lo imposible, mezclada con el caos  
   de la vida nacional, factor que gravitaba también en los   
   inquietantes diálogos del poeta con su propia vida. (Antología  
  12) 
CV gives us the ability to express daily life through images of objects and 
entities that are delivered to us in everyday comings and goings. These bodies 
appear Cuban and foreign at the same time. They are made of themselves and their 
“sobrevida,” of their material limits and their transcendence; they are indifferent 
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bodies that are also symbolic.  
CV expresses a yearning to understand lo cubano in his post-revolution work 
as well.  So I now reconsider his famous lines from “Cántico Nuevo”: “[h]e pasado de 
la conciencia de la poesía / a la poesía de la conciencia” (“Cántico Nuevo” 50). He 
describes being between "la espada y la pared," that he wishes to discuss the poetics 
of political commitment instead.  He says that this impulse to describe reality is 
what in the end we end up calling poetry. Octavio Paz has said of CV’s work, “porque 
para mí su obra pertenece a lo que podría llamarse el segundo momento—el 
momento de la conciencia—de la poesía de Vitier—inequívocamente expuesto en 
esta frase de una de los ensayos que Vitier reúne en Poética: Ese irresistible impulso 
de la realidad hacia la palabra es lo que llamamos poesía” (Antología 15). “Cántico 
Nuevo” the immersion of the poet into the past, with “history’s dimensions”, as 
explained by Saínz, takes on a more central role, as is true for the majority of the 
poems in Testimonios (15-16).  The poem begins with a clear declaration of just 
exactly how this book differs from those before, underscoring the role of CV, the 
poet, and lessening the significance of poetry as an abstract medium. What is 
expressed, CV wants us to realize, is more telling than the fact that it is written in 
verse: 
  Este libro no es tanto de poesía 
  como de conciencia. 
 
  Sus versos resultan duros y desabridos 
  pero dicen la verdad de mi corazón 
  cambiante y una 




The truth expressed by the heart is both changing and singular, that is, a 
paradox. While the words of the poem might seem distasteful, or even insipid, the 
essential expression at heart is most valuable. CV continues: 
 
  Ya no vale la pena escribir 
  una línea 
  que o sea completa, aunque después resulte poca, 
  la verdad. 
  
  La poesía no está encima de nada.  
Poetry, while previously considered a nationalistic symbol, no longer carries 
such narrow characterization in the sense that anything can be poetically expressed. 
What is most important is that the words must convey the truth of redemption. So, 
what, then, is CV’s post-revolution truth? The ending of the poem explains: 
  … 
  Este libro no contiene las notas de una lira 
  salvo que una lira sea 
  el tiempo y el espacio que van de la espada a la pared. 
 
La profunda luz de agosto me lo dice: 
  Nada está por encima de nada. 
Todo va a salvarse o a perderse junto en un solo cuerpo y en 
una 
       [sola] 
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   alma. (319) 
CV no longer (as in Luz ya sueño or Vísperas) feels trapped by the limits of 
words, remaining in the umbral. In prior poetic words, as earlier discussed, the poet 
approaches with patience and circumspection the revelation of knowledge. He is 
eager and willing to let poetry envelop him and imbue him with meaning. Now, he 
proclaims, adamantly, “Nada está por encima de nada,” decisively declaring that 
there is no “magic feather” solution to knowledge; not even poetry possesses such 
power. It is up to the individual, body and soul, where salvation or loss are both 
possible. Saínz describes CV’s evident change in approach: 
Las páginas de Testimonios entran en la realidad de otra 
manera, de un modo directo—como no habían podido penetrar 
los textos de la complicación anterior—, porque la propia 
existencia del poeta había alcanzado una más nítida definición, 
proceso que comenzó en aquella vuelta hacia el hogar…el poeta 
nos dice simplemente lo que ve y siente, lo que la naturaleza de 
las cosas le dice al contemplarla desde la perspectiva de un 
diálogo distinto con ellas, el diálogo con los otros… (Antología 
16).  
CV’s search for self is claimed to be a national discourse. He describes his 
Cuba through poetry, something only CV’s own “historical dimensions” could 
wrestle out on the page. CV’s famous consciousness-poetry relationship, passing 
from one to the other and floating somewhere between, depicts CV’s participation in 




Undoubtedly, Fijman’s work also occupies a space in his poetic consciousness 
that drives him to define identity. Whereas it was clear with CV that his work drove 
a national identity formation, how does Fijman fit into a national discourse, if at all? 
The canon that Fijman builds is not canonical in the nationalistic Argentine sense. It 
is, nonetheless, pursuant to his “Fijmanism.” In this last section I will discuss some 
of Fijman’s unedited poems, collected by Alfredo Arias in his edition of Fijman’s 
poetry, Obras (1923-1969) 1: Poemas (2005), to showcase the cosmovision Fijman 
was creating to establish his own canon. 
Fijman was very purposeful in his writing. He states that despite his 
internment in the hospital, “…h[a] continuado en [su] tarea: escribir poesía” 
(“Reportaje” Talismán NP). He provides a poética in a short article he writes for 
“Número” in 1930 titled, “El misterio de la poesía,”—a cosmological explanation of 
the politics of poetics, of how he views poetry’s larger fit in not just his own universe 
as a convert, but as belonging to the wider human experience: 
La inteligencia toma cuerpo glorioso cuando descansa bajo la 
operación de la gracia; y a modo de esa operación, la poesía 
nos saca del afligimiento de la carne, y apacienta nuestros 
sentidos demorados en los objetos y en las tinieblas exteriores. 
La dignidad es cristiana; y el poeta no busca las palabras, sino 
el Verbo. (NP) 
Poetry, for Fijman, “yanks us away from the ailments of the flesh.” It provides 
a greater explanation for the way the world works. And a poet does not look for 
words, but the word of God (Verbo). Nearly forty years later, shortly before his 
death, Fijman makes a near identical statement: “Yo también creo [en la poesía], 
pero desde la resignación. El misterio de la poesía nos saca del afligimiento de la 
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carne y nos permite esperar la noche divina. Soy un poeta que ya no busca las 
palabras, sino el Verbo” (“Talismán” 1969; Transcribed “Unicornio” 1993). 
Fascinatingly, this worldview for Fijman, does not change from the year he was 
baptized in 1930 until his death. He is steadfast in his commitment to poetry as his 
work for God. Such a commitment, I argue, is the solid foundation for Fijman’s own 
canon.30 To further this notion, I examine one of his previously unknown poems 
written in 1962, published for the first time by Arias in 2005, titled “Canon”:  
  Castilla parte en cruz las aldeas y torres, 
  los versos y los llanos. 
  El Cid cabalga en cruz; 
  y los siervos blasfeman con la sangre de Cristo. 
  Los molinos se tornan por un tiempo de muerte; 
  y Don Miguel Cervantes redime los cautivos 
  con ayunos y prosas consonantes. 
  Castilla dice el Canon en la sangre judía 
  de los niños judíos; 
  y las torres malditas de las viejas aldeas 
  asesinan en cruz 
  a los siervos y llanos. (211) 
Fijman’s canon—what he believes to be representative of his poetic work 
during his lifetime—is multilayered, complex, steeped in Spanish history, 
contradictory and yet consistent. He cites one of the best-known, yet religiously 
complex moments in Spain’s history: El Cid, a Castilian nobleman recognized by 
                                                        




both the Moors and the Christians, having fought for both sides. He travels on his 
horse in Spanish territory that is “cut/divided” (parte) by Castilla, the Catholic 
crown. Fijman describes the servants as blasphemers, implying they are false 
conversos, forced to convert perhaps, or maybe ill-fitting as Christians, disbelievers. 
Fijman then cites Spain’s most famed novelist, Miguel de Cervantes, who redeems 
with his pen by writing a book, whose Moorish “meta-author,” El Cide Hamete 
Benengeli authors Part II.  Fijman identifies multiple aspects of Spanish history (also 
addressed in the Quijote) in this short poem that indicates pluralism, dissent, 
religious questioning and identity. He then goes further to declare that Castilla 
dictates the Canon in Jewish blood from Jewish children in an accusatory tone. The 
canon is presented by one religious system (Catholicism), yet rooted in another 
(Judaism); its symbol, the cross, is an assassin. Fijman’s canon, like the eponymously 
titled poem, is not homogenous. It is fraught with contrary images (Catholic and 
Jewish) that still, as history tells, existed simultaneously.31 Fijman describes his 
version of a canon, a canon rooted in historical events that he renders poetic. His 
canon additionally reveals the mystery of poetry and the writer (Fijman, the poet or 
Cervantes, the novelist) wields the power to unveil its potential. 
Thus, the mystery of poetry is intimately tied to the mystery of mysticism, 
which in turn, informs Fijman’s cosmology. As Enzo Cárcano points out: 
[L]a mística es la cifra de un misterio, de un ocultamiento, de 
una lucha y de una paradoja. Todo poeta místico tiene la 
certeza del decir insuficiente, del saberse incapaz. Sin embargo, 
                                                        
31 Here I reference the widely-debated notion of coexistencia of the Christians and Muslims during 
the time of the Reconquista. My mention is merely to cite its occurrence, not to argue whether or not 
such co-existence was harmonious. Fijman, as I do, recalls a moment in Spanish history that reflected 
pluralism, an as such, embodies conflict and complexity. 
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no todos dicen del mismo modo, desde el mismo lugar; cada 
uno adopta un locus de enunciación que establece su posición 
en relación con su propia experiencia trascendente, su propia 
interioridad, y con su coyuntura terrena (“Dios, Cuerpo y 
Poesía” 57).  
Fijman’s locus (logos) is his canon, his methodology of situating himself as a 
mystic. Cárcano posits that mysticism is the way of measuring (cifra) paradox and 
mystery. Each poet adopts his own logos, in relation to his own transcendental 
experience.  
Fijman’s third book of poems, Estrella de la mañana, is the most forthright in 
declaring his Catholic logos. It is a communication of religious assumption, a 
proclamation of his faith (published the year after he converted). The poems in 
Estrella perform, according to María Amelia Arancet Ruda, a dynamic vertigo or 
dynamic chaos (Jacobo Fijman: un poética de las huellas 199, 248). There is a 
consistent repetition of words, which for Raúl Roque Aragón, are penetrated by the 
“ritmo mental hebreo” of psalms and work written by medieval Spanish conversos 
(“Introduction” Poesía religiosa argentina 43). This sermon-like aspect is noted in 
Fijman’s Poema XXXVI: 
Pongo este llano de mi llanto…  
Pongo este llanto de soledad perfecta; 
pongo este llanto dichoso d mi alma;  
pongo este llanto de acabado recogimiento… (Poesía 159).  
Thirty-one years later, Fijman’s canon is unchanged. In his unedited poems 
written during the 1960s, there is the same dizzying, religious adherence, 




  Tú sentías la pura eternidad, 
  sinfigura, beata, 
  sinrazón, infinita, 
  sinfigura, absoluta, sinfigura, beata. 
  Tú sentías la pura simplición, 
  beata vestidísima beata 
  sinrazón, indistante, 
  a simplición harmónica beata, 
  sinfigura, beata, 
  de eternidad (Obras 210). 
Fijman’s use of anaphora, epistrophe, and apostrophe enhance this prayer-
like quality. The poem’s rhythmic repetition feels like a piously penitentiary prayer, 
particularly due to the use of the prefix “sin” and the word “beata.” The poetic voice 
seems to supplicate the apostrophic “tú”, knowing that s/he experiences such “pure 
eternity,” existing infinitely and absolutely, formless and harmonious: the “you” is 
paradoxical. Fijman’s mystical awareness is intensely manifest: his knowing himself 
to be incomplete and the certainty of using words that are insufficient. To this end, 
this poem, as is true with many of his later poems (in contrast to those published in 
his three books), exemplifies Fijman’s use of neologism. Perhaps his creation of 
words speaks to this knowledge that his own language is insufficient. A word like 
“simplición” implies the word “simplificación”. Simplición is shorter though, and even 
simpler than the word to which it refers. He is reducing the spelling to broaden the 
semantics, to include a type of simplification that perhaps he does not quite know. 
The creation of new words—simplición, sinfigura, indistante—reflects Fijman’s 
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continued search for knowledge of God through a worldview that is unique to the 
poet. 
Finally, the presence of beata is overwhelming during Fijman’s poetry in the 
years before his death. Beatification is the process of honoring/titling a holy and 
devout person after his/her death, decreed a venerable servant of God by the local 
diocese in the name of the Pope. Beatification is always posthumous; I believe it is 
unsurprising, then, that the term beato/a becomes so omnipresent in Fijman’s work 
in the years before his death.  
In late medieval and early modern Spain, the term beata described any 
woman who was noted for her devotion and frequent attendance of mass, though it 
also was used generally for nuns.  In both cases these women wore habits, even if 
they were not officially members of a religious order, though those that were, often 
were linked to Franciscan or Dominican orders. Beginning in the sixteenth century, 
before the Spanish Baroque, beatas came to be associated with Protestantism, 
termed “alumbrados,” and were at times protected by high-ranking officials of the 
Spanish Church, but eventually at other pursued by the Inquisition with the edict of 
Toledo in 1525 enforced by Inquisitor General, Alonso Manrique.32 As a formed 
mystical sect in the early sixteenth century, the beatas were known to enter into 
ecstatic states, to experience the stigmata, and to have visions of Christ, and many 
were exiled or forced to confess and punished. Notably, Santa Teresa de Jesús writes 
at the same time beatas achieve more fame, and she generally made effort to 
differentiate herself from the sect. 
                                                        
32 The “alumbrados” of the mystical sect briefly discussed here do not refer to the “alumbrados 
bávaros”, or iluminati, or the Spanish Enlightenment to occur during the 18th century.  
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Thus, the term beata, is paradoxical: a person, lay or otherwise, who is 
devoutly religious as well mystic who is reprimanded for being too unorthodox. It 
represents a person who, in desiring to express his/her faith, is repressed and 
marginalized. Fijman finds solidarity in the beatas in the following poem “Seráfica 
cosmogonía” (published without date):    
  Los bosques se ocultaron en el magno desierto; 
  el cuerpo onmipotente de una niña de tierra 
  trae el fuego del mundo; 
  y tú beata, 
  de ánima beata, 
  creas lumbre beata 
  de número formal de toda cosa: 
  el número formal 
  que numera al vestigio de la suprema esfera, 
  idéntico, beato, 
  de ánima beata, 
  de serafín á mar, 
  y serafín de mar. 
  un cuerpo omnipotente de una niña de tierra 
  trae el fuego del mundo. (Obras 263) 33 
The poem begins with two strong paradoxes: forests hiding in desert and a 
young, mortal girl holds god-like omnipotence. The beata herself is meta-beata: she 
possesses a beata soul, creating beata warmth/light. A beato appears, of the same 
                                                        
33 Arias mentions in his collection that this poem was found first published in Talismán in 1969, 
though there is no original evidence of the date it was composed: “No hemos visto manuscrito ni 
copia dactilográfica” (263).  
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make and model as the beata, of seraphic provenance. Seraphs, or celestial beings, 
important in both Christian and Jewish angelic hierarchy, are often associated with 
heavenly or apotheostic works, and are mentioned in the Book of Revelation.  No 
stranger to apotheosis or paradox, Fijman explores the notion of beata in this poem, 
to highlight the struggle of such an ardent believer. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, Fijman is able, in his own way, to establish his canon, that 
expresses a proprietary blend of Catholicism and Judaism, derived from his poetry. 
His canon is a body of poetry, which is consistently “Fijman” during the span of his 
lifetime and to which he is fiercely loyal. Fijman is a devout believer, through and 
through, and the “Fijmanistic” canon he produces highlights his acts of faith, as he 
understands them. As he says, “…mis obras prueban que no sólo soy un hombre de 
real razón, sino de razón de gracia” (Talismán NP). Fijman uses paradox to his 
advantage, to underscore the immanent and transcendent aspects of his poetry, as is 
particularly showcased here in a selection of a poem titled “Cántico trascendente” 
(1963):  
 
  Las estrellas se fugan en el mar y la noche 
  donde encuentra su imagen la belleza fugada. 
  Pero también la noche en todo el mar 
  transfigura sus partes en la noche. (Fijman 76)  
Fijman depicts nocturnal stars, which in their escape, discover their own 
beauty. And the night at sea, in turn, transforms its parts into/during nighttime. 
Fijman pieces together a cosmogony that supports his canon. He never strays from 
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his belief system; a conversion which ultimately forms and informs his worldview 
from every possible angle. Likewise, CV’s conversion results in a belief system from 
which is also does not stray, influences his poetry and essays during the pre- and 
post-revolutionary period. On speaking of his own version of Cuban cosmogony, CV 
tells us in 1959, “[h]ay así en la poesía cubana la coherencia de un destino. Ella nos 
habla de un hombre, que al llegar a la plenitud viril, quiere conquistar su espacio y 
su tiempo” (Vitier, “Prólogo” Las mejores poesías NP). The coherence of a destiny 
drives CV’s search for a personal and national poetic discourse. In conquering his 
own space and time in Cuban history, CV, among the other members of Orígenes will 
determine the effects of the revolution, effecting change and building their version 
of national identity. In the following chapter, I analyze how Brazilian writer, Clarice 
Lispector, also of pluralistic origin, seeks out her own cosmogonies by writing a 
psychologically-stirring lyrical novel.  
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Chapter Four—Lispector’s mysticality 
INTRODUCTION: LISPECTOR’S JEWISH, LYRICAL NOVEL 
This last chapter serves to examine Clarice Lispector’s novel A paixão 
segundo G.H: romance (1964), and the degree to which the author writes mysticism 
into the lone, female protagonist.34 My dissertation will conclude with the analysis of 
a lyrical novel whose narration exemplifies Zambrano’s poiesis because it presents 
fractured grammar and mysticalist apostrophe. In this chapter, I discuss Lispector’s 
own identification as Brazilian and Jewish. However, my main purpose is provide 
another case study for mysticality vis-à-vis: 1) Lispector’s “displaced” writing style 
and the protagonist’s relationship to the reader, 2) a naming ritual, 3) alternate 
definitions of the word barata (cockroach) in Brazilian Portuguese, (as the 
protagonist’s interaction with a cockroach is the central event of the narrative); and 
4) the protagonist’s concept of God. Much scholarship has been dedicated to 
establishing whether or not Lispector is a Jewish writer or whether her writing is 
Jewish; nevertheless, it is not my intention to pursue this avenue or corroborate the 
assertions of any particular scholar. I will allude to the enormous body of 
scholarship dedicated to examining Jewish allusions in G.H., but my interest instead 
is to support my argument for mysticality. I argue that Lispector’s thematic 
preferences in G.H. as well as her manner of writing both contribute to a mysticalist 
reading. My questions will concern the following: Is there a mystical union present? 
What does G.H.’s process of self-actualization reveal? Does Lispector use 
                                                        
34 All textual citations in this chapter of G.H. are from the 1984 edition (Rio de Janeiro, Nova 
Fronteira). I additionally use Benedito Nunes’s 1985 critical edition (Rio de Janeiro, Nova Fronteira 
and cite it accordingly. 
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paratactical structures to foment mysticality, and likewise, what role does semantic 
paradox play in my mystical reading? I will first introduce the text and discuss some 
overall plot points to familiarize the reader. Next, I will provide some biographical 
information regarding Lispector to explain how her environment may have affected 
her writing. Afterwards, I will look at the way Hélène Cixous read Lispector’s work, 
as she was an avid fan and critic of the Brazilian writer, which will support a 
mysticalist interpretation. Finally, I will conclude with a variety of close readings to 
show how I evidence mysticality in the novel G.H. 
The narrative of G.H. is simplistic in terms of plot. G.H., a woman of high 
social class, narrates the events of the prior day: she ventures into her maid’s room 
while no one is home (and the maid has recently been fired). Upon entering, G.H. 
describes luggage tags with her initials on them, which is how the reader learns her 
name. The protagonist then spends a great deal of time observing a charcoal 
drawing on the wall of three figures—a man, woman, and a dog. She describes what 
she perceives as their non-uniformity in that they do not actually form a group. And 
finally, the last “event” of the novel details G.H.’s discovery of a cockroach in the 
room. Her disgust and intrigue cause her to question everything about the 
cockroach, from the symbolism of its ancestors to the meaning of its bodily fluids. 
Finally, she kills and consumes the insect. The plot is concluded with G.H. recalling 
the parallels of humanity to the suffering of Jesus Christ. The protagonist never 
reveals what city she lives in, though many assume it to be Rio de Janeiro. 
SCHOLASTIC DEBATE CONCERNING LISPECTOR’S JEWISH IDENTITY 
 
First, I will briefly consider the existing scholarship that analyzes the 
Jewishness of G.H. Lispector engages with a variety of Jewish tropes—the desert, the 
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mystical abyss, the unknowing/impersonability of God—yet she artfully defies any 
categorical association with any particular genre, even that of the Jewish or feminist. 
She is supremely subversive and achieves a new rendering of Jewish mystical 
perspective in this novel. Lindstrom supports that “Lispector's allusions to items 
that are specific to particular cultural traditions may reasonably be suspected of 
making ironic and parodic use of these borrowings, or of transforming them in other 
ways” (“Patterns” 111).  
 Ilan Stavans argues that a work of literature itself is not necessarily Jewish: it 
is the author that is so (Tropical Synagogues 1). In this sense, the author may imbue 
his/her work with qualities that reflect the Jewish author’s ethnic or religious 
background but a text, as it stands independent from its author, is neither Jewish 
nor non-Jewish.35 Conversely, other Jewish critics see the narrative itself as Jewish, 
though the question here that arises is whether or not a Gentile could produce such 
a text. An alternate position is that of Nelson Vieira who explains that (whether or 
not the text or author is Jewish) there does exist a “Jewish gaze” particularly in light 
of his research on Lispector, which revealed what little importance she gave to her 
Jewish identity as an influence on her work. He quotes her as saying, “sou judia, você 
sabe. Mas não acredito nessa besteria de judeu ser o povo eleito de Deus. Não é coisa 
nenhuma...Eu, enfim, sou brasileira, pronto e ponto” (“Clarice Lispector” 117). Vieira 
believes she did rely on aspects of Jewish literary expression, subtly incorporating 
“spiritual and hermeneutical aspects of her Jewish cultural legacy into her unique 
style” and in so doing she “transcended the parameters of literary mimesis” (Jewish 
Voices 101). This transcendent gaze reflects a Jewish history (according to Vieira) 
                                                        
35 This questioning relates to Foucault’s idea of the author himself and how the genealogy of writers 
either does or does not manifest in a work of literature. 
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and I believe this gaze is what propels her interpretive openness, allowing for 
compounded interpretations. Therefore, Lispector’s inclusion of Jewish tropes 
arguably speaks to an inheritance of Jewish writers.  Daphne Patai offers the most 
pan-Christian-Judeo critique in discussing the “generalized mystical language” (e.g. 
Jewish tropes referring to the Kabbalah) used in the novel stating that this language 
could be drawn from multiple sources (“Clarice Lispector: Myth and Mystification" 
91). Especially given what we know about Lispector's own identity-forging, it seems 
impossible to conclude beyond any doubt that one aspect or another is decisively 
Jewish. Patai explains, “[b]ut a knowledge of these perspectives [Zen Buddhism, St. 
John of the Cross, Meister Eckhart] can itself lead to the conscious adoption of a 
typical 'mystical style,' which may present itself as the legitimate alternative to 
silence. This is apparently the path Lispector has chosen in her novel” (92). I think it 
is more realistic to acknowledge a potentially pluralistic reading, than to adamantly 
prefer any other influence, especially since G.H. herself, the protagonist, is not 
overtly Jewish. As Lindstrom points out, “[a]mong many Latin American writers 
from Jewish family backgrounds, Clarice Lispector, with her playful and creative use 
of language and multiple meanings...manifests her Jewish origin in her writing [and] 
does so in an exceedingly cryptic manner” (“Patterns” 111).  In short, the presence 
of mystical language supports my argument and serves only to enhance Lispector’s 
linguistic alterity producing mysticality. 
Further scholars, such as Mario Valdés, discuss Paul Ricoeur’s notions of 
ostensive and non-ostensive referents, which directly dialogue with Lispector’s 
treatment of Jewishness (A Ricoeur Reader 35). If, for Lispector, the ostensive 
referent is Jewish mysticism, then the non-ostensive referent is the subversion she 
manifests in establishing and playing with this Jewish gaze. The non-ostensive 
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referent, for Ricoeur, is always extra-linguistic, that is, outside the means of 
language, and this chapter will serve to examine how Lispector herself view the role 
of language, in addition to how it stimulates mysticality. Valdés takes this a step 
further to delineate between “sedimentation” (ostensive) and that which is 
“innovation” (non-ostensive). G.H.’s journey to the basic substratum of herself, from 
self to cockroach and back again, precisely lies outside the context of language; it is 
non-ostensive and un-knowable. Though, as I will discuss, Lispector uses language 
to express what she knows might be inexpressible. She explains, “[m]inhas intuições 
se tornam mais claras ao esforço de transpó-las em palavras” (Waldman 20). 
Despite the fact that writing might be a transgression, for Lispector, it is the only 
methodological approach to expression. Transgression, as a trope, is evident 
throughout the novel.   
LISPECTOR’S MIGRATION 
Born in Chechelnyk, in what is now Ukraine, to a Jewish family of Lithuanian 
descent, Chaya Pinkhasovna Lispector (1920-1977), migrated to Brazil as a child 
escaping the Russian Civil War. Upon arriving to Brazil, the whole family changed 
their first names except for one sister, Tania. Chaya, now Clarice, together with her 
family are led by Father Pinkus (Pedro) and mother Mania (Marieta). By way of 
Romania and Austria, the Lispectors were able to make it to Brazil in 1923, settling 
first in Alagoas and later in Recife, where Lispector stayed until she was seventeen 
(1937). Marieta, ill and bed-ridden, died when Lispector was nine years old. 
Indicating that her first language was Portuguese when asked if she spoke Russian 
at home, Lispector insisted that her father spoke Portuguese as soon as they arrived 
to Brazil (“Recontres” 33). However, Elisa (the older sister) indicated that their 
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mother spoke Yiddish to them and that Jewish rituals were practiced in the home 
(Marting, “I never set foot” 89). While Lispector indicated she herself had a “speech 
defect” (uma lingua presa), Diane Marting explains that “interviewers often 
insinuated that she had a foreign accent” (89). Regardless, Lispector felt her birth in 
Ukraine was “irrelevant to her life choices, and thus her own self-image…[h]er place 
of birth is merely one of many places outside Brazil where she has traveled, literally 
or in her imagination” (91). 
An excellent student, Lispector was raised in an environment where writing 
and education were praised. She received a Jewish education at the Colégio Hebreo-
Idisch-Brasileiro and was then was accepted into the most prestigious secondary 
school, Ginásio Pernambucano. Pedro was insistent that he find Jewish husbands for 
his daughters and moved the family to Rio de Janeiro (capital city at the time) in 
1937 where he also hoped to encounter more economic opportunity. Pedro was a 
self-taught student of the Bible and the Talmud in addition to being an excellent 
mathematician (Vieira, Jewish Voices 104). It seems natural, then, that he 
encouraged scholasticism and the study of language. Thus, it should come as no 
surprise that, as Vieira points out, “Lispector’s evocative language [is] a reflection of 
the mystic’s journey beyond literal or rational meaning” (105). And many years 
after Marieta’s death, Lispector discovered that her mother kept a diary and wrote 
poetry (110). In short, Lispector grew up in a family of writers who appreciated the 
study of the written word.  
Lispector entered The National School of Law (Faculdade Nacional de 
Direito) in 1940 and while a student there published her first story, “Triunfo,” in the 
magazine “Pan” in 1940, though shortly thereafter her father died. At the age of 
twenty, Lispector has already escaped violence in her native Ukraine, the death of 
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both of her parents, and at twenty-three she married a foreign service diplomat, 
Maury Gurgel Valente. In 1943 she publishes her first novel Perto do Coração 
Selvagem and also is a journalist for “Agência Nacional,” a state-run, (Vargas regime) 
newspaper as well as at “A Noite,” as the lone female employee (Waldman 15). As a 
results perhaps, Lispector downplayed the significance of her Jewishness—
importantly, I point out that as the wife of a foreign service diplomat, and journalist 
for a state-run publication, it seems likely Lispector was interested in assimilation. 
As previously mentioned, Lispector enforced her Brazilianness, sublimating any 
importance of her Jewish identity. Her reticence to admit to being Jewish could 
arguably be due to her desire to assimilate given her career and family choices.  
While in Washington D.C. due to her husband's assignment, Lispector forms 
friendships with Erico Veríssimo and his wife Mafalda in addition to Alzira Vargas, 
the daughter of Getúlio Vargas. It is during this time (the 1950s) that she begins 
publishing short stories in “Senhor” magazine in Rio de Janeiro, which might have 
increased her longing to return to her homeland. By 1959, she had become so 
unsettled by the foreign diplomat lifestyle that she left her husband in the U.S. and 
returned to Brazil with her two sons, living the rest of her life in Rio.  
Thus, during the time Lispector was growing up in Brazil, Getúlio Vargas was 
in power, first between 1930 and 1945 as a dictator and later from 1951-1954 as a 
democratically-elected official. Marking the end of the Old Republic, Vargas was 
brought to power by the Revolution of 1930, which repealed the constitution of 
1891. Leaders of several Brazilian states, Minas Gerais, Paraíba and Rio Grande do 
Sul, initiated an armed movement in response to failed elections earlier that year. 
Despite democratically electing the government’s candidate, Júlio Prestes, the 
former never took office due to the coup and Vargas was instated instead. During 
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the 1920s the Old Republic was experiencing a crisis due to the ever-mobilizing 
industrial workers, particularly in the rural states of Minas Gerais and São Paulo, 
whose socio-political ideals were influenced heavily from European Nazism and 
Fascism (Loewenstein, Brazil Under Vargas 348).  
This political background serves to demonstrate the environment Lispector 
grew up in, having lived in Brazil since childhood. Although I would not argue that 
any of her writing (G.H. or her other works) is in direct dialogue with the Vargas 
regime, I believe that Lispector favors a variety of rhetorical techniques that reflect 
in some way the political turbulence of her childhood years, as she fights against the 
grain, lexically and syntactically. According to Marta Peixoto, João Guimarães Rosa 
(undisputed master of Brazilian twentieth century novels) perceived Lispector’s 
writing as follows: 
Lispector’s linguistic inventiveness centers not so much on the 
lexical level, on the use of unusual words or neologism (in 
which Rosa himself excelled), but rather on syntactical 
contortions and strange juxtapositions, creating semantic 
pressures that unsettle the meaning of words and concepts. 
(Passionate Fictions xii) 
I would suggest that Lispector’s defiance of routine narrative and preference 
for unsettling paradox do reflect the contortions of her environment, as a wife of a 
diplomat, mother of two sons, and talented writer. Thus, I argue that Lispector’s 
unorthodox methods of writing are expressions of mysticality that echo the 
unsettled environment in which she found herself. 
LISPECTOR'S READER: A WARNING?  
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I aim to examine how Lispector responded to her milieu, the personal and 
political, in order to better understand why mysticality plays such a central role in 
G.H. She was always an active writer and journalist, and (as earlier mentioned) 
when she was unhappy in her marriage, she made changes, left her husband and 
together with her sons returned to Brazil. For this reason, she certainly can be 
described as decisive. In Benedito Nunes’s annotated edition of A paixão segundo 
G.H. (Brazil 1988), critic and friend of Lispector, Olga Borelli, offers a prologue 
entitled “A Difícil Definição.” In it, she describes an epistolary friendship she 
developed with Lispector after having read G.H. herself, feeling compelled to get in 
touch with the author (xx). Lispector explains to Borelli how she feels about her role 
in her family life and how she perceives herself as mother, writer, and human, 
describing: 
Nasci para amar os outros, nasci para escrever e nasci para 
criar meus filhos. O amar os outros e tão vasto que inclui até 
perdão para mim mesma com o que sobre. Amar os outros é a 
única salvação individual que conheço: ninguém estará perdido 
/se der amor e ás vezes receber amor em troca. (xxii) 
Lispector's grand capacity for love and for the consideration of her family are 
at the heart of why she believes she is alive. She explains that no one could possibly 
be alone or lost if they love another. I argue that writing, for Lispector, is the 
expression of this love; she spends copious amounts of energy forcing an intense 
writing schedule, just as she spends time with her children. An astoundingly 
introspective person, she even takes into consideration how her own emotions 
affect her judgment, “[e]stou me cuidando muito. Procurando não viver na base do 
emocional…Estou escrevendo as 2 da madrugada, mas em plena forma” (xxii). It 
 181 
 
appears that she might have repressed, or at least quelled her emotional state, to 
force a habit of writing in the early morning. According to Borelli, “[n]unca escreveu 
para desabafar ou como catarse. Para isso, dizia ela, tenho os amigos” (xxii). Borelli 
draws this conclusion because Lispector clearly states the type of reader she writes 
for, a reader who has “uma alma já formada.” But does this statement necessarily 
preclude her writing from being a catharsis of some kind? If she isn’t writing for 
cathartic purposes, then why does she write? As Vieira often points out, Lispector 
abhorred categorization, so I believe, simply, she writes to transcend categories. 
Vieira supports this argument, positing, “[h]er writing transcends the social notion 
of oppression, marginalization, and victimization because she focused upon the 
problematics of a fixed identity or existence” (Jewish Voices 101). As I will discuss, 
Lispector wrote because she felt she needed to; it was an effort to understand her 
provenance.  
Borelli does make a fascinating statement about both the content and syntax 
of her writing, “Clarice escrevia simplesmente. Como quem vive. Por isso todas as 
vezes que foi tentada a deixar de escrever, não conseguiu. Dizia: ‘Não tenho vocação 
para o suicídio’” (xxii). Suicide—allegory for the greatest version of giving up—is 
not an immanent quality for Lispector. Instead, she marshals the feelings that result 
from her day-and-night intensive introspection and (one of) the products is G.H.  She 
instructs her potential reader:  
    A Possíveis Leitores 
Este livro é como um livro qualquer. Mas eu ficaria contente se 
fossa lido apenas por pessoas de alma já formada. Aquelas que 
sabem que a aproximação, do que quer que seja, se faz 
gradualmente e penosamente—atravessando inclusive o 
 182 
 
oposto daquilo de que se vai aproximar. Aquelas pessoas que, 
só elas, entenderão bem devagar que este livro nada tira de 
ninguém. A mim, por exemplo, o personagem G.H. foi dando 
pouco a pouco uma alegria difícil; mas chama-se alegria. (NP) 
She presents the idea that someone with a “fully forged” soul is the only one 
to take on G.H. And it reads like a possible warning to her “possible readers.” 
Lispector cautions that the idea of approaching something, even if with 
circumspection, can result in the opposite of the desired effect. Perhaps she means 
to say that this is what happened to her after writing this book. Caufield does point 
out, “[f]or the reading subject, G.H. is a fictional creation that is evoked through the 
act of reading; for G.H., who is narrating subject, the reader is a fiction that she 
evokes, but who is not there” (“Clarice Lispector's The Passion” 404). Borelli says 
that Lispector was in a difficult moment, both in terms of her family and her own 
emotional health. However, Borelli claims that the “livro, porém, não reflete nada 
sobre esse momento de crise. A inspiração era algo muito especial e que nem 
sempre a visitava” (xxiii). Although Borelli knew Lispector well, I would suggest that 
claiming with certainty that Lispector was not at all influenced by her life in writing 
G.H., is a difficult statement to make. Borelli supports this claim by stating that 
during a period of eight years, Lispector never wrote one word, and then suddenly, 
from a single breath, G.H. was born. She does not specifically cite a letter or 
communication with Lispector to indicate that G.H. was the product of one 
inspiration, thus making it a difficult claim to support. I posit, instead, that if 
Lispector did produce G.H. in one fell swoop, as it were, that the circumstances of 
her surroundings must have had influence on this swift and abrupt return to 
writing. What might have caused this cleavage in her life?  
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To answer this, I turn to Borelli’s suggestion that God was an “intimate 
possibility” for Lispector, reiterating that she seemed to always be in search of 
something (xxiii). Still, search for something, whether it be for self or for a 
transcendental alternate/higher meaning, does not necessarily precipitate a 
mysticalist reading. A questioning or transforming of the language itself is also 
necessary.  Lispector’s novel does intimately showcase her search for something, 
though I suggest the search for self is mystical only in terms of my definition of 
mysticality. Her language, her use of punctuation, her lyrical, non-linear plot, the 
lack of action (other than the entrance into the room and the killing of the 
cockroach) all are rhetorical devices Lispector employs that mimic mystical writing. 
In the end, however, what the protagonist achieves, through the consumption of the 
organic cockroach, is the re-wiring of the self through its own meta-union. There is 
no union with God, and as such, I argue this novel is not mystical in the traditional 
theological sense. Mystical language and structures are used to support the 
protagonist’s pursuit of meaning, which ultimately is located within.  Sonia 
Roncador discusses Lispector’s “impulso autobiográfico” indicating that G.H. or Agua 
viva “não habia nenhuma intenção da autora de que seus textos possem ser lidos 
como autobiografias. E somente a partir da publicação de “A via cruces do corpo” 
(1974) que Clarice envereda pelo caminho autobiográfico” (114). Nunes likewise 
offers the theory that, despite G.H. and Agua viva containing first-person narrative, 
they do not necessarily represent the author herself, that the “eu” could be an 
impersonal “I” or merely anonymous. Of course, we determine an author’s 
autobiography by the author’s own statement that this is the case.  
I turn, instead, to the notion of auto-representation. In terms of an argument 
using mysticality, Lispector’s daily experiences influenced the way in which she 
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wrote her protagonist. Roncador goes on to suggest that in Lispector’s novels 
published before 1974 (hence including G.H.) there is a clear element of “auto-
representação” (114). It is this notion of auto-representation that informs this 
chapter’s analysis. Minimally, auto-representation in G.H., in my view, becomes 
G.H.’s own perception of herself, a meta-representation perhaps. The reader 
experiences what G.H. experiences, instigating G.H.’s representation of herself in the 
novel, manifest for the reader. Thus, I cite Roncador again, “[c]omo Clarice quisesse 
vincular a sua escrita ao momento específico de sua produção, ela prove 
informações sobre o tempo o lugar onde os contos do livro são escritos, como 
também sobre seu propriedade no naquele momento em particular” (115). 
Roncador speaks here of Lispector’s short stories, “O homem que apraeceu”, “Por 
enquanto” and “Dia apos dia”. However, I suggest, then, as I have throughout this 
dissertation, that it is impossible to divorce a writer from his/her environment. 
Ultimately, then, Lispector’s G.H. was created with some purpose that represents her 
circumstances, even though it is not autobiographical. The rest of my analysis in this 
chapter does not examine whether or not Lispector was inserting herself into her 
text; rather I scrutinize the circumstances in which she wrote G.H.  (socio-political 
environment) to suggest why G.H. was created. Lispector herself says in Agua viva, 
“There is much I cannot tell you. I am not going to be autobiographical. I want to be 
‘bio’” (40). The notion of “bio” implies biological, human, humanistic. She aims to 
write the human experience: an experience that necessarily reflects her own life, but 
also necessarily that of everyone else. “I am all of yourselves”, she declares in Um 
sopro da vida: Pulsaçoes and the reader must take it seriously (25).  
WHY WORDS ARE LISPECTOR'S MYSTICISM 
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Lispector tells us “A palavra tem o seu terrível limite”  (Nunes xxiii). Just like 
Vitier recognizes the terrible restraint of words, that they are merely an umbral, 
Lispector is similarly aware that words on a page do not constitute the entirety of 
human expression. Yet, they are her only recourse. Caufield suggests, “Lispector's 
fiction utilizes discourse as the means of elucidating ontology...there is a self-
reflexive awareness of the limitation of language and an acknowledgement of the 
impossibility of designating or representing the remnant” (Caufield 404). That is, 
being acutely conscious and explicitly verbal about the parameters language 
enforces proves Lispector's self-awareness. Arguably, she inserts this element of 
self-awareness into the novel, either by way of her protagonist's actions and words, 
or by her very own act of writing G.H. itself. She admits multiple times to Waldman, 
among others, “[e]u nasci para escrever. Minha liberdade é escrever. A palabra é o 
meu domínio sobre o mundo” (Waldman 10). Presumably, when asked why she 
writes, Lispector answers in a manner that is both rhetorical questioning and direct 
response: 
Quem sabe, escrevo por não saber pintar. Escrevo sobretudo 
porque a vida é mortal mesmo antes de uma pessoa realmente 
morrer. Escrevo porque o que é que eu faria dessa onda de 
amor que as vezes existe em mim? Escrevo por amor? 
Escrevo…o que mais poderia fazer, se não escrevesse? Escrevo 
porque, se doi muito escrever, não escrever doi também e 
mais. Escrevo por que amo e odeio o mundo? Escrevo para 
saber porque nasci. E as vezes escrevo como quem da de comer 




Writing is a revelatory process; it informs Lispector’s understanding of 
herself, explaining “why she was born.” If words are her mechanism of “dominion” 
over the world before her, then she cannot conceive of any other way to manage her 
thoughts. Writing is her only remedy; as such, her use of mystical language enhances 
this self-described dominion.  
Benedito Nunes mentions a variety of critics and their mystical 
interpretation of Lispector’s G.H.:   
Exemplo das novas condições da recepção crítica é o diálogo 
mantido por três importantes professores brasileiros: 
Benedito Nunes, Luís Costa Lima e Affonso Romano de 
Sant'Anna. Se o primeiro fala de uma “via mística” no itinerário 
de GH, o segundo de uma “mística ao revés” e o terceiro de um 
critério estrutural (as observações deste último referem-se aos 
contos da escritora—para ele, uma “contingencia”, já que 
poderia estendê-las aos romances), eles se encontram quando 
apontam a associação simétrica tema-linguagem, processo 
enunciativo básico de A Paixao Segundo G.H.  e do conjunto da 
obra de Clarice Lispector. (Nunes, Vozes da Crítica 203) 
All of the aforementioned scholars cite some degree of mysticism (“vía 
mística” or “mysticism in reverse”), which this chapter does not serve to wholly 
deny. However, I argue that it is mysticality, rather than any sort of mysticism 
proper, that best describes Lispector’s novel. It is precisely because of Lispector’s 
recognition that words merit only their limits, that mysticality is the best 
interpretation.36  
                                                        
36My arguments for mysticality are furthered in the “Elemental Analysis” sections. 
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One of the aforementioned critics, Affonso Romano de Sant’Anna, discusses 
the role of language in G.H. In “O ritual epifânico do texto,” (1976) Sant’Anna states 
that Lispector’s narration penetrates, “no laberinto mágico, místico e metafisico” 
(241). Lispector’s narrative “labyrinth” responds to Lispector’s creation of 
“stretched” or “scattered” (espraiar) textual events that somehow still remain in 
contact. He goes on, “[s]eu processo narrativo é assim: o texto é uma massa que vai 
se espraiando sobre o papel em círuculos concêntricos” (242). For Sant’Anna, 
despite the scatterdness, the concentric nature of her narration keeps the storyline 
in check. Finally, Sant’Anna puts forth a variety of descriptors about G.H., a few of 
which I will highlight here:  
1. A narrativa de A Paixão Segundo G.H. como epifania literária, 
psicológica e mística. 
2. A narrativa epifânica como ritual. G.H. é de passagem. A 
percepção de narrativa como exercício de liminaridade. (243) 
I am most interested in Sant’Anna’s expression of G.H. as “epiphany” in the 
sense that something new is revealed or illuminated in a singular instant at every 
step of the text, thus making it ritualistic. A psychological or mystical essence is 
intuitively grasped by either G.H. or the reader, as the narration progresses through 
this “passage” (passagem). By exercising this “mystical practice” so consistently in 
the narrative, Lispector achieves a mystical reality for her protagonist and a 
mysticalist reading for the reader. 
Borelli suggests that Lispector, “…vivia num atualismo místico, Deus era a 
sua mais íntima possibilidade. Pelo conhecimento que dela tive notei que sua acao 
na vida sempre correspondia a uma busca” (xxiii). The notion that Lispector was “in 
search” of something does not inevitably presuppose a mystical existence. However, 
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the suggestion that God was “her most intimate possibility” does support a mystical 
reading. But how does Lispector achieve this? I will argue in the “Elemental 
Analysis” sections of this chapter that it is Lispector’s syntax and paradoxical 
semantics that prove mysticality, not the mere “search for self.” It is as much the 
grammar of the transcendent and the constant rhetorical apostrophe that generate a 
mysticalist interpretation. G.H., Lispector’s protagonist in A paixão Segundo G.H. 
states, “[a]lém do mais a ‘psicologia’ nunca me interessou. O olhar psicológico me 
impacientava e me impacienta, é um instrumento que só transpassa. Acho que desde 
a adolescência eu havia saído do estágio do psicológico.” (21). G.H. believes that the 
psychological gaze/examination is excessive; it is a recourse that the protagonist 
has overcome long ago, during adolescence. As a psychiatrist can explain the psyche, 
but not the soul; G.H. believes the yearning-questioning she experiences throughout 
the novel cannot fully be explained by psychology. Therefore, psychology provides 
no comforting remedy, and G.H. does not have the patience for it. I believe, just as 
the “warning” to potential readers, Lispector, (through G.H.) posits that a 
reductionist understanding of her novel—that it is a simple, psychology quandary—
is not enough.  
This struggle for meaning is present in Lispector’s other works as well. In her 
foreword to the 1989 translated version of Agua viva (The Stream of Life) Hélène 
Cixous writes about Lispector’s manner of writing. Cixous beautifully describes 
Lispector’s usage of poiesis (though never calling it such): 
In Close to the Savage Heart, Clarice had recourse to the 
geometric form of the circle of life. Agua viva is its realization 
and its representation…The problem is that to delve into “the 
instant-already” is complicated by the fact that we deal with 
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depth and that the latter cannot be measured by watch 
alone…Themes relate to life: there is the constant inscription of 
birth in innumerable ways. It is a process that recurs from 
circle to circle, often dealing with the birth of the subject itself, 
the birth of moments of the subject. First, there of moments of 
gestation during all the moments of gestation. (“Foreword”, 
The Stream of Life x) 
Cixous's arguments here dovetail with argument about mysticality. Although 
Cixous discusses Lispector’s first novel Perto ao coração selvagem and as well as 
Agua viva, I will elucidate Cixous’s comments in relation to G.H. Cixous’s marvelous 
“instant-already” describes the mystical process evident in G.H., a process that is at 
once evolving and also the finalized product at the same time. It is simultaneously 
lyrical-poetic creation and manifestation, in short, Zambrano’s poiesis. Cixous also 
insists that “[t]hemes [of the book, i.e., depth of the self] relate to life”; making 
certain that what Lispector writes is constantly inscribed in herself. G.H. echoes 
these encircling “Lispector experiences” in considering the character of G.H. If “the 
birth of the subject itself” as Cixous argues, persists from “circle to circle,” then 
Lispector bears the subject of G.H. again and again. In reading G.H. there is a clear 
exploration, through figurative mud and brambles, to attempt to see who G.H. might 
be, to herself and to the reader. Nunes explains that this multi-faceted approach to 
G.H., the protagonist, offers the reader a multi-focal approach to the novel: 
A experiência de GH, que procuramos circunscrever em seu 
aspecto confessional, abstraindo as circunstancias da 
narrativa, é uma experiência multivocal. A via mística, eixo 
dessa experiência em torno da qual a ação romanesca se 
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esquematiza, é uma via aberta a múltiplos temas, como a 
linguagem e a arte, entramos ao da busca espiritual, e que são 
fundamentais ao desenvolvimento da narrativa. (Nunes, 
Leitura de Lispector 60) 
THE RITUAL OF NAMING TO EXPRESS MYSTICALITY 
In the following section I suggest that Lispector included a “naming 
ceremony” for her protagonist, which one could argue parallels the Jewish naming 
rituals for babies.  The forthcoming analysis of this Jewish cultural and religious 
event, serves, I believe, as a type of Jewish sedimentation (here Ricoeur’s 
sedimentation) for Lispector, but nothing is sedimented, that is, forcefully or 
traditionally Jewish. Lispector parallels the multiplier effect of the search for 
knowledge and therefore God, and in her case, the search for self.  I question the 
usage of the initials G.H. as additional religious allusion. The reader learns they are 
the initials of the protagonist as viewed on a luggage tag when she enters the maid's 
quarters. No additional information is ever given by Lispector as to the relevance or 
choice of these letters, other than that they belong to the protagonist. Vieira points 
out, “the first-person narrative of this novel is only known by her initials G.H., 
thereby turning the text's compass toward an ontological direction of identity that 
points to universal issues of self, otherness, nothingness, self-knowledge, exile, 
action, and possibly redemption” (“Clarice Lispector's Jewish Universe” 103).  She 
reveals early on, in the second chapter, that she is named G.H. It is the first “event” 
upon entering the room, before the analysis of the “family portrait.” Thus, the 
presentation of the initials is significant in that 1) it occurs so early on, and as such, 
2) catalyzes the rest of the novel's events under the notion specifically of how G.H. 
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perceives herself, how (un)connected she is to the labels that are ascribed to her. 
She explains: 
Nunca, então, havia eu de pensar que um dia iria de contorno a 
este silencio. Ao estilhaçamento do silencio...Esse—apenas 
esse—foi o meu maior contato comigo mesma?  
G.H. first establishes that she has never, ever been faced with such silence. 
And in order to reconcile such a novel experience, she immediately turns to self-
actualization and classification: a name. 
O resto—o resto eram sempre as organizações de mim mesa, 
agora sei, ah, agora eu sei. O resto era modo como pouco a 
pouco eu havia me transformado na pessoa que tem o meu 
nome. E acabei sendo o meu nome. E suficiente ver no couro de 
minhas valises as inicias G.H., e eis-me. (21) 
The protagonist is transformed into the person that owns her name and she 
eventually turns into the name itself. It is arguable that this polysyndeton could be 
described as a kind of circumlocution—instead of just simply stating “Eu sou G.H.,” 
G.H. describes the encircling of the name, like a speck of dirt going down the drain. 
There is an approach to the name from various points but eventually they are so 
many that the name, together with the person it represents, is sucked downward as 
the water rushes through the pipes and gravity takes its course. And for the first 
time, the protagonist refers to herself in the third person: “A G.H. vivera muito, 
quero dizer, vivera muitos fatos” before going on to examine what her life has meant 
so far (21).  Referring to herself both in first- and third-person is both a semantic 
and conjugational method of creating distance, or maybe confusion. Perhaps it also 
reveals the internal turmoil experienced by G.H., having entered for the first time a 
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location that should be known to her, but is novel and mysterious (her maid’s 
room). After being “named,” G.H. reveals a litany of questions: 
--para ficar depressa livre do meu destino humano menor? E 
ficar livre para buscar a minha tragédia. Minha tragédia estava 
em alguma parte. Onde estava o meu destino maior…A 
tragédia—que é a Aventura maior—nunca se realizara em 
mim. Só o meu destino pessoal era o que eu conhecia. E o que 
eu queria. (21) 
It is perhaps logical to conclude that the “tragedy” G.H. speaks of refers to 
lack of economic need, i.e., she does not know what it means to suffer as she is a 
well-to-do woman. I suggest, however, that after receiving a name and 
conceptualizing herself as this mutual first- and third-person she is at a precipice, 
and knows it. What could possibly happen, what tragedy or adventure that she has 
never experienced, awaits?  
The letters “G” and “H” are concurrent in the Portuguese alphabet. They are 
also the seventh and eighth letters. Many scholars such as Vieira, Lindstrom, 
Waldman, and Schiminovich have discussed the presence or lack of a literary 
Jewishness, but I believe the mere letters of G.H.’s name indicate, minimally, a 
Biblical reference. The seventh day, in Genesis, is the first day of rest for God, after 
he has completed his task of creating and ordering the world. The eighth day, 
therefore, might represent this very same mystery, perhaps tragedy or adventure, 
that is unknown to humankind. G.H.’s own name propels her on a trajectory so 
forceful that she will be flung off the edge into the world and must survive with 
nothing more than what she knows about herself. And she knows only her name. 
If we take into consideration that Lispector did come from a Jewish family, 
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her mother speaking to her in Yiddish until she was nine, I think it is possible to 
examine this naming ceremony as potentially an echo of Jewish culture (Marting, “I 
never set foot” 89). Thus, in Reform, Conservative, and Reconstructionist families, a 
“b’rit milah” (for boys) “b’rit bat” (for girls), a Jewish baby naming ceremony, is 
performed to don the newborn with a Hebrew name in addition to his/her 
English/secular name.  Rabbi Karen Companez of Flint, MI explains the details of the 
baby naming ceremony’s purpose: 
During the ceremony, there is an opportunity for the parents of 
the new baby to explain their choice of name and its 
significance to them. Blessings are said during the ceremony 
acknowledging that the child has been entered into a brit, a 
covenant, with God. Blessings are also recited for the baby's 
well-being. The traditional wish is offered - that this child may 
grow into a life of study of Torah, of loving relationships, and 
the performance of good deeds. (reformjudaism.org) 
For boys, this ceremony takes place on the eighth day after birth, coinciding 
with the circumcision, and for girls it can be on the eighth day or thereafter. Doubly 
significant is G.H.’s own naming ceremony. Just a baby is new in the world, unaware 
and naïve, so too is G.H. in the maid’s room, completely unfamiliar with what is 
happening to her at any given moment in the text and what may come to pass. G.H. 
knows her destiny, she says, but her greatest tragedy or adventure lies waiting. She 
names herself in her own ceremony and the name itself reflects new beginnings of 
unknown adventure. 
It is true that naming ceremonies are not unique to Jewish culture. In relation 
to what has just been presented, however, I do not believe this not is a coincidence. 
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Lispector belongs to a Jewish family; Jewish babies are named on the eighth day (or 
after), “G” and “H” and the seventh and eighth days letters of the alphabet; and 
finally, the passage of the novel described is, in my view, a ritual enacted to bestow a 
name. I believe it can be reasonably argued, given Lispector’s penchant for semantic 
complexities, that this mere encounter with a luggage tag is, in fact, a naming 
ceremony key to the plot of the novel. 
CIXOUS’S LISPECTOR 
In the following section, I will address how Cixous read Lispector in an effort 
to gauge what aspects of feminism speak to the evidence of mysticality. As argued 
above, it is paramount that this “naming” occurs first. The sequence of events occurs 
as such: 1) Naming of G.H., 2) Observation of “self” in charcoal drawing, 3) 
Interaction with cockroach, and 4) Understanding of self. G.H.’s adventure leads her 
down a path that, while inducing vertigo in the reader, is actually quite systematic. 
There is a purpose and a plan, though G.H., like the reader, becomes dizzied in the 
vehicle on the bumpy, switch-backed road leading her there. It is my belief that all of 
these techniques (and the order in which they are presented) serve to highlight my 
reading of mysticality. In order to further understand the significance of these 
systematic events permitting a reading of mysticality, I turn to Cixous. Cixous was an 
avid reader of Lispector, writing several books about her work, one of which I will 
highlight here, Reading with Clarice Lispector (1990). It is significant to note that 
Cixous never wrote a specific study about G.H., though she references it often in her 
analysis of Lispector’s other novels and short stories.37 Verena Adnermatt Conley, 
                                                        
37Given Cixous’s works’s importance to this dissertation, I would be remiss in not addressing the way 
she read Lispector’s novels and short stories. Any comments I make in linking Cixous to G.H. are my 
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editor and translator of Cixous’s Reading with Clarice Lispector, speaks overtly about 
the way Cixous reads Lispector as a female writer: 
In the relation that Cixous holds with Lispector, écriture 
feminine is a working term referring less to a writing practiced 
mainly by women than, in a broader logical category, to textual 
ways of spending. It suggests a writing, based on an encounter 
with another—bit it a body, a piece of writing, a social 
dilemma, a moment of passion—that leads to an undoing of the 
hierarchies and oppositions that determine the limits of most 
conscious life. (Conley xii) 
Certainly Lispector’s G.H. has an encounter with an “other” (many of such 
“others” surface during the course of the narration) and Cixous’s “undoing of 
hierarchies” is transparent, I argue, in the transgressions performed by G.H. in 
dealing with these “others.” It is true that both Lispector and her protagonist are 
female, but it is more the sense of unraveling a status quo of emplotment and 
narrative that permit Lispector’s G.H. to fall within écriture feminine.  
Cixous discusses the journey in G.H. “in proximity to a vital experience”; here, 
referencing I believe her earlier suggestions that both the gestational journey and 
destination are one in the same. Cixous posits that G.H., “progressed orthogonally, 
step by step, chapter, by chapter. The trajectory went from self to cockroach. A 
space of perhaps three yards had to be covered. Three yards divided into a 
multiplicity of tiny movements of thought that are inscribed slowly, minutely in the 
text. The book has time to develop between the moment when Clarice opens the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
own suppositions to strengthen my argument, and I carefully choose moments where Cixous 
specifically addresses G.H. 
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door to the room where she had first seen the cockroach and the final moment when 
something is happening between her and the insect" (109). 
Cixous compares G.H. to “O ovo e a galinha” (1975, first published “A legião 
estrangeira”) suggesting that “instead of the slow mobility [in G.H.]” that the story 
exemplifies some order of gravitational pull: “it gravitates and gravidates. Let the 
egg be! It engenders a text that is written in a system of phrases, a linking of 
phrases, which turn around this little essential object” (110). As I have discussed, 
there is a systematic movement through stages of expression (naming, drawing, 
cockroach), but the way of arriving to each stage is anything but orthodox slow 
mobility. It is hindered mobility, certainly, but I believe the manner in which G.H. 
questions herself, and the reader, wondering aloud what the consequences of such 
questions might be, offers a dense and complex experience for the reader. While G.H. 
might not be a system of phrases like “O ovo”, it is indeed a series-system of 
thoughts, which pivots on the axis of G.H., the novel's “essential little object.” 
Thus, I deem G.H.’s “essential little object” to be this series-system of 
thoughts. And therefore the developmental, systematic thought processes that the 
reader witnesses as the emplotment. However, the reader must let go of this 
hierarchy of novelistic structure forcing an understanding that a “beginning, middle, 
and end” to a narration must necessarily be linear in an anticipated manner. Cixous 
remarks on the structure of G.H.: “It is the same process of incessant leaping [as in 
“A Maça no Escuro” (1961)], of letting go of the border, that traces the path of love in 
The Passion according to G.H….it is not a state of being, but a path that is not 
following step by step but leap by leap, always from one extremity to another, and 
always into the unknown, into the void. The goal is the movement toward, not the 
arrival" (77). As I have argued previously, both the reader and G.H., the protagonist, 
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are essential to one another; without one the other fails in his/her practice. The 
reader does encounter a border: that of the text itself and the confines of the 
narrative—we know only what G.H. chooses to tell us. Yet, as Cixous asserts, the 
reader must be willing to forgo the expectation of what a border will produce. The 
journey toward G.H., not the arrival to her is what should matter to the reader, and 
arguably, what Cixous believes Lispector intended to happen. 
Lastly, Cixous makes interesting remarks with regard to how G.H. should be 
read on a macro-level by looking at the micro-level techniques with which it was 
created, “[o]ne has to reread The Passion According to G.H., or Kierkegaard’s Fear 
and Trembling, in which a single thought is being developed in three hundred pages. 
What can happen, by chance, is the moment of encounter between oneself, a space 
capable of thought, and something else. It produces a vibration. If one has been 
receptive, that is where one can begin to work, at the very point of impact” (163). In 
describing the “self” as a space capable of thought, Cixous extends the means of 
interpretation for the self indeed. The space of G.H.’s maid’s room, just like the space 
of the self become fused together. At this point of fusion a “vibration” is produced 
that reverberates throughout the whole narration, and the reader rides the wave to 
Lispector’s chosen end: “A vida se me é, e eu não entendo o que digo. E então adoro-- 
-- -- -- -- --" (Lispector 175). Her ending declares her own suspicion the previous 175 
pages might have been her erring, for naught. Regardless, though, she loves. As we 
know Lispector values writing, family, and love above all else, it is difficult to 
wrestle too much with G.H.’s conclusion. And finally, Cixous concludes that G.H., “…is 
a difficult text, written at the point of reversal of contradiction; and, of course, 
language only wants to say one thing at once. Language wants to go straight. To 
force it to produce ambiguous statements requires extraordinary strength and 
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labor. It is precise, minute work that requires a lot of time” (163). I will now 
examine the effects of punctuation and syntax to seek the textual manifestations of 
Lispector’s wrestling with language and whether or not she manages it to “go 
straight.”  
ELEMENT 1: PUNCTUATION AS A MEANS OF MYSTICALITY 
In this section I will discuss the more meta-linguistic aspects of Lispector's 
work, specifically commenting on syntax and anacoluthon (a construction that lacks 
grammatical sequence) as well as what it means to be considered “lyrical prose.” 
The purpose of this section is to suggest that lyrical prose as written by Lispector 
foments a reading for mysticality in that sentences and sentence structure lend 
themselves to suitable mysticalist interpretation. 
What is the difference between the poetization of prose verses the 
prosification of poetics? Broadly, lyrical prose exhibits characteristics of linguistic 
inventiveness, remaining a text in prose form, but containing elements that feel 
poetic, e.g. non-linear or ambiguous (in terms of narrative or plot structure) to the 
reader. Robert Pickering, in his analysis of early twentieth-century French poet-
philosopher Paul Valéry’s “Cahiers” (1894-1914), discuses the limits of self-
expression. Just because an author employs lyrical prose, “[a]mbiguity, however, 
does not equate in the lyrical prose to vagueness of intention and response” 
(Pickering 40). As Lispector's novel is titled a “romance” (i.e., a novel), I choose the 
notion “poetization of prose” based solely on the author's suggestion that the 
narration is, in fact, a novel, though it is important to note the difference. Pickering 
explains, citing Valéry, “[i]n effect, at the basis of the poetic prose there lies a 
principle of communication based on notions of lyrical potential, rather than poetic 
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materialization: “Ou cesse l’expression, mais non le besoin d’exprimer, la commence 
(par definition) la Mystique […]” (Pickering 40, Valéry XXII 351). The potentiality of 
something lyrical, says Pickering, weighs more than the manifestation of something 
poetic in lyrical prose. Thus, the mere possibility of an aesthetic, expressive quality 
in the work equates to lyrical prose. Interestingly, he also chooses the word 
“mystique,” indicating that in the cessation of expression, mystique begins. Mystique 
or mystery, as I have discussed in Lispector’s protagonist, drives the expression. By 
way of Valéry, Pickering details this idea further: 
The impulse to expression which precedes languages, 
moreover, is poetic in its own right, since never actually 
circumscribed in any one particular form. Plurality and 
ambiguity are the touchstones of poetry: beside the 
homogeneity of intention underlying prose, poetry by its very 
nature avoids clarity and statement, opting for heterogeneity 
of expressive means and effect. (40)38 
Therefore, I conclude that this goal of “expressive means and effect” so 
endemic to poetry is what makes the “lyrical” in “lyrical prose.” For a meta-linguistic 
analysis, particularly of punctuation and its effects, I am interested in the negative 
space it creates in the lyrical prose of Lispector. Valéry believes the “état du manque 
de mots” (the state of lacking words) due to “inexprimabilité” (the unexpressable) 
engenders meaning. Valéry explains: 
                                                        
38Personally, I disagree with the notion of prose=homogeneity and poetry=heterogeneity. I believe 
that poetry can certainly boast a “statement”, in contrast the Valéry’s indications that it avoids a 
statement in the way logic, philosophy, or positivist discourse does. In fact, my dissertation has 
served to prove exactly the opposite. However, for purpose of sussing out the difference between 
lyrical prose (poetization of prose) and prose poems (prosification of poems), I think it important to 
lay a framework for the rest of this chapter. 
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Inexprimabilités signifie non qu’il n’ya ait pas des 
expressions—mais que toutes les expressions sont incapables 
de resituer ce qui les excite—et que nous avons le sentiment de 
cette incapacité ou irrationalité comme de véritables 
propriétés de la chose-cause. (XVIII, 350/OCI 374)39 
The problem is not that there is no manner in which to express oneself, as 
Valéry suggests, but rather the fact that our expressions simply lack the capacity to 
constitute what they were meant to communicate in the first place. As such, poetic 
authors (Lispector) search for a vehicle by which to express this negative linguistic 
space, and it turns out to be lyrical prose. Thus, the ultimate linguistic deficiency to 
signify such negative space is silence. And textually, silence is exemplified by myriad 
methods of punctuation (dashes, commas, empty space, and so on). As such, as 
Pickering agrees, this deficiency “acquires a peculiarly positive meaning, as 
something desirable in the tentative groping towards as complete participation as 
possible in existence” (41). I will now examine the ways in which Lispector uses 
punctuation and syntactical strategy to achieve negative space, silence, and 
ultimately lyrical expression. 
In G.H. the reader first “meets” the narrative by a massive leap into the text, 
indicated by a series of six dashes without any preceding words. Similarly, the 
reader must brusquely exit the text in the exact same manner: six dashes leading to 
nothing. The reader enters and exits the text in medias res, sans exposition, 
decontextualized, and alone (being the first-person without an obvious dialogic 
interlocutor): 
  -- -- -- -- -- -- estou procurando, estou procurando (7). 
                                                        
39  All words in italics are Valéry’s own emphasis. 
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A vida se me é, e eu nao entendo o que digo. E então adoro. -- -- 
-- -- -- -- (175). 
Lispector is well-known for rupturing regulatory grammatical regimes. In 
her description of Lispector's short story, “O ovo e a galinha” (1975) Cixous 
describes the writing as, “The sentences are short. They are here one after the other, 
in a paratactical model, without coordination, without subordination…. Here we 
proceed by leaps, without coordination” (110). G.H. differs from the aforementioned 
story, but I argue that the paratactical model is still at play. Lispector intersperses 
short sentences with rhetorical apostrophe, together with repetitive syntactical 
structures and longer, stream-of-conscious paragraphs. The parataxis manifests 
itself as the previously mentioned “series-system of thoughts”, thus a kind of 
semantic interpretation on a syntactical mechanism. Cixous presents why Lispector 
chooses the dashes: “Clarice does not say: ‘I leap.’ She performs it in a moment when 
she literally cannot use words…. What comes about in terms of punctuation shows 
that it is a text of silence. To make a space for this silence is an infinite art and…is 
made through the art of typography, through paginal setting, through the space of 
paragraphs” (70). Presenting G.H. as a “text of silence” in its entirety is rich for 
commentary, but certainly the lack of dialogue between characters and relative 
deficiency of action signal a certain amount of “silence.”  Arguably, Lispector defies 
even the category of silence, proposing a new conceptualization of what it means to 
write silence into a text. Cixous’s point is that Lispector employs writing strategies 
that express the incompleteness of a story and moments of narrative paucity in 
which words would suggest a false sense of fullness or plenitude of meaning. Here I 
believe this is precisely how Lispector invites the reader, of fully-formed soul (“alma 
já formada”), to leap into the text. The text begins with six dashes, implying much 
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more than a leap. It is a leap of faith, into the unknown. Perhaps, it is a leap more 
than words on a page can permit, and hence, the extensive use of dashes to imply 
something extra-textual.  
Further, the use of the present progressive (“procurando”) suggests the 
protagonist is actively involved in a process, to which the reader has just become 
witness. If the narrative voice is “trying” or “attempting” as she suggests, what 
precisely is being searched for? Waldman explains this search:  
Entre eles [the six dashes], a narrativa que aponta para uma 
busca (as palavras iniciais são)…mas que so dobra para o 
retorno, se bem que o ponto de chegada nao é propriamente ao 
ponto de partida. O texto inicia quando a personagem está 
retornando do distanciamento prolongado que a tinha isolado 
de sua experiência de vida anterior, quando já se tinha desfeito 
a ruptura que a tinha separado do mundo e que vai ser 
narrada. (Waldman 52) 
Stephanie Sweet describes Lispector's mobilization of another technique, the 
anacoluthon, to signify another type of lapse in the logical flow of a sentence. Sweet 
explains, citing Cixous, “In commenting on 'E para lá que eu vou' Cixous says, 'There 
is a displacement, from border to border, from relay to relay. But we do not enter 
because we stay at the edge of the circle. I read it as a jump, as an anacoluthon, or a 
break of classical construction” (Reading Clarice 74). Arguably, everything from 
syntax to thematics are a “break of classical construction,” but it is the punctuation, 
in particular, that heralds what Sweet calls “rhetorically sanctioned breaks.” Such 
breaks, or breakdowns, of language are indeed sanctioned by G.H. herself. She 
constantly encircles her own story, removing herself, becoming conscious of her 
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role as narrator, making the reader aware of the “meta-text.” Caufield argues 
similarly: 
G.H. alternates between “confessing” to this constructed other 
and stepping out of her own story and acknowledging what she 
is doing: 'But I am afraid to start writing to be understood by 
that imaginary someone, I'm afraid I'll start 'making' a sense, 
with the same meek madness that up to yesterday was my 
'healthy' way of fitting into a system. Will I have to have the 
courage to use an undefended heart and go on speaking to 
nothing and no one? (Caufield 404). 
Lispector's use of quotations to indicate uncertainty or figurativeness implies 
that the reader must accept multifarious possibilities of meaning. What does 
“making sense mean”? Or specifically, what does it mean to G.H.? The quotation 
marks around “healthy” call into question G.H.'s entire cosmovision up until her 
experience in the room. She wonders if everything she has accepted as standard or 
“healthy” is perhaps thwarted or “other” now that she lives on the other side of the 
experience. G.H. additionally recognizes the “system” into which she fits (or formally 
did, pre-experience). I posit that G.H.'s newly-minted “series-system of thoughts” 
overtakes her prior conception of her life; and as such, she transforms this system 
herself.    
Another such anacoluthon, is also considered when G.H. apostrophically 
directs herself toward the reader, “Dá-me a tua mão:” (94). G.H. three times 
commands the reader as such at the close of the prior chapter, where she has never 
previously spoken to the outsider so directly, in grammatical command form. She 
first supplicates, “Não me abandones nesta hora, não me dexes tomar sozinha esta 
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decisão já tomada” (93). She does not know what to do with the cockroach. She then 
reaches to the reader to shed light, to explain what has happened, to explain why, to 
assure G.H. that she still persists: 
--Dá-me a tua mão. Porque não sei mais do que estou falando.  
 Acho que inventei tudo, nada disso existiu! Mas se inventei o  
que ontem me aconteceu—quem me garante que também não 
inventei toda a minha vida anterior a ontem?  
 
Dá-me a tua mão: (93). 
G.H. leads herself from one existential question to another. If she insists first 
that she has invented this story, then who is to say that everything up until the 
experience wasn't also fabricated? Her experiences cause the signifier to flee the 
signified; her only respite is to look outside the text to a voice, her “imaginary 
person,” to help maintain focus. G.H. represents the transcendent to which it refers, 
making the extra-diegetic reader effectually diegetic, necessary.  Caufield argues, 
“[t]he transcendent reference is intricately woven into the textual strategy: the 
narrating ‘I’ requests: “give me your anonymous hand” (505). The text is ostensibly 
G.H. attempting to explain her experience to an unknowable reader. In this literary 
structure, the reader functions as G.H.'s sought-after (silent) dialogue partner; the 
ineffable (to G.H.) reader assumes the role of transcendent referent for the 
protagonist. Thus, in confessional study, the reader has a role within the diegetic 
world: to be the receptor of G.H.'s story in addressing the reader in this way, “the 
narrating 'I' creates an ineffable—yet actually existing—other” (506).   
Toward the end of the novel, however, G.H. comes to realize that a reality 
inside or outside the text, is ultimately rooted in language, a mystical rhetoric to 
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support her experience:  “A realidade é a matéria-prima, a linguagem é o modo 
como vou buscá-la—e como não acho. Mas é do buscar e não achar que nasce o que 
eu não conheçia, e que instataneamente reconheço. A linguagem é o meu esforço 
humano” (A paixão 172). G.H. recognizes the necessary limitations of her own 
language, her own “human effort,” as well as the role of the outsider. Now, I turn to 
how she uses this language to speak mystically about her experiences.  
ELEMENT 2: SEMANTIC PARADOX: CONTRADICTIONS IN TEXT 
In G.H. there is continuity in non-conformity. Lispector begins each chapter 
as previous one ends, literally repeating the entire sentence/phrase at the beginning 
of the chapter that concluded the previous one. The entirety of the plot takes place 
in one room, in the space of three yards at Cixous's estimation; yet, this confined 
space in a familiar place (her home) is an unknown space. The unexpected paradox 
is anticipated. In the section that follows I will analyze specific instances of 
“contradictions-in-text” that draw together the narrative in such a way that the 
impurity and asymmetry are ripe breeding grounds for expression in mysticality. 
1. THE ROOM AND THE DRAWING 
 
Like Muñiz-Huberman, Lispector examines the process of naming, yet the 
resolution to such a process is to transgress it rather then accept its intrinsic value 
as just a name belonging to an object. I argue that the transgression of a name is 
mysticalist—G.H. is seeking some name beyond a name. Ultimately, the odd 
otherness within G.H. relates to her suspicion that an unknowable God is rooted in 
all lived experience (including the drawing on the wall as I will point out). If God 
represents that which is unknown, then this room for G.H. is an unanticipated 
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unknown and her attempt to know it is the utmost transgression.  
For this sequence of events to occur, G.H. first decides to clean her apartment 
and begins with her maid’s quarters, a space she has never before visited. When she 
enters, G.H. encounters a charcoal drawing on the wall of a man, woman, and a dog. 
This first contact with that which is unknown to her is unsettling to her core and she 
dislikes the experience. Why does she react so negatively to her own portrait? I 
argue that this is the first experience (and the first push in this journey) where she 
sees herself as the “other.” This room in her apartment, ostensibly, belongs to her in 
the way that legal documents permit one possession of a home. Yet, symbolically, it 
is not hers. It is not even familiar to her. Here begins her journey; she experiences 
the nascent disavowal, where she observes and scrutinizes herself as an outsider, as 
something to be detected and evaluated. The transgression lies in her attempt to 
nominally appropriate the space that does not belong to her.40 It is unfamiliar and 
unknowable because of this new perspective of “other”. Thus, the nominal 
appropriation is forbidden, just when she explains, “É proibido dizer o nome da 
vida” (12). G.H. is capable of the recognition of this unknown abyss but she cannot 
resist the temptation to trespass this threshold. This transgression fundamentally 
speaks to the Jewish paradigm because she asks how to name something she cannot 
name; in Kabbalah, Ein Sof, or the name of God, means the “nameless being,” 
implying infinity and unknowability. The disavowal is furthered in that G.H. 
endeavors to recuperate the non-ostensive referent, that is, the oblivion. She is 
attempting to archive what happened to her the day before yet with no memory of it 
whatsoever. This pursuit to reconcile this abyss, this unknown, speaks forcefully to 
the Jewish paradigm of knowing and (necessarily) accepting the unknowability of 
                                                        
40See the earlier part of this chapter where I discuss the idea of “naming” as central to my analysis. 
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God (the Great Unknowable). Here, we see Lispector’s innovative literary art where 
she establishes a clear ostensive referent but thwarts it and moves to defy it. 
This room G.H. occupies for the entirety of the novel is transformed from the 
physical place that contains her to the mystical dimension Borgesian Aleph where 
time and space are limitless.41 G.H. evokes the desert often during her internal 
struggle in this room and Lispector writes “desert” frequently in the novel. Does this 
room transform into the desert, as a place traditionally described as one of 
purification, emptiness, self-search and ultimately the place of revelation of God? It 
is trope that is significant for Jews. Likewise, Jacobo Fijman discusses his madness 
(and it is fitting as Lispector also suffered from debilitating depression) as “el 
camino más alto, más desierto”; so there exists this contemplative state that 
accompanies the desert imaginary. I argue that while the desert is referenced in G.H. 
often it does not necessarily come to represent that physical space of aimless 
movement in which the Wandering Jew finds himself throughout history. G.H. does 
find herself in a desert, symbolically, in that she searches for what it is that she 
searches for, a paradoxical Jewish question. However, what she finds is ultimately 
herself, represented by the cockroach, and an understanding of the term “paixão.”   
In the room, G.H. contemplates the charcoal drawing of a man, woman, and 
dog: “as três não formavam um grupo” (35). G.H. describes a drawing of three 
individuals (two persons and a canine), potentially representing her family, yet 
insists that they are unrelated, so much so that even three individuals appearing 
together on a visual surface do not constitute a group. All evidence, as humans are 
meant to perceive drawings, even those dating to the earliest of human knowledge, 
                                                        
41 Again, the notion of the aleph comes from Jorge Luis Borges’s collection of short stories “Ficciones”. 
One story, titled “Aleph” describes an encounter a man has with a concentration of energy that 
simultaneously contains all of time and space.  
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suggest that images of people together indicate relation of some kind, a grouping, 
potentially kinship. But G.H. not only defies seeing a visual link between them 
“nenhuma figura tinha ligação com a outra,” she presupposes that they themselves 
are sentient beings and are rendered incapable of mutual recognition. Caufield 
argues that this space of the maid's room where the drawing is encountered is a 
“container” where G.H.'s spiritual journey takes place. In confronting the cockroach, 
Caufield argues, “the physical container of the room is transgressed, becoming 
boundless, like a Borgesian aleph—...[t]he “reality” of physical space is transformed 
into the reality of mystical place in the present of narrative time where all place and 
time converge” (503). I fully support the notion that the maid's room is a 
transformed space, as G.H. herself describes it as “livre flutuando acima de uma 
extensão ilimitada” (Lispector 30). Description as an aleph is apropos as well, in that 
G.H.'s transformative experience occurs in this single space. However, to label such a 
space as additionally mystical is somewhat problematic. In the Judeo-Christian 
sense of what is mystical, either persons or texts can be described as such, but a 
physical location cannot bear markers of mysticism. It is a person that interprets a 
text as mystical or practices in meditation to achieve a mystical union with God. As 
would follow, the spaces they occupy during these events might be special or sacred, 
but the space loses meaning without the experiencer/believer to bestow it. Thus, I 
argue that the drawings, much like the wall and room in which they are contained, 
are not a mystical spot, in situ. The room and the portrait would not have garnered 
significance, mystical or otherwise, had G.H. not entered it or viewed it to begin 
with. It is G.H., together with her reader, that ascribe meaning. And as G.H. is our 
narrator, she confesses to us. And perhaps we, the reader, are the fiction created by 
G.H’s storyline. In fact, it might be possible that we exist apostrophically for G.H. in 
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place of a transcendent being—perhaps G.H. addresses an “external” voice, hoping 
that it is divine and instead finds the reader. And likewise, her experience comes to 
being through her own narration of it, describing the events of the day prior, a very 
casual, quotidian consideration. She vacillates between supplicating the reader in 
clear apostrophe, and then textually leaping from the text to look back at her 
words/actions, questioning them, as if she were an alternate version of herself: “Até 
agora achar-me era já ter uma idéia de pessoa e nela me engastar: nessa pessoa 
organizada eu me encarvaba, e nem mesmo sentia o grande esforço de construição 
que era viver. A idéia que eu fazia de pessoa vinha de nimha terceira perna, daquela 
que me plantava no chao. Mas, e agora? Estarei mais livre? (Lispector 8). Caufield 
goes on, “G.H. does not feel awed by this glimpse of the Holy. She feels irritated, 
notes that the room physically bothers her, that she detests the room and view it 
with repulsion and despair” (503). The unsettled unfamiliarity with the space 
engenders the experience-to-come; it does not itself represent the “Holy.” Hence, the 
unfolding events of the cockroach sequence express mysticality because G.H. uses 
language via Lispector using writing. The room itself is not mystical until G.H. moves 
through her transformative experience. 
2. THE COCKROACH 
 
In the middle of this journey, in G.H.’s contemplation of her meaning in this 
unknown, lifeless space, the antithesis of the desert appears: life. A cockroach 
emerges and it is living, breathing, moist. Most importantly, it is organic life material 
that cuts through the dryness and inexpressive state experienced in the maid’s 
room. If this desert trope were orthodox Jewish/mystical, the cockroach would 
come to represent God, as God should be the only life form manifest in the desert. 
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But I am more interested in G.H.’s relationship to the cockroach. At the same time, 
the cockroach is G.H. herself. She examines it, just as she examined her “self’s” 
charcoal drawing, and chooses to violate the natural law of the desert trope and eat 
it. She squishes the cockroach with the edge of the wardrobe and observes as its 
innards, its insides, ooze out. Just as she has entered a space that is inside her home, 
within the confines of what she knows, the maid’s room represents the innards of 
her psyche, what she does not know, that only manifest when transgressed (killed). 
The cockroach is G.H. and she even shocks herself at this self-revelation; stupefied 
she questions what she has done to herself. G.H. reveals that which codifies and 
fabricates G.H. herself and in consuming its material, finally appropriates that which 
is unknown to her.     
After first confronting the cockroach, G.H. remembers her childhood, 
recalling that “percevejos, goteiras, baratas e ratos,” era de cómo um [seu] pasado 
pré-histórico, [ela] já havia vivido com os primeiros bichos da terra” (44). The 
cockroach is like a fossilized fish, so old in fact that it is akin to mythical creators like 
griffins, chimeras, and “leviatas” (51).42 G.H. believes the cockroach to be 
anachronistic. Culturally, the cockroach is known for its ability to survive 
catastrophic events and is well-known for its resilience, dating back to the 
Carboniferous period about 320 million years ago. But G.H.’s cockroach is more than 
just a pest. Paradoxically, it is human; she describes its face and eyes, its mouth, 
gaping open. She contradicts everything culturally known about cockroaches and 
does not just personify it, she humanizes it. G.H. details her existence as a child as 
                                                        
42It seems that leviatas in Portuguese reveals a monstrous creature that is capable of possession and 
metamorphosis. In Anglo-culture it is often equated with “Leviathan,” most often represented as a 
sea monster. Regardless, its origins are in the Hebrew Bible.  
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both contemporary and pre-historic in her thought process concerning the 
cockroach. It is a semantic anachronism.  
In her intense and thoughtful consideration of the cockroach, with her full 
energy focused on its location, meaning, and lifespan, G.H. simultaneously considers 
every expectation/concern she herself has ever experienced. She simultaneously 
focuses fully on something else while opening up her psyche to exploration, a 
presumed paradox. G.H. explains:  
Fiqui imóvel, calculando desordenadamente. Estava atenta, eu 
estava toda atenta. Em mim um sentimento de grande espera 
havia crescido, e uma resignação surpreendida: e que nesta 
espera atenta eu reconheçia todas as minhas esperas 
anteriores, eu reconheçia a atenção de que também antes 
vivera, a atenção que nunca me abandona e que em última 
análise talvez seja a coisa mais colada a minha vida… (47). 
In the singular breath of intensity on a singular item, the cockroach, G.H. 
finds the capacity to consider every other fear she has ever faced. I find it useful 
here to momentarily consider G.H.’s problematic in psychoanalytic terms. Perhaps 
her ego is functioning in overdrive to mediate what the superego observes (the 
cockroach) and must reconcile and the id (G.H.'s involuntary past, incumbently in 
the background). Regardless, G.H. at this moment becomes omnipotent in her 
psychological ability, occupying all of her own time-space in a single instant. In 
describing this feeling, G.H. submits to the vastness of her identity, the previously 
unknown pathways that transverse it, “[e] que eu olhara a barata viva e nela 
descobria a identidade de minha vida mais profunda. Em dorrocada difícil, abriam-
se dentro de mim passagens duras e estreitas” (53).  
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And the cockroach itself is a paradox. It is feminized in a variety of ways, 
when G.H. knows nothing of the cockroach's sex. In Portuguese the word barata is 
feminine, so this element is somewhat inconsequential. But Lispector chose it, when 
any number of other household pests were available, such as mosquitoes, ants, or 
rats. And barata’s significance is manifold depending on the region in Brazil: 
cockroach is universal, but other definitions include an elderly woman who 
frequents church, a girl who has lost her virginity, and a vulgar word for vagina. It 
would be nearly impossible to insist that Lispector intended for all of these uses to 
be contemplated at every turn that barata appears in the text. What is clear, 
however, is Lispector’s clear mastery of double and even triple entendre, as is 
evident by all the scholarship dedicated to determining the implication of Jewish 
allusions in her work. Thus, in collective consideration of the multiple feminine 
associations of the word barata, I turn toward an analysis of the cockroach’s 
eyelashes in particular. 
G.H.’s description of the cockroach is thorough, to say the least. The reader 
learns of the cockroach’s emotional state, of her physical features, of her insides 
(when G.H. describes the process of innards becoming exterior), and particularly of 
the effect her eyelashes:    
A barata é pura sedução, Cílios, cílios pestanejando que 
chamam. Também eu, que aos poucos estava me reduzindo ao 
que em mim era irredutível, também eu tinha milhares de 
cílios pestanejando, e como meus cílios eu avanço, eu 
protozoária, proteína pura. Segura minha mão, cheguei ao 
irredutível com a fatalidade de um dobre—sinto que tudo isso 
é antigo e amplo, sinto no hieróglifo da barata lenta a fragia do 
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Extremo Oriente. (56-7) 
Undeniably associated with sex appeal and femininity, eyelashes are meant 
to seduce. And the cockroach’s do not disappoint. They beckon G.H. (chamam), 
batting themselves, turning the cockroach, in its entirety, into “pure seduction.” 
Lispector transforms an ideal of feminine beauty on its head, evoking here the best 
of Cixous’s écriture feminine, the subversion of gendered hierarchies. Marta Peixoto 
discusses Lispector’s many works in reference to gender and violence, and I cite her, 
“[c]hallenging limits and courting excess, Lispector invokes a Dionysian force in her 
attempt to question and disrupt the fixity of genres of establishes genres and 
narrative forms…” (Passionate Fictions xiii). G.H.’s excess comes in the form of 
“thousands of eyelashes” situating her in antiquity, reducing her to “pure protozoan 
protein.” Eyelashes become ahistorical, no more part of a woman’s body than part of 
the evolution of life itself.  And paradoxically, the cockroach’s own eyelashes reduce, 
in G.H., what is irreducible. I argue that what is irreducible for G.H. is her definition 
of herself up until this textual moment, where she had never before considered what 
eyelashes could mean outside of shading her eyes, laced with mascara. Now, the 
implication that they are more than just facial adornments for women and markers 
of femininity requires G.H. to call into question that which she defines as G.H. G.H. 
completes her thoughts on the cockroach’s methods of seduction: 
E neste deserto de grandes seduções, as criaturas: eu e a barata 
viva. A vida, meu amor, é uma grande sedução onde tudo o que 
existe se seduz. Aquele quarto que estava deserto e por isso 
primariamente vivo. E chegara ao nada, e o nada era vivo e 
úmido. (56-7) 
G.H. equates herself with the cockroach and life and love. Thus, if the 
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cockroach is seduction, then life must be as well. I suggest that the opposite of life is 
“nada”; and G.H. labels it as alive and moist. Nothing is fixed; meaning of what is 
black and white, alive or dead, becomes interchangeable. And so, G.H. must further 
push her limitations to discover what happens when she consumes something that 
is both life’s seduction and vacancy (nada). She kills the cockroach and eats it.  
Finally, after squishing the cockroach, G.H. reveals the following about her 
synecdochic transformation: 
Eu, corpo neutro de barata, eu como uma vida que finalmente 
não me escapa pois enfim a nejo fora de mim—eu sou a barata, 
sou minha perna, sou meus cabelos, sou o trecho de luz mais 
branca no reboco da parede...os pedaços continuarão 
estremecendo e se mexendo. Sou o silencio gravado numa 
parede, e a borboleta mais antiga esvoaca e me defronta: a 
mesma de sempre. De nascer até morrer é o que eu me chamo 
de humana, e nunca propriamente morrerei. (61)  
What G.H. suggests feels to the reader to be more than a figurative or 
metaphorical transformation into the cockroach. She is both one and the same as the 
cockroach, yet bodily cockroach bits that continue to ooze out continuously 
interlace with her own: her hair, her legs. She becomes both the process and the 
product at the same time, a poiesis of physical transformation. And as a result of 
such a transformation, G.H. will never actually die. How is this possible? In 
consuming the cockroach, she has co-opted the history of the living world, not just 
of cockroaches, but butterflies too and the “silencio gravado numa parede.” The 
silence represents the humanity of the living world, her family's portrait on the wall 
that lacks meaning as unified kinship. Yet, one in the same, G.H., post-cockroach 
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communion, has become omniscient.  
G.H. further puts life and death into oppositional terms, yet simultaneously 
suggesting that they are one in the same. Such a practice, is of course, very mystical, 
as in the case with Santa Teresa.43 Although, G.H. suggests an alternative: “A vida é 
tão contínua que nós a dividimos em etapas, e a uma delas chamamos de morte” 
(61).  Humanity, she correctly points out, observes the continuity of life. But instead 
of considering progeny as the means by which to carry it forward, she believes we 
(as humanity) actually just divide the continuity of life into parts, one of which is 
death. By scientific definition, life is the opposite of death; believers of certain 
religions might suggest death is a next step, but certainly different than life itself. 
Even those that believe we are re-born still consider death as an alternate reality to 
the one a person currently lives. G.H. believes life is the overarching narrative that 
continues on forever and death is contained within that trajectory.  
GOD MANIFEST 
The last element I will consider is the presence of God in the text. I will argue 
that there is not mystical union with God, but rather with G.H.’s cosmovision of 
humanity. Finally, as the novel draws to a close, G.H. re-visits her name, this time, as 
it pertains to her conception of God, depicting how G.H. perceives humanity. G.H. 
tells the reader, “E eu também não tenho nome, e este é o meu nome. E porque me 
despersonalizo pronto de não ter o meu nome, respondo cada vez que alguém 
disser: eu” (171). The name that G.H. had so carefully considered and inspected at 
the beginning of the novel has ultimately disintegrated. Not being named is the new 
“name”; she is de- or un-personalized to such an extent that she is both an un-name 
                                                        
43Here I refer to her famous poem “Muero porque no muero” among others where she describes life 
as dying because only death permits her union with God. 
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(nothing) as well as every name (every time someone says “I”). G.H.'s journey 
through the text has proven that she represents both the process of naming as well 
as its product, an un-name, another example of Lispector's textual poiesis.  
If we consider for a moment the psychoanalysis of this naming practice in 
mystical terms, it is useful to apply Julia Kristeva's thoughts from her book This 
Incredible Need to Believe (2006). According to Kristeva, “The path of mystical belief 
plunges the ego into the id by means of a sort of sensual autoeroticism that confers a 
kind of omnipotence on the id: revelation and absence, pleasure and nothingness” 
(This Incredible Need 11). Thus, mystical language permits G.H. to revel in this 
paradox of revelation-absence and pleasure-nothingness. G.H., I argue, does not 
unite with God, nor with Christ, but rather with a new conception of and 
appreciation for herself. If she can simultaneously conceive of her ego as “G.H.” as 
well as every “I” that is ever uttered, she is united with the concept of humanity. She 
does symbolize humanity; she embodies it. And she reveals, “[e] é aceita a nossa 
condição como a única possível, já que ela é o que existe, e nâo outra. E já que vivê-la 
é a nossa paixão. A condicão humana é a paixão de Cristo” (171). It is the collective 
“condition” that is “ours” that becomes the only possibility, the only “possível 
linguagem.” And she goes on to elucidate that her natural condition, that is, the 
human condition, is equivalent to pain. We are human because we suffer. G.H. 
explainz, “Só então minha natureza é aceita, aceita com o seu suplício espantado, 
onde a dor não é alguma coisa que nos acontece, mas o que somos (171). Pain is not 
something humanity experience because it defines us—just as G.H. does not 
experience humanity, she defines it. 
Is G.H. now a disciple of Christ because her condition is humanity's, which in 
turn is also Christ's? Here Lispector uses language that speaks to a large audience, a 
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Christian audience, that will identify with a struggle that is familiar to them, one 
they have read about and believe in: that of Christ. The apostrophe she has engaged 
is a transcendental one. G.H. never explicitly ascribes to Christ's teachings, or 
suggests that she was or is Christian. She likens humanity's passion/condition to the 
suffering of Christ; a formidable metaphor with such intense implications that it is 
possible for the reader to understand the weight G.H. means to convey. Perhaps it is 
as Kristeva notes, with regard to the way secularized, modern society reacts toward 
ontotheology (that is, the ontology of God),  “the uncertainties of secularization in 
our time reopen this recurring problematic in a new way. The remains of the 
ontotheological continent...seem...more and more like laboratories of living cells 
whose exploration might allow us to clarify present aporias and impasses” (32). At a 
minimum, G.H. is aporic in the presentation of any sort of ontotheological 
questioning. G.H.'s own awareness of Brazilian society's internal conflicts are 
evident—she is unable to even deal with her own narration without reaching 
outside the text to the reader, often supplicating him/her. This reach outside the 
text is a transcendental apostrophe. Thus, I suggest that Lispector skillfully employs 
language that is theological in nature to speak to a common humanity to help her 
protagonist navigate her own ontotheology. Plus, G.H. finally reveals the 
problematic of her own voice and the language that is produces, “[m]inhas 
civilizações eram necessárias para que eu subisse a ponto de ter de onde descer. E 
exatamente através do malogro da voz que se vai pela primeira vez ouvir a própria 
mudez e a dos outros e a das coisas, e acietá-la como a possível linguagem” 
(Lispector 171). G.H. therefore must be strategic and universal in her approach.  
And finally, the consumption of the cockroach, then, must also be considered 
paradoxical. Peixoto claims, “In this tense encounter [where G.H. kills and eats the 
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cockroach] observation yields repulsion, identification, and dizzying reversals of 
relative power as the woman feels engulfed by the cockroach, which is in turn 
victimizer and victim. I think it fair to say that Lispector narrative often demands a 
victim, or conversely, that the victim demands narrative” (Passionate Fictions 82). 
G.H. as the victim of the series of events throughout the text finally succumbs, 
“[s]enti que meu rosto em pudo sorria. Ou talvez não sorrise, não sei. Eu confiava. 
Em mim? no mundo? no Deus? Na barata? Não sei (174). G.H. is sure she believes 
and trusts in something (confiava), but that something is unclear. The narrative's 
victim is G.H., who demands an outside, a humanity to trust her, and in the final 
accepting of this humanity, she finally can find a bit of happiness (sorria). To close, 
the penultimate page of narrative reveals the following baptism, “Oh, Deus, Eu me 
sentia batizada pelo mundo. Eu botara na boca a matéria de uma barata, e enfim 
realizara o ato ínfimo” (174). Based on my analysis of G.H.'s identification with and 
co-optation of humanity as her condition, she is not baptized by God, but by the 
world itself. Her respite is in humanity, which is both metonymic for herself as well 
as for every other “I” it contains. 
CONCLUSIONS 
There is no room for doubt that Lispector included myriad mystical elements 
in G.H. It is my belief that these elements are presented in such a way that mysticism 
is not the most appropriate interpretation; rather, mysticality better allows for 
Lispector’s thematic nuances and semantic contortions in her lyrical prose. G.H.’s 
naming ceremony, together with her subversion of the feminization of the 
cockroach, the paradox of God’s textual presence, and reliance on the reader all 
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permit a reading of mystical rhetoric to achieve these ends. Peixoto tells us that 
Lispector’s deft use of unusual phrases and abstract linguistic formulations evade 
rationale intelligence (Passionate Fictions xii). However, G.H. narrates the novel to 
the reader in an effort to present her own narrative rationale, making an argument 









Throughout the analyses of this dissertation I hope to have demonstrated the 
overwhelming presence of mystical language in mid-twentieth century Latin 
American poetry. Developing my notion of mysticality requires an in-depth 
examination of many authors from various countries to prove it as any sort of 
rhetorical strategy. However, I believe I have exacted several detailed, close-
readings of four Latin American authors in an effort to prove mysticality’s incidence. 
I have learned that writers favor language that is religiously charged to talk about 
events that are decidedly secular. It seems that this linguistic paradox permits 
authors to express their poetic sentiments regarding religion by way of revolution, 
identity, and nation-building. I have gleaned from my analysis that the 
environments of these writers necessarily influenced both the themes of their 
poetry/lyrical prose as well as the rhetorical structures they employed.  
The primary theoretical underpinning I have presented in this dissertation is 
María Zambrano’s notion of poiesis. Such poetic creation and expression is so 
paramount to my argument because it offers an explanation of how and why writers 
express mysticality in poetry. Zambrano constructs a philosophy of poetry by 
examining the emergence of poetry (poiesis), the crisis of the word, relations of time 
and poetics, poetry vis-a-vis ethics and history, and the poetry of Gods. Zambrano’s 
discussions of this “poetic reason” examine the exteriority of poetic words versus 
the interiority they are meant to express; the function of Zambrano’s poiesis is to 
engender this spirit as a rejection of more secular philosophy. Here, I again supply 
Zambrano's baseline definition of poiesis: 
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Apegados a cultivar discernimientos y a ahondar diferencias, 
habíamos olvidado la unidad que reside—y sostiene—en el 
fondo de todo lo que el hombre crea por la palabra. Es la 
unidad de la poiesis, expresión y creación a un mismo tiempo 
en unidad sagrada, de la cual por revelaciones sucesivas irán 
naciendo, separándose al nacer—nacimiento es siempre 
separación—la poesía en sus diferentes especies y la filosofía. 
(Algunos lugares 61)   
The poet is the person who is capable of pushing the limits of the self, 
specifically to explore these limits. “The poetic word trembles over silence, and its 
rhythm’s orbit sustains it [the poetic word]” (102). The poet does not renounce 
words or seek them out; s/he simply possesses them (Filosofía y Poesía 17). The 
poet possesses that which is in front of him/her, as much the sensual and tactile as 
well as anything that affects his/her senses. Plus, the poet has the advantage of 
drawing from his/her own dreams, their own interior ghosts, that, when mixed with 
dreams form an opened world where anything is possible (18). Is this open world of 
revelatory possibility, of uninhibited intellect and knowledge, I have demonstrated 
that the poetic word also the “beyond” of the Hegelian self-consciousness dialectic. 
In Hegel's rhetorical terms, Zambrano's poet accepts and recognizes the 
confrontation of his limits and, as such identified with the poet-self, the poetry 
being, de facto, what belongs to the self. I have presented in the previous four 
chapters that the poet's creation is also this ongoing process of “poetic being” that 
form the stages of being leading towards a full self-consciousness/creation, or 
poiesis.   
Lastly, I have also examined the idea of the poetic word as capable of 
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transcending communication, though every case, each author confronted the limits 
presented by language. I believe each author examined struggles with words and 
through this struggle mystical language is the preferred method of poetic 
expression. Zambrano’s supposition is that the poetic word generates something 
beyond the meaning of the word itself and thus transcends communication. I have 
argued that each of my authors’s work attempted some kind of transcendence. This 
notion of poiesis as a simultaneous poetic expression and creation, of being and 
becoming, is a proliferating logos, that is, a reasoning that is continuously 
burgeoning and multiplying. This germinating logos manifests in Cuba, Argentina, 
and Brazil—Zambrano’s poetic word is discovered in each of these places and I have 
argued that the poetry produced is mysticalist.   
 
The other thematic concept linking my arguments is mysticism. I have 
discussed at length the varying definitions of mysticism in early modern European 
contexts as well as contemporary Latin American texts. By using critics such as 
Hollywood and Irigaray, I examine how mysticism is an expression of and expressed 
through the body. I have argued that mysticism is imperative to my argument 
because my authors use rhetorical mysticism to express themselves poetically, and I 
have called it mysticality. In citation of a point made earlier, if a mystic is in constant 
search of a body, either through ecstatic experience or biblical exegesis, then I have 
proven that mysticality—and not necessarily mysticism—uses poetry as the 
medium by which to search for this body. I have relied on Hollywood’s notions of 
“emotional, bodily and excessive forms of mysticism” (Sensible Ecstasy 5). Because I 
argued for mysticality, insisting on the extra-mystical writing offered by my authors 
in question, then I had to consider 
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these “excessive” types of mysticism that other scholars discuss. In my argument, 
however, the end result (the poetic words) did not achieve nor propagate mystical 
thought alone. Rather, the desired side effect was political, ontological, identity-
seeking, or feminist in nature. I believe I have successfully discussed that a mystical 
literary rhetoric permits a body of written work whose tone is religious, yet not 
necessarily mystical in the traditional sense.   
I also presented the psychoanalytic review of Helene Cixous and Amy 
Hollywood in their discussion of the intersection of femininity and mysticism. As 
Hollywood observes, “Cixous's argument leads to the conclusion that mystics, in that 
they are religious, are obsessive-compulsives, whereas in that they are hysterical, 
they are artists and revolutionaries” (4). Hollywood identifies this classification as a 
“transvaluation of values,” or “a radical reversal  of the deployment of medical and 
psychoanalytic categories...” (4). While Cixous's observations are rich for 
commentary, I presented mysticality as a movement beyond this transfiguration of 
medical/psychoanalytic lexica. I hope to have proved that a (female) poet can write 
mystically without being chained to diagnoses of hysteria, religious fanaticism, or 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. All of my authors, I believe write with some 
consciousness of William James’s “mystical state.”   
The authors I have considered in Chapters Two, Three, and Four all shared 
some foundational characteristics of the mystical logos: they identify as religious or 
mystical, they write mystically in such a way that the profane is divinized—thus 
instituting Hollywood’s “transvaluation” of religious identity values.  
I have argued that Cuban authors Fina García Marruz and Cintio Vitier as well 
as Argentine Jacobo Fijman and Brazilian Clarice Lispector all perform mysticality in 
their poetics. In the case of FGM, the poet fuses the mundane and the divine, 
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avoiding what Saínz called “sterile” division in poetic fields. I describe her poetry as 
intimate and private, yet the mysticalist tendencies call apostrophically to Jesus and 
God in a way that is consumable for the reader. The origenistas aimed to “encontrar 
su unidad esencial y alcanzar entonces su verdad más profunda” (Saínz 296). Amid 
this poetic ontology, Catholicism [or Catholicity] was the methodology by which to 
achieve personal intimacy. I posited that FGM successfully writes about the 
sacramental, precisely by reflecting intimate moments and experiences outside the 
Church and its dogma, such as items of clothing, liturgical descriptions, and 
relationships of love depicted by nature. As the primary female representative of 
her literary movement in Cuba, she discussed the “phenomenon of perception” of 
being a woman writing a female heritage in her poem about Santa Teresa and Saint 
Thérèse de Liseux. I presented that FGM uses a “perceptive” female body to 
experience the phenomena of subjectivity, of experience, and of poetic embodiment.  
 
In my comparative chapter on Vitier and Fijman I discussed how their poetry 
was a testament to their faith as well as testimony to their canons (national or 
personal). Each author was a sort of “fish out of water” in his environment and 
wrote (poetically) to confront this non-conformity. For Vitier, he established his 
poetic and essayistic voice as the trumpet of Cuban identity; for Fijman, 
governmental forces often muted his voice, though he experienced beneficiary 
relationships with the Catholic writers community in Buenos Aires and the SADE 
that helped him to promulgate his work. In both cases, I have contended that their 
mysticalist poetry confirmed Zambrano’s poiesis, in that the poetic writing is 
simultaneously symptomatic of their condition and the remedy for their own 
treatment. Both writers’s poetics are exemplary of overcoming outsiderness, an 
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alienation that is endemic to their “ser” but also to their homelands that experienced 
dictatorship. Mysticality expressed via poetry was the proved way to express a new 
or "reborn" cultural identity. 
In my final chapter, I turned to Brazilian writer, Clarice Lispector and her 
“mystical” novel, which I hope to have proved exhibited mysticalist tendencies. I 
presented some of the scholarship revolving around Lispector as a Jewish writer, 
though it was my intention to prove at what points textually mysticality was 
present. To this end, Lispector depicted a series of encounters for her protagonist, 
G.H., to experience—I then examined these encounters through the lense of 
mysticality. G.H. moves through a naming ceremony, which I presented as ritualistic; 
G.H. contemplates the non-conformity of human life as represented by a family 
portrait on the wall; and finally the protagonist’s intimate “conversation” with a 
cockroach, which Lispector humanizes. I chose to analyze specifically the ways in 
which Lispector subverted traditional feminist critique by probing the meaning of 
the cockroach’s symbolism and eyelashes. Ultimately, I argued that G.H. did not 
encounter ecstatic union with God, as in a customary mystical experience. Instead, 
she was baptized by humanity and came to embody the Borgesian aleph: the 
simultaneity of time and space, an alternative version of poiesis. 
 
To conclude, there are several angles that should be examined in future 
iterations of this work in order to make it more well-rounded. Firstly, as Orígenes 
was comprised of predominantly white, male, and Catholics, issues of race must and 
should be addressed. Critics such as Duanel Díaz consider racial tensions and 
exclusions in his book Los límites del orígenismo (2005) and Palabras del transfondo 
(2009). Poets such as Nicolás Guillén, who wrote extensively about Cuban identity 
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from a racial perspective (including religious elements of santería) is well worth 
exploring. To that end, Eastern religions such as Buddhism are known to have 
influenced Orígenes writers like Lezama Lima and merit investigation. As I 
mentioned in the Introduction, I believe an argument for mysticality can be made 
for authors from Puerto Rico, Francisco Matos Paoli (1915-2000), from Argentina, 
Alejandra Pizarnik (1936-1972), and from Uruguay, Delmira Agustini (1886-1914), 
though this is not a comprehensive list. Additionally, I believe there is room for the 
examination of more lyrical prose, including that of Cuban Dulce María Loynaz’s 
novel Jardín (1951), which I intended to examine in this analysis but proved too 
much for this particular project. There are many comparative elements between 
Loynaz’s novel and Lispector’s, notably the authors’s use of domestic space as a 
portal for self-exploration. 
Finally, I would like to explore some further sub-trends that are correlated to 
this project, namely, the notions of mental illness in mystical writing, and “writing 
the life cycle.” By “writing the life cycle” I refer to how authors’s work changes 
throughout their careers, specifically taking into account what shifts occur in their 
work as they confront death (in the face of illness, potentially, or mortality 
otherwise). Questions I am interested in exploring are: How does mysticality 
present in works written toward the end of life? Does end of life alter their mystical 
rhetoric? Are there just semantic changes or also rhetorical shifts during this time? 
Questions regarding mental illness might encompass: Can mental illness be the 
catalyst for writing mysticality? Can be excluded as a reason? In what ways do 
authors rely on or refuse their mental capacities to write mystically? In short, I 
believe there are numerous avenues to explore how mysticality manifests itself, 
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Cárcano, Enzo. "God, Body and Poetry: The Inscription of Corporality in Jacobo  
 
Fijman and Héctor Viel Temperley." Perifrasis: Revista De Literatura, Teoria Y  
 
Critica 4.8 (2013): 41-55. Web. 10 Aug. 2015. 
 
Caufield, Catherine. “Clarice Lispector’s The Passion According to G.H. : Articulating  
 
an Ontology, with Recourse to Jewish Paradigms.” Studies in Religion/Sciences  
 
Religieuses.  40: 4 (2011): 497-510. Print. 
 
Cixous, Hélène. A hora de Clariece Lispector/L’heure de Clarice Lispector. Rio de  
  
Janeiro, Exodus: 1999. Print. 
 




 UP: 1991. Print. 
 
---. “Reaching the Point of Wheat, or a Portrait of the Young Artist as a Maturing  
  
Woman.” New Literary History. Johns Hopkins UP. 19:1 (1987) 1-21. Print. 
 
---. Stigmata: Escaping Texts. Routledge, London: 1998. Print. 
 
Condé, Lisa P., and Stephen M. Hart. Feminist Readings on Spanish and Latin- 
 
American Literature. Lewiston, N.Y., USA: E. Mellen, 1991. Print. 
 
De Ávila, Teresa. Las moradas: Libro de su vida. Mexico: Porrúa, 1966. Print. 
 




De Certeau, Michel. The Mystic Fable. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1992. Print. 
 




De la Cruz, Juan. Cántico Espiritual; Noche Oscura Del Alma; Llama De Amor Viva;  
 
Poemas. Ed. Miguel Rocabruna. Barcelona: Associació De Bibliòfils De  
 
Barcelona, 2008. Print. 
 
De Sant’Anna, Affonso. “O ritual epifanico do texto.” Vieira, Nelson. Jewish Voices in  
 
Brazilian Literature: A Prophetic Discourse of Alterity. Gainesville: U of  
 
Florida, 1995. Print. 
 
Díaz-Infante, Duanel. Hasta Sus últimas Consecuencias: Dialécticas De La Revolución  
  
Cubana. Diss. Princeton U, 2012. Princeton: Princeton Univeristy, 2012. Print. 
 




---. Palabras Del Trasfondo: Intelectuales, Literatura E Ideología En La Revolución  
 
 Cubana. Madrid: Editorial Colibrí, 2009. Print. 
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